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ARMY MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS: 







The U.S. Army must maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the documents that 
facilitate successful materiel requirements generation for the warfighter.  Throughout the 
last decade, incremental modifications to policies and procedures have resulted in 
changes to the mandatory materiel requirement documents.  These incessant changes 
have forced continuous revisions to the requirements generation process and materiel 
requirements documents over the last decade.  Consequently, many factors are 
constraining the future of the Army’s requirements generation process as the Global War 
on Terror comes to a close.  This project examines the benefits and shortfalls of past and 
present materiel requirements documents.  It examines these requirements documents 
based on their efficiency and effectiveness for key stakeholders.  The project also weighs 
these documents against current initiatives for best practices in the DoD.  Subsequently, a 
comparative analysis is performed on requirement documents for three ground vehicles 
that have been either produced or projected for production.  Recommendations for 
changes to future requirements documents are presented.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overarching synopsis of this project.  
We accomplish this by summarizing the history and evolution of the current materiel 
requirements documents, identifying the primary research question and supporting 
questions, describing the scope of the project and the summarized research methodology, 
and outlining the organization of this project.  Our objective in this chapter is to clearly 
define the intent of this project and the strategy to answer the research questions. 
A. PREFACE 
The Army’s requirements generation process (RGP) has undergone multiple 
evolutionary changes since the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  These 
changes have resulted from many different causes.  First, the National Security Strategies 
(NSS) over the past decade have dictated many incremental changes to the process and 
documents that support the process.  Second, there have been organizational changes in 
the Army’s structure and formation.  Third, there have been ongoing initiatives for 
improvements and enhancements to streamline processes.  Fourth, there have been shifts 
in the holistic mentality of the Department of Defense (DoD) to become more joint and 
unified between each of the Services.  Furthermore, there continue to be changes to the 
existing RGP perpetuated by the government as adaptations are made in response to ever-
changing worldwide threats. 
The United States (U.S.) Joint Forces have persistently revised their materiel 
requirements to meet the urgent needs of warfighters and to fulfill capability gaps.  Prior 
to the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), each branch of 
Service possessed its own unique system to validate materiel requirements and the 
acquisition process used to interface with requirements and the associated documents.  
The Army’s process had been very bottom-up driven.  The Army’s training schools 
identified the warfighters’ need, and Army Headquarters (HQ) would acquire those 
validated needs.  After 2003, a new mindset began to take precedence within the Joint 
Staff and Combatant Commands.  An emphasis on joint thinking became a necessity 
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across the defense community.  The requirements generation process had to be top-down 
driven in order to fully embrace joint thinking.  By switching to top-down direction, the 
Joint Staff and Combatant Commands created greater oversight, which provides 
commonality across the Services.  This top-down flow ensures clearly communicated 
strategic guidance and concept of operations (CONOPS).  The approach for top-down 
thinking is depicted in Figure 1.  Nevertheless, the implementation of change would 
prove to be challenging and defining the most efficient process would be an arduous task. 
 
Figure 1.  Top-Down Approach for Capability Needs (From CJCS, 2007, p. A-3) 
1. The Past 
In October 2001, the U.S. began combat operations in Afghanistan in response to 
the 9/11 attacks.  Years later, in May 2003, the U.S. committed to its second combat front 
in Iraq.  As with any war, the enemies began augmenting their tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) based on observed actions of the people they were fighting.  Change 
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of their TTPs drove the U.S. warfighters’ demand for enhanced equipment to assist in 
neutralizing and defeating the enemy’s new TTPs.  The Army had to respond with full 
force and vigilant tenacity.  The Army, as well as the whole DoD community, had to 
drastically evolve their RGP in order to meet the needs of the warfighters.  By order of 
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army shifted from its own requirements 
generation system (RGS) and transitioned to the DoD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System.  As a result, the materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) used in 
JCIDS replaced the Army’s materiel requirements documents (MRDs) used in the RGS.   
This change occurred at a volatile time for the DoD.  Implementing change was 
difficult in a stable organization like the DoD that had been wedded to a process that had 
existed for over a decade.  Implementing change in the midst of the beginning of two 
campaigns would prove to be much more difficult and somewhat disruptive to the DoD culture.  
2. The Present  
There are many stakeholders and key personnel involved in the RGP that 
contribute directly to the writing of MRDs.  However, there are also indirect factors that 
drive and define the language of these documents.  For instance, the enemy has always 
been relevant as one of the primary influencers on requirements for new equipment.  
Additionally, dramatic advancements in technology have resulted in the acquisition of 
new materiel and the associated new documents.  The idea of needs in the RGS has been 
replaced by the concept of capabilities in JCIDS.  Exact materiel solutions (new 
equipment/system) to meet desired capability should not be specifically requested.  
Additionally, capabilities can often be met without a materiel solution.  Simply, the 
concept of needs was replaced with capabilities because the DoD did not feel that it was 
efficient for the warfighter to ask for a materiel solution.  Asking for a specific materiel 
solution would only create multiple solutions and redundancies in equipment.  Instead, 
the warfighter is to request capabilities. 
A simplified example of this is if users state that they need an M224 60-mm 
Lightweight Mortar.  This may not be the best solution.  The user should request a system 
under 50 lbs. that may be disassembled, man portable, operated from the ground, fire 
 4 
multifunctional munitions, including high explosive rounds, smoke rounds, and 
illumination rounds, and has a maximum effective range not less than 3,000 meters.  This 
allows supporting stakeholders to identify what is the best and most efficient solution that 
can meet all of the users’ capability needs. 
Technological advancements on both friendly and enemy sides have also 
compelled the DoD to revise their MRDs into systems of systems and family of systems.  
According to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, Systems and Software Engineering (ODUSD [A&T] SSE), systems of 
systems bring “added complexity due to multiple system lifecycles across acquisition 
programs, involving legacy systems, systems under development, new developments, and 
technology insertion; typically have stated capability objectives upfront which may need 
to be translated into formal requirements” (Dahmann, Baldwin, & Rebovich, 2011, p. 3).  
The DoD recognizes that the future of technology is difficult to predict.  Nonetheless, the 
DoD also realizes that, even with this unpredictability, the processes that initiate materiel 
solutions must project potential future capabilities insertions.  Furthermore, 
unconventional warfare requires unconventional materiel solutions.  Improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), Ruchnaya Kumulyativnaya Granata 3 (RKG-3), and 
homemade explosives (HMEs) have led to U.S. forces developing capability 
requirements for equipment to improve survivability.  Therefore, the United States has 
had to heighten its ability to answer the warfighters’ demands to counter the enemy’s 
abilities to conduct kinetic operations on the battlefield.  Thus, the state of the world 
continues to have an effect on the future of the RGP and the associated MRDs. 
3. The Future  
The RGP and MRDs are facing another potential change due to the state of the 
nation.  The U.S. government has projected the GWOT troop drawdown to occur in 2014.  
The president of the United States and the secretary of defense (SECDEF) have given 
guidance through their security strategies for the military’s future fighting force to shift 
its focus to air and sea superiority.  In addition, Congress has directed the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) through the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, to 
annually reduce the defense budget by $54.7 billion from 2013 through 2021 (Heniff, 
Rybicki, & Mahan, 2011). 
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These directives pose new constraints and forces that may greatly impact the U.S. 
Army.  First, budget reductions have caused the Army to begin executing a 50,000-
soldier reduction plan to be complete by 2017,  and potentially downsizing the Army’s 
combat formations from 47 active duty brigade combat teams (BCTs) to as few as 32 
active BCTs.  The end-state composition of the Army has yet to be defined.  Second, the 
unit-level modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E) of this future Army is 
even further away from final delineation.  Last, the projected threat and shift in emphasis 
on air and sea superiority will undoubtedly affect the Army’s future missions.  These 
constraints will change the future modernized equipment structure of the joint military 
and the U.S. Army.  The Army must project and plan for this impending conversion.  
Aftereffects of a shift in force structure and MTO&E may lead to a change with the RGP.  
A change with the RGP would also impact the MRDs and force the documents to change.   
4. The Way Ahead 
The U.S. Army must posture itself for this transformation if it wishes to minimize 
the effects of change on its operations.  The Army recognizes that its equipment must be 
modernized and at the forefront of technology if it is to remain the world’s most powerful 
land force.  Conversely, the Army recognized that RGS MRDs were inefficient and 
ineffective.  MRDs lacking in efficiency and effectiveness lead the Army’s acquisition 
programs down a path of not meeting the required capabilities.  “If we always did what 
we always do, we will always get what we always got.  We need tough examination of 
the assumptions of our past and real ideas for change that solve issues,” said Paul Mann 
(personal communication, October 25, 2012), SES/Assistant Director Land Warfare & 
Munitions at OSD AT&L and former Joint Program Manager for Mine-Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.   
The Army recognizes that in order to improve its requirements documents, it must 
change in four key functions, as outlined by the Army Acquisition Review Board in 2011: 
1.  Realign, resource and focus its requirements and acquisition 
professionals on their raison d’être and associated core competencies, i.e., 
Training and Doctrine Command’s timely delivery of requirements; 
Program Executive Office (PEO) and Program Manager delivery of 
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products meeting the requirement on cost and on schedule; and Army 
staffs that are accountable for enabling the requirement to be met 
2.  Involve all stakeholders collaboratively in requirements development, 
development planning and acquisition solicitation, rather than just 
critiquing others  
3.  Realistically assess and manage risk, and follow more tailored 
evolutionary acquisition strategies with associated reductions in steps, 
time and documentation to provide new systems  
4.  Improve the number, quality and accountability of the people essential 
to the acquisition of equipment and systems needed for our servicemen 
and women to be equipped, trained and ready.  (Army Acquisition Review 
Board, 2011, p. iv)  
More efficient and effective MCDs are crucial in the support of key functions 1, 
2, and 3.  Identified requirements may be met by numerous means by the Army.  They 
may be answered by changing doctrine, organization, training, and TTPs.  If requirements 
are not achieved by these methods, the acquisition of new equipment or systems is 
needed.  The RGP is essential to a functional acquisition process.  Three primary decision 
support systems interact to develop materiel capabilities: (1) the Planning, Program, 
Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process; (2) the Defense Acquisition System; and (3) the 
JCIDS (see Figure 1).  The RGP falls within the JCIDS process.  Thus, without an 
efficient RGP and supporting efficient and effective requirements documents, the 
overarching acquisition process cannot be efficient.   
Cohesive MCDs will reduce unnecessary redundancies and will allow 
requirements to be delivered in an efficient and effective manner.  Gaining stakeholders’, 
such as the warfighter’s, buy in and input early in the MCDs will provide better 
collaboration and will reduce scrutiny.  Finally, effective MCDs are the tools to deliver 
defined requirements from the warfighter to fill capability gaps with materiel and non-
materiel solutions to the warfighter.  While there are many other facets in the defense 
acquisition system, MCDs are a crucial aspect that must continually evolve to refine a 
better way ahead for a more efficient RGP.      
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B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to analyze the characteristics of Army materiel 
requirement documents that support material development up to Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) within the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
Life Cycle Management System.  We look at the necessary documents that facilitate the 
creation of a materiel solution, MRDs and MCDs used to develop the prototypes of the 
HMMWV, M-ATV, or JLTV.  In this project, our analysis focuses on the documents 
used in both the old RGS and the new JCIDS processes, and identifies distinctive 
elements of efficiency and effectiveness, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Effectiveness vs. Efficiency (After Croxford, 2012) 
In this project, we identify potential changes to the MCDs or the Army’s RGP 
(JCIDS) that will result in more efficiency and effectiveness, based on our analysis of 
these documents.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Our objective in this research project is to answer the following question: What 
should be the Army’s major considerations for the revisions of future materiel 
requirements documents? 
To aid us in answering the primary research question, we utilized these supporting 
questions: 
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Question 1: What makes requirement documents efficient and effective, or 
inefficient and ineffective for the stakeholders who facilitate the RGP? 
Question 2: What key differences exist in the documents from the old RGS 
process compared to the new JCIDS process, and why were these changes made 
during this transition? 
Question 3: Does future change need to be evolutionary or revolutionary?   
D. SCOPE  
We analyze the requirements documents of two specific Army RGP systems in 
the project.  The name of materiel requirements documents (MRD) was changed to 
materiel capability documents (MCD) during the transition to the Joint Capabilities 
Integrated Development System (JCIDS).  For our project, we used the term 
“requirements documents” as a generic term for both.  The first RGP system was the 
Requirements Generation System (RGS), which was used prior to 2003 and used MRDs.  
These documents are the mission needs statement (MNS), the initial operational 
requirements document (ORD), and the production ORD.  The second RGP system is the 
JCIDS, established in May 2003, which uses MCDs and is augmented by the Joint Urgent 
Operations Needs Statement (JUONS) process.  The JCIDS documents are the initial 
capabilities document (ICD), the capability development document (CDD), and the 
capability production document (CPD).  Furthermore, the project team analyzed the type 
of change for a future requirements generation process and requirements documents.  The 
identified changes are supplemented with effective methods and techniques to implement 
these system changes into the U.S. Army.  Finally, the project team identified the benefits 
of recommended changes.  
In Figure 3, we identify the project’s scope where MRDs and MCDs affect the 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) which is outlined by the DoD Instruction 5000.02 
(DoD, 2008).  The figure identifies the periods of time during which the RGS and JCIDS 
were in effect.  Although there are three major DoD decision support systems (i.e., 
JCIDS, DAS, PPBE), in this project we focus only on the requirements documents 
interface between the Acquisition Management System (AMS) and the RGS as well as 
the interface between the DAS and JCIDS.  The figure represents these interactions by 
the shaded cross-hatched sections.  Specifically, in the project, we examine and analyze 
the requirements documents used to communicate between the two decision-support 
systems from both eras; this is represented by Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Scope of Analysis in Relation to the DoD Decision Support Systems 
(After CJCS, 2001, p. A-1) 
One additional note pertaining to the scope of our project is with the research and 
data collected.  Our project analyzes the requirements documents from the perspective of 
program managers and other personnel working within a program office.  
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY SUMMARY 
In this research project, the project team undertook three primary focuses.  We 
focus on the evolution of the requirements generation documents prior to the Global War 
on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ongoing processes, including the JUONS process, 
that have supported the war, and the merger of both processes to develop future 
requirements.  Within these areas of focus, we used a qualitative approach for document 
comparison.  Another focus is a comparative analysis between three separate wheeled 
vehicles that were developed to meet the requirements from three separate requirement 
generation processes. 
The project team utilized past and present policy and procedures, analyzed studies 
and reports produced during both RGP periods of RGS and JCIDS, reviewed past and 
present classes and trainings provided to the defense acquisition workforce, and 
conducted interviews with governmental subject-matter experts (SMEs) who have 
worked and lived through this period of time.  All data were collected through public 
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records and all interviews adhered to the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review 
Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, Executive Decision Memorandum dated 
April 29, 2005.   
F. ORGANIZATION OF MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
This project report is organized in the following order: the background of the 
requirements generation process, research methodology, case studies of the materiel 
requirements documents of the past and the present, results, and conclusions.  In the 
background chapter, we provide an overview of the RGPs of the RGS and JCIDS and 
their respective requirements documents.  In the research methodology chapter, we 
provide detailed information on how the study was conducted.  In the next chapter, we 
present the case studies and results.  In the case study, we provide an overview of 
evolutionary change versus revolutionary change and compare and analyze the 
requirements documents of three Army wheeled-vehicle platforms that have been 
affected by the different requirements generation processes with respect to Better Buying 
Power 2.0 and efficiency and effectiveness.  In the results, we provide the findings from 
the comparative analysis.  Finally, in the conclusions chapter, we provide answers to each 
of the proposed questions, techniques to effectively implement the project’s 
recommendations, and the benefits of implementing the recommendations.   
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we gave an overview of the background of the development of this 
project’s topic, the purpose of this project, and the primary question and supporting 
questions that this project intends to answer.  Additionally, in this introduction, we 
provided the scope of the project, the methodology that the project team utilized, and the 
organization of the project.   
In the background chapter (Chapter II), we supply a synopsis for both the RGS 
and JCIDS RGP systems.  In addition to the synopsis, we provide an overview of the 
requirements documents we analyzed for this project.  Finally, we describe the key 
stakeholders that author, approve, and execute the MRDs and MCDs.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the information required to understand 
the Army’s requirement documents and their significance in the requirements generation 
process.  We accomplish this by, first, describing the purpose as well as the evolution of 
the RGP from the Requirements Generation System to the current Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System.  Second, we provide a summary of the requirement 
documents and their associated formats.  Last, we describe the key stakeholders who 
author, staff, approve, and execute the requirement documents.        
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this project, we analyze the requirements documents that are utilized to create a 
materiel solution.  Requirements documents are the essential records that articulate needs 
or requirements, and then refine such needs or requirements for a materiel solution if a 
non-materiel solution cannot be identified.  Each requirement document has its specific 
designated authors, and the document is staffed for validation, approved by the respective 
authority, and executed within the Army’s acquisition process.  The requirements 
documents we discuss in this project were used during the requirements generation 
processes of the RGS (pre-June 2003) and the JCIDS (post-June 2003).  The documents 
we analyzed in this project are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1.    Documents Analyzed for Project 
RGS Materiel Requirements Documents JCIDS Materiel Capabilities Documents 
 Mission Needs Statement (MNS) 
 Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD)—Initial 
 Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD)—Revised 
 Initial Capability Document (ICD) 
 Capability Development Document 
(CDD) 
 Capability Production Document (CPD)  
 Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement 
(JUON) 
 
Our overview begins with the concepts on which these requirements documents 
were developed.  These concepts are the purpose of each document, the RGPs in which 
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they were used, the time period in which they were used, why the RGS documents were 
replaced by the JCIDS documents and how they evolved, and how they are embedded in 
the DoD 5000 Defense Acquisition System (DAS).  We have aligned these requirements 
documents in Figure 4 to illustrate their interface with the Defense Acquisition System. 
 
Figure 4.  The Defense Acquisition System With Associated Requirements Documents 
(After DoD, 2008, p. 12) 
Figure 4 is composed of several components to depict and guide the examination 
process we used in this project.  We emphasize three specific segments in the figure.  The 
first segment is the top portion.  This area outlines the simplified version of the DoDI 
5000.02 (DoD, 2008) DAS and identifies key milestones that occur between the specific 
phases of the process.  The five phases are (1) Materiel Solution Analysis, (2) 
Technology Development, (3) Engineering and Manufacturing Development, (4) 
Production and Deployment, and (5) Operations and Support.  In this project, we review 
the requirements documents that pertain to Phases 1, 2, 3 and 4, which take a program 
through Milestone (MS) A, B, and C. 
The lower portion of Figure 4 outlines the requirements documents within their 
respective RGP.  In the RGS (upper lane) and JCIDS (lower lane) sections are several 
document-shaped icons.  Each icon represents a requirements document and is shown 
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where it would be implemented within the acquisition process.  Requirements documents 
shifted in names, details, and locations within the acquisition process as the transition 
was made from RGS to JCIDS.  The figure shows the past and present documents, and 
how the documents are nested into the DAS.  Additionally, by depicting the requirements 
documents within the DAS, we have been able to better understand the transformation 
from one document to another. 
We analyzed the documents required once a need/capability is identified (prior to 
MS A) to the time when a materiel solution is about to undergo LRIP.  Once CJCSI 
3170.1C (CJCS, 2003) cancelled CJCSI 3170.01B (CJCS, 2001) in 2003, ICD replaced 
the MNS, CDD replaced the ORD-Initial, and CPD replaced the ORD-revised.  Both 
MNS and ICD are required before the decision point to move into Materiel Solution 
Analysis phase.  The ORD-Initial is required before a materiel solution can enter MS A.  
However, the ICD moves forward through MS A, and the CDD is not required until the 
pre-EMD review and prior to entering MS B.  Both ORD-revised and CPD are required 
prior to entry into MS C and LRIP.  A detailed description of each requirements 
document is provided in this chapter. 
B. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION PROCESSES  
The Requirements Generation Process (RGP) is the documentation used by the 
Army to provide materiel and non-materiel solutions to fill capability gaps.  The process 
identifies a system need or capability which brings an acquisition program from a mere 
thought to an actual product that is derived from the original need / capability.  (How the 
Army Runs 2011-2012, p. 46).  The RGP has been in a state of constant evolution since 
2000.  This evolution has resulted from transformation of the Army’s force structure, 
advancement in technology, the state of the world, and threats to national security.  Since 
2000, the Army has realized that transformation is critical in order to accomplish present 
and future missions and strategic objectives.  In 2002, the Army RGP was required to 
first address non-material solutions by considering doctrine, training, leader development, 
organization, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS).  The RGP consisted of four distinct 
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phases: Phase 1, Definition Phase; Phase 2, Documentation Phase; Phase 3, Validation 
Phase; and Phase 4, Approval Phase (U.S. Army War College, 2002).   
During this time period (early 2000s), the Army was still operating under a force 
structure and MTO&E based on a Cold War mentality.  The MTO&E brought clear 
expectations to the requirements for each level of organization within the Army.  The 
MTO&E’s priority focused on equipping heavy brigades with armored track vehicles like 
Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Armored Personnel Carriers.  However, a 
heavy-force conflict has not occurred since the Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm 
(1990–1991).  Conflicts ensuing after the Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm were 
Somalia (1992–1995) and the Balkans (1991–2001), but these operations used nowhere 
near the heavy force of Desert Storm.  The scale of these operations neither caused nor 
influenced any significant changes in how the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted 
RGPs for materiel solutions. 
Requirements started as a force development process to fill equipment shortfalls 
within the Army’s formation.  Identification of material solutions to fulfill needs would 
require a lengthy and arduous process.  Then, going through the acquisition process often 
took up to 15 years before the material solution was fielded to soldiers.  The Requirement 
Generation System (RGS) pre-June 2003 was very bottom-up focused.  Bottom-up focus 
means the lower echelons state what they need or capabilities they want to have with 
regard for only their particular functional area.  A bottom-up focus generally leads to 
unsynchronized actions and in acquisition can lead to systems that are incompatible with 
systems in other functional areas.  This creates constraints on the material development 
system.  Acquisition programs may end up being incompatible with other systems or may 
only serve one specific function within the specified area.  However, with a “big picture” 
outlook, control can be placed on needs and capabilities to ensure compatibility and 
usefulness across all of the different functional areas within the Army.   
General (GEN) Eric Shinseki, the chief of staff of the Army (CSA) in 2000, took 
operational and tactical, technical, and procedures (TTPs) lessons learned from the 
Balkans and recognized the importance of transforming the current Army’s formation.  
GEN Shinseki’s concept of transformation was to transition the legacy force into an 
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interim force and, ultimately, into an objective force.  GEN Shinseki identified that 
transformation was not limited only to the Army’s physical composition (force structure) 
but applied also to its doctrine (Burlas, 2003).  A holistic change with regards to how the 
Army conducted operations was required to achieve a successful and seamless 
modification that would not interrupt the Army’s ongoing missions (Shinseki, 2000).  
“Transformation isn’t just about shiny new equipment—it’s also about changing systems 
and processes” (Burlas, 2003).  As a result, the Army’s RGP would also need to 
transform to support the Army’s initiatives of a highly mobile force that had the same 
lethality as a heavy force.  The transformation would have to be top-down driven.  
Ultimately, GEN Shinseki’s concept for modifying the RGP faced great resistance and 
slow change. 
The events of 9/11 followed by the GWOT increased the need for the acquisition 
process to generate requirements more quickly.  Capability gaps increased as well as the 
need to fill these gaps for the warfighter in order for them to execute their missions on the 
battlefield.  It became the DoD’s decision to revolutionize the RGP.  Army leadership 
and the Joint Staff leadership recognized that the branch-centric approach with a sole 
acquisition focus for specific functional areas was no longer sufficient to meet 
warfighters’ needs.  Branch-centric mindsets and functions were inadequate to execute 
combat operations.  “Requirements needed to be determined holistically and incorporate 
a greater perception of warfighting concepts focusing on the future and to provide the 
military with viable requirements” (U.S. Army War College, 2002, p. 5-5).  The DoD 
evolved the RGS into the JCIDS.  The change from RGS to JCIDS provides the DoD 
with the means to emphasize and structure the requirements generation process to begin 
looking at programs from a Joint perspective for all of the different Services.  
Consequently, the evolution of the RGS to JCIDS resulted in the modification of the 
requirements documents that facilitated materiel solutions.       
The Army’s process has evolved over the years; however, the basic concept of 
identifying system capabilities has always been a three-step procedure.  First, it begins 
with the identification of a broad need or capability gap.  Second, non-materiel or 
materiel solutions are recommended and every suggested proposal undergoes evaluation 
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to determine if it fulfills the need or capability.  Third, a course of action is selected and 
refined with key performance parameters (KPPs).  Figure 5 illustrates this concept. 
 
Figure 5.  Identification of Systems Capabilities Flow Chart (After DAU, n.d., p. 4) 
Each of these basic Army steps has an associated requirement document based on 
the time frame of the specific RGP (RGS or JCIDS) that is being followed: At Step 1, 
Very Broad Needs uses the MNS or ICD; at Step 2, Performance Objectives uses the 
ORD-Initial or the CDD; and at Step 3, System-Specific Requirements uses the ORD-
Revised or CPD.  It is necessary in our study to understand the difference between the 
RGS and JCIDS, and how the RGP has evolved. 
1. Requirements Generation System (Pre-June 2003) 
We begin our study chronologically based on time and occurrence within the 
RGP.  The starting point is RGS, outlined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction (CJCSI) Requirements Generation System, or CJCSI 3170.01B (CJCS, 2001), 
dated April 15, 2001.  This was then cancelled by CJCSI Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System, or CJCSI 3170.01C (CJCS, 2003), dated June 24, 2003.  
Additionally, the three DoD decision support systems during this time period, shown in 
Figure 3, were the RGS, the Acquisition Management System, and the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS; CJCS, 1999).  A close and effective 
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interface among these systems is required to ensure quality products are acquired for the 
nation’s armed forces (Peppe, 2002).  The RGS produced information for decision-
makers on the projected mission needs of the warfighter and was a bottom-up-driven 
process, with the lowest level echelon in a particular functional area stating its desired 
needs and initiating the requirements process. 
Figure 6 shows the initiation of the RGS from both the bottom echelon and top 
echelon of leadership.  The top portion of the figure shows the staffing effort, whereas the 
bottom portion shows the movement of requirements documents for definition, validation 
and approval.   
 
Figure 6.  RGS Requirements Documents Approval Process: Requirements and Acquisition 
Interface Model (From CJCS, 2001, p. C-1, D-1) 
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The first requirements document aided decision-makers in the RGS by translating 
the identified mission needs into more broad and generalized operational terms, known as 
the mission needs statement (MNS; U.S. Army War College, 2002).  MNSs document the 
needs of the Army’s operational requirements that could potentially result in a materiel 
solution and, eventually, in a new defense acquisition program.  Validation of the MNS 
confirms that after much analysis, a non-materiel solution alone cannot satisfy the need, 
and that a potential “new concept/system” materiel solution should be considered (Peppe, 
2002).  Subsequently, the needs expressed in the MNS are developed into requirements 
by the RGP in the form of operational requirements documents (ORDs) or capstone 
requirements documents (CRDs; CJCS, 2001). 
Capstone requirements documents are excluded from the scope of this paper.  
However, a description of them follows to provide greater understanding of requirements 
documents and the RGP.  CRDs outline the necessary development guidance for ORDs.  
The guidance provides a means to validate performance-based capabilities for a specific 
mission area.  Additionally, this mission area may form a system of systems (SoS) or 
family of systems (FoS).  CRDs are a combination of two or more MNSs or ORDs, or a 
combination of both (U.S. Army War College, 2002).  ORDs define the MNS and (if 
applicable) CRD requirements into detailed, refined performance capabilities and 
characteristics of the proposed system.  ORDs provide the specific requirements baseline 
for the Acquisition Management System (AMS) and the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS; CJCS, 2001).   
Within the first years after the U.S. deployment into Afghanistan, the RGS 
reached its culmination and was no longer effective for both the DoD and the Army.  The 
culmination led the DoD to evolve its process for requirements generation from the RGS 
to the JCIDS. 
2. Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (2003–Present) 
In 2003, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld directed the DoD to 
change the requirements generation process (Figure 7).   
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The Department currently is pursuing transformational business and 
planning practices such as adaptive planning, a more entrepreneurial, 
future-oriented capabilities-based resource allocation process, accelerated 
acquisition cycles built on spiral development, out-put based management, 
and a reformed analytic support agenda. (DoD, 2003, p. 1) 
SECDEF Rumsfeld identified the need for the process to be less Service-centric, 
while having a greater Joint-centric focus.  The intent of the JCIDS concept was to 
eliminate the unnecessary stove-piped mentality of the Services and write requirements 
for systems that could be used across all Service.  This note may be seen in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Memo From Secretary of Defense That Began JCIDS (From Force Structure, 
Resources, and Assessments Directorate [JCS J-8], 2006, p. 5) 
The DoD immediately responded to the SECDEF and began planning to quickly 
change the RGP.  Fifteen months after receiving the SECDEF’s email, General Peter 
Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, answered with an approved solution.  By 
June 24, 2003, the JCIDS replaced RGS and CJCSI 3170.01C (CJCS, 2003) replaces 
CJCSI 3170.01B (CJCS, 2001) as the new doctrine.  The primary goal of the JCIDS is to 
provide the Joint Force with the necessary capabilities required to operate in full-
spectrum operations.  The JCIDS has three founding principles:  
1. Description of needs by capabilities instead of systems,  
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2. Emphasis on needs at the joint level instead of at the level of 
separated branches [of Service], and 
3. One single general or flag officer to manage the separate DoD 
functional portfolios.  (CJCS, 2003) 
The evolutionary change from the RGS to JCIDS also changed the range of 
considerations of non-materiel solutions from DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leader 
development, organization, materiel, and soldier) to DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities).  Essentially, this 
modification changed leader development to leadership and education, changed soldier 
to personnel, and added facilities.  Materiel solutions would be pursued if a non-materiel 
solution could not be identified through the initial DOTMLPF analysis.  Four major steps 
must occur in the analysis prior to the development of a materiel solution.  The following 
list outlines the four steps found in the Defense Acquisition University class 
“Functionality of the JCIDS Process” (DAU, 2011): 
Step 1. Top-down analysis based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), 
National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Joint Vision 2020; 
Step 2. Integrated architectures of multiple operating systems analysis; 
Step 3. Capability gaps/shortcomings and associated risk analysis; and 
Step 4. Materiel solution recommendation which would lead to the 
initiation of an acquisition program. (p. 5) 
Figure 8 demonstrates the change implemented through the SECDEF’s guidance.  
The figure shows the change from threat-based to capability-based planning and the 
movement from a bottom-up approach to a top-down approach.  The left side of the 
figure shows the RGS process while the right side shows the JCIDS process. 
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Figure 8.  Threat vs. Capability-Based Planning (From Willis, 2012, slide 5) 
The JCIDS suspended existing RGS documents, which consisted of the MNS and 
ORDs with the ICD, CDD, and CPD.  Figure 9 outlines each of the JCID documents and 
shows how each document is intended to fit into the JCIDS process. 
The flow shown in Figure 9 occurs from enclosures (boxes) that progress into 
decision points (diamonds) and then displays appropriate end points dependent on the 
path followed.  The ICD is found at the Enclosure B step.  At the Enclosure D and E 
steps is where requirements documents (ICD, CDD, CPD, JUONS) enter the decision 
points.  The subsequent steps are based on the decision points.  A “no” decision leads to 
the end of the process and possible reworking/correcting of documents.  However, a 
“yes” decision moves the requirements documents into the deliberate acquisition process.  




Figure 9.  JCIDS Requirements Documents Approval Process 
(From Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC], 2012b, p. 2) 
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Since 2003, the JCIDS process has been updated six times from version C through 
version H, which was published in January 2012 (CJCS, 2012).  We now discuss the 
details for each of the specific documents, after going through an overview for the 
different materiel requirement processes. 
C. REQUIREMENTS GENERATIONS SYSTEM (RGS) MATERIEL 
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS (MRD)—(1999–JUNE 2003) 
The RGS provides information for decision making stakeholders to better 
understand the warfighter’s mission needs.  The acquisition process begins once the 
milestone decision authority (MDA) decides whether or not the need will be met with a 
material solution.  This is based on the materiel development decision that identifies that 
the operational capability cannot be met a non-material solution.  As per CJCSI 3170.01B 
(CJCS, 2001), requirements are defined as mission needs: “A deficiency in current 
capabilities or an opportunity to provide new capabilities (or enhance existing 
capabilities) through the use of new technologies.  They are expressed in broad 
operational terms by the DOD components” (p. 84).  The three major requirements 
documents that were used to fulfill the U.S. Army’s RGS from the identified need to 
LRIP are the mission needs statement (MNS), the operational requirements document 
(ORD)-Initial, and the ORD-Revised.  An additional capstone requirements document 
(CRD) was only needed as required.  The Global Information Grid (GIG), which was 
approved in JROCM 134-01, dated August 30, 2001 (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2001), 
is an example of a requirement that needed a CRD.   
The concept of a “Global Information Grid” (GIG) was born out of 
concerns regarding interoperability and end-to-end integration of 
automated information systems. Issues such as streamlined management 
and the improvement of information infrastructure investment have also 
contributed to the heightened interest in a GIG. However, the real demand 
for a GIG has been driven by the requirement for information superiority 
and decision superiority to achieve full spectrum dominance, as expressed 
in Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020).  JV 2020 also highlights the importance of 
a network-centric warfare (NCW) environment, enabled by the GIG by 
means of dramatically improved information sharing through the robust 
networking of warfighting forces. (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2001, p. 
2)  
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CRDs were a means to combine requirements with multi-systems functions.  
Figure 10 depicts the necessary requirements documents and the interface with the 
acquisition system.   
 
Figure 10.  Requirements and Acquisition Interface Model (From CJCS, 2001, p. A-2) 
1. Mission Needs Statement  
The initial requirements document in the Army’s RGS is a mission needs 
statement (MNS).  The MNS is a non-system-specific document that states an operational 
capability need(s).  By this, it is not directed for a specific desired system.  The MNS 
identifies a capability in broad operational terms.  The MNS describes the warfighters 
operational requirements and constraints that must be DOTMLP analyzed, and may result 
in a materiel or non-materiel solution.  The MNS is developed by four distinct phases: (1) 
definition, (2) documentation, (3) validation, and (4) approval (CJCS, 2001).    
The MNS may be initiated by any of the unified commands, military departments, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or the Joint Staff.  However, the Combat 
Developer (CBTDEV; see Combat Developers/Capability Developers in the stakeholder 
section) within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) produces the 
MNS.  The MNS outlines a list of operational capabilities, but does not identify a specific 
materiel solution or system.  A warfighting MNS is approved by the chief of staff of the 
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Army.  A CBTDEV-led integrated concept team (ICT, see Integrated Teams in the 
stakeholder section) evaluates the capabilities of the MNS.  This ICT identifies the strategy 
to test and evaluate a system of materiel solutions that attempts to answer the MNS. 
The Unified Commands, the military departments, OSD, or the Joint Staff identify 
mission needs.  The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC), prior to making a 
recommendation to the chief of staff of the Army, will review all Joint/other Service 
requirements.  The chief of staff of the Army approves all MNSs outlining the 
warfighters’ needs.   
As per CJCSI 3170.01B: Appendix A to Enclosure C, dated April 15, 2001 
(CJCS, 2001, p. C-A-1), the MNS format consists of the following parts: 
Part 1. Defense Planning Guidance Element 
Part 2. Mission and Threat Analysis 
Part 3. Non-Materiel Alternatives 
Part 4. Potential Materiel Alternatives 
Part 5. Constraints 
Part 6. Joint Potential Designator 
2. Operational Requirements Document 
The operational requirements document (ORD) follows the MNS.  Prior to entry 
into MS B, the ORD is written to answer the MNS.  The ORD is a document that outlines 
the performance and operational boundaries as a result of the proposed solution for an 
MNS.  The CBTDEV/training developer (TNGDEV, see Combat Developers/Capability 
Developers in the stakeholder section) defines the objective requirement parameters.  The 
CBTDEV/TNGDEV identifies the significant operational capability.  The ORD-Initial 
must contain the bottom-line thresholds that the capability must meet through KPPs.   
The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) must approve all ORDs 
before a program is approved.  Acquisition programs must also receive HQDA approval 
for all non-developmental items, commercial items, or items with mature technology.  
The Joint chief of staff or other Service-specific (JROC approved) leadership may only 
approve acquisition category (ACAT) ID-level programs.  The chief of staff of the Army 
may approve all Army-specific programs at the ACAT IC level. 
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The ORD-Revised later redefines the KPP as well as the objective requirements 
for a materiel solution.  ORDs are revised prior to MS C and are required to receive 
approval to enter MS C.  Refinement to ORDs occurs after MS B but prior to MS C if 
there are any changes in the mission needs. 
As per CJCSI 3170.01B: Appendix A to Enclosure E, dated April 15, 2001, 
(CJCS, 2001, p. E-A-1) the ORD format consists of the following parts: 
Part 1. General Description of Operational Capability 
Part 2. Threat 
Part 3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems and C4ISR Architectures 
Part 4. Capabilities Required 
 Part 4.a. System Performance 
 Part 4.b. Information Exchange Requirements 
 Part 4.c. Logistics and Readiness 
 Part 4.d. Environmental, Safety and Occupational Health (ESOH) and  
  Other System Characteristics 
Part 5. Program Support 
 Part 5.a. Maintenance Planning 
 Part 5.b. Support Equipment 
 Part 5.c. C4I/Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality 
 Part 5.d. Computer Resources 
 Part 5.e. Human Systems Integration 
 Part 5.f. Other Logistics and Facilities Considerations 
 Part 5.g. Transportation and Basing 
 Part 5.h. Geospatial Information and Services 
 Part 5.i.  Natural Environmental Support 
Part 6. Force Structure 
Part 7. Schedule 
Part 8. Program Affordability 
3. Capstone Requirements Documents 
We do not analyze the capstone requirements document in our study.  However, 
understanding the CRD is necessary for the overall understanding of the purpose of 
requirements documents.  CRDs are the combination of more than one MSN, ORD, or 
program developed as a family-of-systems (FoS) or systems-of-systems (SoS).  The CRD 
links MSNs or programs into one synchronized ORD for future production of a materiel 
solution.  Nonetheless, CRDs are capabilities-based requirements that combine 
requirements documents and provide a means to merge the framework of multiple 
operational initiatives and create the standards for the development of materiel solutions.  
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CRDs are the overarching requirements documents that tie multiple needs together in 
order to meet core capabilities, such as a vehicle requiring a specific level of 
survivability, which also possesses communication, protection, transportability, power, 
and maneuverability capabilities to meet a need. 
CRDs are approved by HQDA unless they are ACAT ID, Joint, or other Service-
specific (JROC approved).  As per CJCSI 3170.01B: Appendix A to Enclosure D, dated 
April 15, 2001 (CJCS, 2001, p. D-A-1), the CRD format consists of the following parts: 
Part 1. General Description of Operational Capability 
Part 2. Threat 
Part 3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems and C4ISR Architectures 
Part 4. Capabilities Required 
D. JCIDS MATERIEL CAPABILITIES DOCUMENTS (MCD)—(POST JUNE 
2003–PRESENT) 
In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
replaced the RGS.  There were some very noteworthy changes that took place outside of 
merely the processes and documentation.  Concepts and terminology were also changed.  
The Materiel Capabilities Document replaced the term Materiel Requirements Document.  
Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF) replaced DTLOMS.  “Mission Needs,” a term commonly used in 
CJCSI 3170.01B, was no longer a term in CJCSI 3170.01C; and the term “Capability 
Gaps” was added.  Capability gaps are “those synergistic resources (DOTMLPF) that are 
unavailable but potentially attainable to the operational user for effective task execution” 
(CJCS, 2003, p. GL-4).  By CJCSI 3170.70H (January 10, 2012), capability gaps had 
evolved into the following definition: “the inability to execute a specified course of 
action.  The gap may be the result of no existing capability, lack of proficiency or 
sufficiency in an existing capability solution, or the need to replace an existing capability 
solution to prevent a future gap” (CJCS, 2012, p. 31). In addition, DOTMLPF was 
replaced by DOTmLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, policy 
and education, personnel, facilities, and policy). 
Part of our analysis has been to understand why CJCIS 3170.01 has undergone so 
many evolutionary changes.  This is consistent with the concept of the evolutionary 
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changes to the RGP.  In fewer than nine years, the JCIDS has had to evolve and adapt to 
the changing environment of the GWOT.  Within this time period, the DoD has adapted 
and evolved the JCIDS process to improve efficiency or effectiveness and continues to 
reevaluate its overall process.  This has caused the JCIDS process to undergo six 
revisions from CJCSI 3170.01C (CJCS, 2003) through CJCSI 3170.01H (CJCS, 2012).  
Table 2 shows the length of time between each change.  However, this evolutionary 
change may have been necessary because of the revolutionary change experienced from 
moving from RGS to JCIDS.  Regardless, a revolutionary change for JCIDS has not been 
planned or executed but evolutionary changes to the process have been redundantly 
implemented.  This is not so much a fault of the DoD, but a necessary evil of the 
situation.  We have analyzed whether a recurring evolution will be efficient and effective 
for JCIDS in the future.  A revolutionary change to JCIDS may be necessary if the 
process is no longer effective and efficient, like its predecessor, the RGS.  Plus, another 
consideration for implementing changes is if materiel solutions are not meeting 
warfighters’ expectations in a timely manner.   
Table 2.   JCIDS Amendments and Number of Months Amendment Was Valid 
Publication Date of Publication 
Number of Months Until 
Changed 
CJCSI 3170.01C June 24, 2003 Approximately nine Months 
CJCSI 3170.01D March 14, 2004 Approximately nine Months 
CJCSI 3170.01E May 11, 2005 Approximately 11 Months 
CJCSI 3170.01F May 1, 2007 Approximately 24 Months 
CJCSI 3170.01G March 1, 2009 Approximately 22 Months 
CJCSI 3170.01H January 10, 2012 Ongoing 
 
Each change brought a new publication or update to the existing CJCSI for the 
RGP.  However, the one constant that remained amongst each of the changes was 
documents and their timing within the JCIDS.  Figure 11 shows the alignment of the 
different materiel requirements documents (ICD,CDD,CPD), the associated 
review/approval authority (triangles), and the MS review boards for entering into the 
specific MS phase of the RGP (MS-A, MS-B, MS-C).  The flow of the figures 
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demonstrates the movement and use of documents as an acquisition program approaches its 
MS and then transitions to the next phase within its timeline.  An example of this is moving 
from MS A to MS B.  The acquisition program exits MS A with the appropriate approval, 
transitions from using the ICD to using the CDD at MS B, as depicted in the below. 
 
Figure 11.  Flow of Materiel Capabilities Documents in the JCIDS Process 
(From DAU, 2011, p. 2) 
1. Initial Capabilities Document 
The initial capabilities document (ICD) replaced the MNS.  This document is 
required at the decision point prior to moving into the materiel solution analysis phase.  
The purpose of the ICD is to document the possible non-materiel or materiel solution or a 
mixture of both to satisfy an identified capability gap.  The ICD is similar to its 
predecessor, the MNS, because it is not system specific.  The ICD only describes the 
capability needed or a capability gap. However, if a materiel solution is approved by the 
MDA then an analysis of alternatives (AoA) might be required.  The AoA would be used 
to support an MS A decision (Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA], 2009). 
In CJCSI 3170.01C (CJCS, 2003), ICDs were defined as follows: 
Documents the need for a materiel approach to a specific capability gap 
derived from an initial analysis of materiel approaches executed by the 
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operational user and, as required, an independent analysis of materiel 
alternatives. It defines the capability gap in terms of the functional area, 
the relevant range of military operations, desired effects and time. The 
ICD summarizes the results of the DOTMLPF analysis and describes why 
non-materiel changes alone have been judged inadequate in fully 
providing the capability. (p. GL-6) 
In CJCSI 3170.01H (CJCS, 2012), ICDs is redefined as follows: 
Summarizes a CBA and justifies the requirement for a materiel or non-
materiel approach, or an approach that is a combination of materiel and 
non-materiel, to satisfy specific capability gap(s). It identifies required 
capabilities and defines the capability gap(s) in terms of the functional 
area, the relevant range of military operations, desired effects, time and 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy implications and 
constraints.  The ICD summarizes the results of the DOTMLPF and policy 
analysis and the DOTMLPF approaches (materiel and non-materiel) that 
may deliver the required capability. The outcome of an ICD could be one 
or more joint DCRs or recommendations to pursue materiel solutions. (p. 
GL-5) 
Initially in 2003, CJCSI 3170.01C outlined that the documents were focused on a 
materiel solution to meet a capability gap.  This would often result in the creation of new 
programs.  The intent evolved over nine years as CJCSI 3170.01 was modified through 
versions C, D, E, F, G, and H.  CJCSI 3170.01H outlined a more revised approach for the 
ICD.  The definition for the most recent ICD still includes a possible materiel solution, 
but also includes non-materiel solution, changes to policy, changes to DOTMLPF, or 
variations of combining these to fill a capability gap.  This shift in intent for changes to 
the purpose of the ICD is a result of changes in the DoD’s budget, organizations, 
operations, and considerations of the future state of the DoD in downsizing.      
The ICD provides an overview of the capability-based assessment where a non-
materiel solution has been identified not to exist or to be inadequate to meet the needs of 
a capability gap.  The ICD must consider DOTMLPF non-materiel solutions.  The ICD 
also proposes a materiel approach and must justify why the proposed materiel approach 
best meets the needs to solve the required capability gap.  Once the document has been 
written and approved it can lead to one or more DOTMLPF Integrated Capabilities 
Recommendation (DICR), DCR, CDD, or CPD (HQDA, 2009).       
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As per the JCIDS Manual, (CJCS, 2012, p. B-1), the ICD format consists of the 
following parts: 
Part 1. Length (Part 3 and Appendix A may not exceed 10 pages) 
Part 2. Cover Page 
 Part 2.a. Classification 
 Part 2.b. Title.  The title must start with the phrase “Initial Capability 
 Document for…” 
 Part 2.c. Sponsoring organization 
 Part 2.d. Date submitted by the sponsoring organization 
 Part 2.e. Points of contact (primary and secondary) 
 Part 2.f. Proposed validation authority 
 Part 2.g. Proposed milestone decision authority 
 Part 2.h. Proposed joint staff designator 
Part 3. Executive Summary (Seven primary sections) 
 Section 1. Contingency operations (CONOP) summary 
 Section 2. Joint Capability Area (JCA) and identified Integrated Security 
 Construct (ISC) 
 Section 3. Capability requirements 
 Section 4. Capability gaps and overlaps/redundancies 
 Section 5. Threat and operational environment 
 Section 6. Assessment of non-materiel approaches 
 Section 7. Final recommendation 
Appendix A. Architecture data 
Appendix B. References 
Appendix C. Acronym List 
Appendix D. Glossary 
2. Capability Development Document 
This document replaced the ORD-initial.  The capability development document 
(CDD) is developed during MS A and is required prior to the MDA’s decision for 
approval for moving into MS B.  The ICD develops and guides the CDD.  A CDD is not 
submitted until the AoA is complete, unless there is an approved justification regarding 
why an AoA is not required.  The CDD is the document that allows the sponsor(s) to 
further refine the required capabilities.  These capabilities are expressed as performance 
attributes that contain threshold and objective values (HQDA, 2009).  The sponsor 
enhances the capability required by defining the KPPs, key system attribute (KSA), or 
other descriptors.  CDDs must be updated with any changes to the KPPs.  Additionally, 
the KPPs contained in the CDD are taken verbatim into the acquisition program baseline 
(APB) and are validated by the JROC (HQDA, 2009). 
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Since the CDD serves as the next main step for MCDs, there is no surprise that it 
contains information necessary for the development of the proposed program.  Plus, it 
routinely follows an incremental acquisition strategy.  To aid in this process, “the CDD 
outlines an affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically 
achievable or mature capability” (HQDA, 2009, p. 20).  In addition to this, the CDD can be 
used for multiple increments if sufficient performance attributes are properly defined.  One or 
more CDDs may be developed to provide support for multiple or complex capability gaps 
that are identified and explained within a single ICD (HQDA, 2009). 
As per the JCIDS Manual, Enclosure B (CJCS, 2012, pp. B-29–B-37), the CDD 
format consists of the following parts: 
Part 1. Length. (Part 3 and Appendix A may not exceed 45 pages) 
Part 2. Cover Page. 
 Part 2.a. Classification 
 Part 2.b. Title.  The title must start with the phrase “Capability   
  Development Document for…” 
 Part 2.c. Sponsoring organization, and signature authority who authorized  
  the submittal into JCIDS. New CDDs, and modifications to  
  previously validated CDDs, must be endorsed by the Service,  
  CCMD, or other DoD Component J8 equivalent or higher 
 Part 2.d. 
  (d) Date submitted by the sponsoring organization. 
  (e) Primary and secondary POCs for the document sponsor. 
   Include name, title/rank, phone, and both Non-Classified  
   Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (NIPRNET) and  
   Secure IP Router Network (SIPRNET) email addresses.  
   POCs must have completed the appropriate level of RMCT  
   in accordance with Enclosure H. 
  (f) Proposed validation authority 
  (g) Proposed MDA 
  (h) Proposed JSD 
  Proposed Acquisition Category (ACAT) 
  (3) Executive Summary. An executive summary, not to exceed one 
    page, shall follow the cover page and precede the  
    body of the CDD. 
 c. Section Descriptions.  The CDD shall have the following 16   
  sections, followed by four appendices. 
   (1) Capability Discussion 
    (a) Discuss the operating environment of the system.  
    (b) If the CDD is part of an FoS or SoS solution, identify  
     the source ICD and related CDDs and CPDs.  
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   (2) Analysis Summary  
   (3) CONOPS Summary  
   (4) Threat Summary 
    (a) Summarize the projected threat environment and the  
     specific threat capabilities to be countered to ensure  
     the capability gap can be mitigated.  
    (b) Programs designated as ACAT I/ID (or potential ACAT 
     I/ID) must incorporate DIA-validated threat   
     references.  
    (c) During staffing, documents with JSDs of JROC Interest, 
     JCB Interest, and Joint Integration will be subject to 
     Defense Warning Office (DWO) threat validation in 
     accordance with reference pp. 
   (5) Program Summary  
   (6) Development KPPs, KSAs, and additional performance  
    attributes 
    (a) Sponsors must consider the six “required” KPPs  
     detailed in Appendix A to this Enclosure.  
    (b) Sponsors should avoid over specification of   
     KPPs/KSAs, or inclusion of technical specifications 
     as KPPs/KSAs, unless essential to addressing a  
     specific capability gap. 
    (c) Provide a description of each attribute and list each  
     attribute in a separate numbered subparagraph.  
    (d) Present each attribute in output-oriented, measurable,  
     and testable terms.  
    (e) Provide tables summarizing specified KPPs, KSAs, and  
     additional performance attributes in    
     threshold/objective format, as illustrated in Tables 
    B-6 through B-8. 
   (7) SoS Synchronization. In SoS capability solutions, the CDD  
    Sponsor is responsible for ensuring that related capability  
    solutions, identified in other CDDs and CPDs, remain  
    compatible and that the development is synchronized. 
     (a) Discuss the relationship of the system described in this  
     CDD to other systems contributing to satisfying the  
     capability requirements.  
    (b) Provide a table that briefly describes the contribution  
     this CDD makes to the fulfillment of capability  
     requirements and closing of capability gaps   
     described in the applicable ICDs, and the   
     relationships to other CDDs and CPDs that also  
     support these capability requirements, as illustrated  
     in Table B-9.  
   (8) Spectrum Requirements  
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   (9) Intelligence Supportability 
    (a) Identify, as specifically as possible, all projected need  
     for intelligence support throughout the expected  
     acquisition life cycle in accordance with reference  
     pp. 
    (b) During staffing, documents with JSDs of JROC Interest, 
     JCB Interest, and Joint Integration will be subject to 
     Joint Staff J-2 intelligence certification in   
     accordance with reference pp. 
   (10) Weapon Safety Assurance. In accordance with reference tt, all 
    munitions capable of being handled, transported, used, or  
    stored by any Service in joint warfighting environments are 
    considered to be joint weapons and require a joint weapons  
    safety review in accordance with Appendix A to Enclosure  
    D of this Manual and references tt through vv.  
    (a) System Safety  
    (b) Insensitive Munitions  
    (c) Fuze Safety 
    (d) Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
    (e) Demilitarization/Disposal  
    (f) Laser Safety  
   (11) Technology Readiness Assessment  
   (12) Assets Necessary to Achieve IOC  
   (13) IOC and FOC Schedule Definitions  
   (14) DOTmLPF-P Considerations  
    (a) Discuss any additional DOTmLPF-P implications  
     associated with fielding the system, to include those 
     approaches that would impact CONOPS or plans  
     within a CCMD Area of Responsibility (AOR).  
    (b) Highlight the status (timing and funding) of the other  
     DOTmLPF-P considerations. 
    (c) Describe, at an appropriate level of detail, the key  
     logistics criteria, such as system reliability,   
     maintainability, transportability, and supportability  
     that will help minimize the system’s logistics  
     footprint, enhance mobility, and reduce the total  
     ownership cost.  
    (d) Detail any basing needs (forward and main operating  
     bases, institutional training base, and depot   
     requirements). 
    (e) Specify facility; shelter; supporting infrastructure; and 
     Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health  
     (ESOH) asset requirements, and the associated  
     costs, availability, and acquisition MS schedule(s)  
     related to supporting the system. 
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    (f) Describe how the systems will be moved either to or  
     within the theater, and identify any lift constraints. 
   (15) Other System Attributes  
    (a) Anti-tamper, embedded instrumentation, electronic  
     attack (EA), and wartime reserve mode (WARM)  
     requirements. 
    (b) Human Systems Integration (HSI) considerations that  
     have a major impact on system effectiveness and  
     suitability. 
     (c) Natural environmental factors (climatic design type,  
     terrain, meteorological and oceanographic factors,  
     impacts and effects). 
    (d) Expected level of capability provided in various mission 
     environments, if degraded relative to KPPs, KSAs,  
     and additional performance attributes articulated in  
     Section 6 of the CDD. 
    (e) Physical and operational security needs. 
    (f) Weather, oceanographic and astro-geophysical support  
     needs throughout the program’s expected life cycle,  
     including data accuracy and forecast needs. 
    (g) For intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
     platforms, issues relating to information security  
     and protection standards. 
(h) For systems that may be used in combined allied and 
coalition operations, issues relating to applicable 
U.S.-ratified international standardization 
agreements which will be incorporated in the 
derived system requirements, in accordance with 
references ggg and hhh. 
    (i) Whether or not the system must be able to survive and  
     operate through chemical, biological, radiological,  
     and nuclear (CBRN) environments in accordance  
     with reference iii.  
   (16) Program Affordability. Show total cost as shown in Table B- 
    10, including cost by FY and type of funding based upon  
    threshold levels of performance.  
  d. Appendices 
   (1) Appendix A: Net-Ready KPP (NR KPP) Architecture Data  
(2) Appendix B: References 
(3) Appendix C: Acronym List 
(4) Appendix D: Glossary 
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3. Capability Production Document (CPD) 
This document replaced the ORD-revised just prior to LRIP.  The capability 
production document (CPD) can also be an amended version of the CDD, which is useful 
since these documents have a similar format (HQDA, 2009).  “The CPD addresses the 
production elements specific to a single increment of an acquisition program resulting 
from an approved CDD or mature existing technology” (HQDA, 2009, p. 20).  A key 
difference between the CDD and the CPD is the use of performance attributes.  The CPD 
transforms the performance specification threshold and objective values into production 
threshold and objective values (HQDA, 2009).  Another difference between the two 
documents is that a CPD is required for any acquisition program to enter into production, 
whereas the CDD is needed for an acquisition program that still needs to develop mature 
technology before proceeding into production.  Additionally, the document is used to 
move beyond MS C, enter into the production phase, and address the production elements 
of a specific increment of an acquisition program (HQDA, 2009). 
As per the JCIDS Manual, Enclosure B, dated January 19, 2012 (CJCS, 2012, pp. B-41–
B-49), the CPD format consists of the following parts: 
Part 1. Length. The body of a CPD—consisting of the 16 primary sections and 
 Appendix A—shall be no more than 40 pages long. 
Part 2. Cover Page. The cover page of a CPD shall include the following 
 information. 
 Part 2.a. Classification 
 Part 2.b. Title, starting with the phrase “Capability Production Document  
  for…” 
 Part 2.c. Sponsoring organization, and signature authority who authorized  
  the submittal into JCIDS. New CPDs, and modifications to   
  previously validated CPDs, must be endorsed by the Service,  
  CCMD, or other DoD Component J8 equivalent or higher. 
 Part 2.d. Date submitted by the sponsoring organization 
 Part 2.e. Primary and secondary POCs for the document sponsor  
 Part 2.f. Proposed validation authority 
 Part 2.g. Proposed Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
 Part 2.h. Proposed Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) 
 Part 2.i. Proposed Acquisition Category (ACAT) 
Part 3. Executive Summary. An executive summary, not to exceed one page, shall 
 follow the cover page and precede the body of the CPD.  
Part 4. The CPD shall have the following 16 sections followed by four 
 appendices. 
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 Part 4.a. Capability Discussion  
  Part 4.a.1. Discuss the operating environment of the system.  
  Part 4.a.2. If the CPD is part of an FoS or SoS solution, identify the 
   source ICD and related CDDs and CPDs. 
 Part 4.b. Analysis Summary 
 Part 4.c. CONOPS Summary 
 Part 4.d. Threat Summary 
  Part 4.d.1. Summarize the projected threat environment and the  
   specific threat capabilities to be countered to ensure that the 
   capability gap can be mitigated 
  Part 4.d.2. Programs designated as ACAT I/ID (or potential ACAT 
   I/ID) must incorporate DIA-validated threat references. All  
   other programs may use DoD Component intelligence  
   center-approved products and data. 
  Part 4.d.3. During staffing, documents with JSDs of JROC Interest, 
   JCB Interest, and Joint Integration will be subject to  
   Defense Warning Office (DWO) threat validation. 
 Part 4.e. Program Summary 
 Part 4.f. Production KPPs, KSAs, and additional performance attributes 
  Part 4.f.1. Sponsors must consider the six “required” KPPs. 
  Part 4.f.2. As in the CDD, care must be taken to stabilize and not  
   over specify attributes in the CPD. Only the most   
   significant items should be designated as performance  
   attributes with threshold and objective values. 
  Part 4.f.3. Provide a description for each attribute and list each  
   attribute. 
  Part 4.f.4. Present each attribute in output-oriented, measurable,  
   and testable terms. 
  Part 4.f.5. Provide tables summarizing specified KPPs, KSAs and  
   additional performance attributes in threshold/objective  
   format. 
 Part 4.g. SoS Synchronization  
  Part 4.g.1. Discuss the relationship of the system described in this  
   CPD to other systems contributing to satisfying the   
   capability requirements. Discuss any overarching   
   DOTmLPF-P changes needed to make the SoS an effective  
   military capability solution. 
  Part 4.g.2. Provide a table that briefly describes the contribution  
   this CPD makes to the fulfillment of capability   
   requirements and closing of capability gaps described in the 
   applicable ICDs, and the relationships to other CDDs and  
   CPDs that also support these capability requirements. 
 Part 4.h. Spectrum Requirements  
 Part 4.i. Intelligence Supportability 
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  Part 4.i.1. Identify, as specifically as possible, all projected   
   requirements for intelligence support throughout the  
   expected acquisition life cycle in accordance with the  
   format and content prescribed. 
  Part 4.i.2. During staffing, documents with JSDs of JROC Interest,  
   JCB Interest, and Joint Integration will be subject to Joint  
   Staff J-2 intelligence certification. 
 Part 4.j. Weapon Safety Assurance. The CPD will address the following: 
  Part 4.j.1. System Safety 
  Part 4.j.2. Insensitive Munitions 
  Part 4.j.3. Fuze Safety 
  Part 4.j.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
  Part 4.j.5. Demilitarization/Disposal 
  Part 4.j.6. Laser Safety 
 Part 4.k. Technology and Manufacturing Readiness  
 Part 4.l. Assets Required to Achieve FOC. Describe the types and   
  quantities of assets required to attain FOC. 
 Part 4.m. IOC and FOC Schedule Definitions 
 Part 4.n. Other DOTmLPF-P Considerations 
  Part 4.n.1. Discuss any additional DOTmLPF-P implications  
   associated with fielding the system, to include those  
   approaches that would impact CONOPS or plans within a  
   CCMD AOR. Describe the implications for all   
   recommended changes. 
  Part 4.n.2. Highlight the status (timing and funding) of the other  
   DOTmLPF-P considerations. 
  Part 4.n.3. Describe, at an appropriate level of detail, the key  
   logistics criteria, such as system reliability, maintainability, 
   transportability, and supportability that will help minimize  
   the system’s logistics footprint, enhance mobility, and  
   reduce the total ownership cost. Also discuss energy  
   demand impacts, including fuel and/or electrical power, if  
   applicable. 
  Part 4.n.4. Detail any basing needs (forward and main operating  
   bases, institutional training base, and depot requirements). 
  Part 4.n.5. Specify facility, shelter, supporting infrastructure, and  
   ESOH asset requirements, and the associated costs,   
   availability, and acquisition MS schedule(s) related to  
   supporting the system. 
  Part 4.n.6. Describe how the system will be moved either to or  
   within the theater. Identify any lift constraints. 
 Part 4.o. Other System Attributes. Address any other attributes not   
  previously identified, especially those that tend to be design, cost,  
  or risk drivers, including but not limited to the following: 
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  Part 4.o.1. Anti-tamper, embedded instrumentation, EA, and  
   WARM requirements. 
  Part 4.o.2. HSI considerations that have a major impact on system  
   effectiveness, suitability, and affordability. 
  Part 4.o.3. Natural environmental factors (climatic design type,  
   terrain, meteorological and oceanographic factors, and  
   impacts and effects). 
  Part 4.o.4. Expected level of capability provided in various mission 
   environments, if degraded relative to KPPs, KSAs, and  
   additional performance attributes articulated in Section 6 of 
   the CPD. Include applicable safety parameters, such as  
   those related to system, nuclear, explosive, and flight  
   safety. 
  Part 4.o.5. Physical and operational security needs. 
  Part 4.o.6. Weather, oceanographic and astro-geophysical support  
   needs throughout the program’s expected life cycle,  
   including data accuracy and forecast needs. 
  Part 4.o.7. For ISR platforms, issues relating to information  
   protection standards. 
  Part 4.o.8. For systems that may be used in combined allied and  
   coalition operations, issues relating to the potentially  
   applicable U.S.-ratified international standardization  
   agreements. Provide an initial indication of which ones will 
   be incorporated in the derived system requirements. 
  Part 4.o.9. Whether or not the system must be able to survive and  
   operate through CBRN environments. 
 Part 4.p. Program Affordability 
Part 5. Appendices 
 (1) Appendix A. Net-Ready KPP Architecture Data 
 (2) Appendix B. References 
 (3) Appendix C. Acronym List 
 (4) Appendix D. Glossary 
E. STAKEHOLDERS 
Every requirements document has a vast network of personnel who have specific 
responsibilities associated with a particular document.  This begins at conception as a 
document comes into existence, all the way through staffing and approval, and eventually 
onto execution.  Knowing the stakeholders involved throughout the review and approval 
process leads to an understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of the documents.  
Additionally, this provides the ability to analyze what changes are needed to aid a 
specific set of stakeholders for the lifespan of the document. 
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Determining specific stakeholders first requires defining the term “stakeholder.”  
In addition, the term “stakeholder” is commonly used in conjunction with the term 
“user.”  Generally, the term “user” in the DoD refers to the “warfighter.”  The warfighters 
are the personnel that directly use the product produced from an acquisition program 
guided by requirements documents from the old RGS and the new JCIDS processes.  In 
this paper, the term “user” applies to materiel developer and the acquisition program 
office.  These are the entities that use the requirements documents to produce a material 
solution.  Whereas, the term “stakeholder” applies to the multiple entities, person or 
office, that have roles dealing with the development and writing, review and approval, 
and ultimately the execution of a requirements document.  
Warfighters are both the stakeholders and users in the RGP.  As a user, they are 
the beginning and end point for the use of a product produced from the acquisition 
process.  CJCSI 3170.01C defines user and user representatives as follows: 
user - An operational command or agency that receives or will receive 
benefit from the acquired system. Combatant commanders and their 
Service Component commands are the users. There may be more than one 
user for a system. Because the Service Component commands are required 
to organize, equip and train forces for the combatant commanders, they 
are seen as users for systems. The Chiefs of the Services and heads of 
other DOD Components are validation and approval authorities and are 
not viewed as users. 
user representative - A command or agency that has been formally 
designated by proper authority to represent single or multiple users in the 
capabilities and acquisition process. The Services and the Service 
Components of the combatant commanders are normally the user 
representatives. There should only be one user representative for a system.  
(CJCS, 2012, p. GL-11) 
These quotes show how the warfighter is viewed as the overall user for an acquisition 
program.  However, we are looking at the warfighter in a stakeholder perspective.  As a 
stakeholder, they initiate the acquisition process by stating and identifying a need for 
some solution to an existing capability gap that prevents them from completing their 
mission.  Warfighters submit their request for a desired need to the CMBTDEV, 
providing the first requirement to the RGP.  From this point forward, the CMBTDEV 
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develops and writes the requirements for the warfighter/combatant commanders.  
Additionally, field commanders submit an ONS/UONS to request a solution for a 
capability gap (HQDA, 2009). 
Stakeholders involved in a specific requirements document can be identified.  
Stakeholders are those entities directly associated with the development, staffing, 
approval, and execution of the requirements documents.  Many stakeholders have 
multiple roles within requirements documents.  In the following sections, all stakeholders 
are described and their involvement and responsibilities with a particular requirement 
document are explained.  However, the order of presented stakeholders does not signify a 
specific priority or level of importance for the stakeholders. 
In 2003, a revolutionary change was identified to support the warfighters involved 
in the GWOT.  “What’s taking place in the conflict [Afghanistan], in the global war on 
terrorism, and the distinctively new threats we’re facing, [provides] the impetus to 
transformation” (Lucas, Sanchez, Thomas, & Ipekci, 2003, pp. 1–2).  As the Army and the 
DoD close the GWOT in Afghanistan, a change may be required to support future 
initiatives of the National Defense Strategy of the RGP.  The future RGP must undergo 
changes, whether these changes are evolutionary or revolutionary, to adapt to this future 
environment and must consider budget, downsizing, technology, and future capability gaps.  
The greatest questions are based off lessons learned from the past, and what measures are 
required in order not to repeat the shortfalls of these lessons learned.  Ultimately, the 
question is this: Should the future of the RGP be an additional fragmentary order 
(FRAGO), quick revision/alteration of a base policy/plan/procedure, of JCIDS, or should 
the U.S. Army write a new operation order (OPORD), policy/plan/procedure, that creates a 
new process and different documents?  Stakeholders were integral in the RGP’s 
evolutionary changes to produce both efficient and effective MCDs. 
1. Integrated Teams   
Various types of teams conduct an array of missions throughout the RGP.  Each 
team performs functions that are essential to the efficiency of the defense acquisition 
system.  Functions range from roles that are directly associated with requirements 
documents to roles that transform requirements into useable performance specifications 
for industry. 
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Integrated concept teams (ICTs) are teams of personnel that have specific skill 
sets within their discipline.  Personnel serving on ICTs include program managers, 
doctrine writers, combat developers, action officers from branch proponent schools, and 
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, HQDA, industry, national 
laboratories, and potential users.  Personnel serving on ICTs serve to bring many 
disciplines and forms of expertise to the table to be able to review the identified 
capability gap or specified need, and develop the requirements to be incorporated in the 
appropriate requirements documents.  ICTs are used for the development and writing of 
each requirement document, both with the previous RGS and now with JCIDS. 
Integrated product teams (IPTs) come in the form of overarching integrated 
product teams (OIPTs) and working-level integrated product teams (WIPTs).  Both teams 
are comprised of SMEs from several functional disciplines to build a successful and 
balanced program.  Additionally, they identify and resolve issues, and provide 
recommendations to decision-makers. OIPTs focus on strategic guidance, program 
executability (cost, schedule, risk), and issue resolution (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  
Additionally, OIPTs are used as subordinates of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
reviews.   They analyze material alternatives and recommend study efforts before the 
DAB convenes (HQDA, 2009). All of this occurs prior to the MS A decision for approval 
and review of concept studies.  The documents used by the OIPT to execute their 
responsibilities are the initial requirement documents, the MNS or ICD (HQDA, 2009).  
However, WIPTs focus on particular topics, such as T&E, cost/performance, and risk 
management (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  Focusing on the topics allows WIPTs to 
identify and resolve issues, determine a program’s status, and seek opportunities for 
acquisition reform (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  Members of the WIPT come from 
HQDA or Service/functional action officers, and the WIPT is chaired by the PM or a 
selected designee. WIPTs provide advice and aid the PM to prepare a program’s plan and 
strategy (U.S. Army War College, 2011). 
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2. Combat Developers/Capability Developers   
This entity is the direct representative for the warfighter.  The individuals that 
compose these entities can be acquisition personnel, branch-specific personnel for the 
acquisition program, or personnel completely outside of the branch that are tasked to 
develop and write the materiel requirements documents.  All of these personnel are 
within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  Additionally, two 
Army manuals provide different titles for the same position that accomplishes the same 
mission while following the same responsibilities.  Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting 
Capabilities Determination (HQDA, 2009), clearly identifies CMBTDEV as the 
requirements writer for the warfighter who resides within TRADOC.  However, How the 
Army Runs (2011–2012 ed.; U.S. Army War College, 2011) identifies this entity as the 
Capability Developer (CAPDEV).  The only distinction between the two entities is their 
title.  For this project, we use the term CBTDEV.  AR 71-9 (HQDA, 2009) states 
CBTDEV’s responsibilities as the following: 
1.  Utilize Army and Joint capstone concepts to develop operating and 
functional concepts detailing how the Army will operate as part of a Joint 
warfighting force. Link the concepts to Joint capability areas (JCAs) for 
relevancy to Joint capability needs. Develop component cost position 
(CCP) as required to define/refine operational, warfighting requirements 
for a particular warfighting function or capability area. When CCP are 
required, CCP developers will outline the basic capability requirements to 
provide enough detail to initiate a capabilities-based assessment as 
outlined in the JCIDS Manual. All concepts must illustrate how future 
forces will operate, describe the capabilities required to carry out a range 
of military operations against adversaries in the expected Joint operational 
environment, and how a commander, using military art and science, might 
employ these capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives.  
2.  Utilize the contemporary operational environment and Joint Operating 
Environment. The operational environment must describe the composite 
of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of 
military forces and bear on the decisions of commanders. It depicts the 
challenging, adaptive global setting the U.S. Army military will encounter 
over the next 20 years and beyond, and provides the fundamental context 
for Army and Joint experiments and training. It must provide the essential 
foundation for developing concepts and writing requirements; define the 
threat and environment for individual and collective training across 
schools and combat training centers (CTCs); and provide benchmarks for 
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comparing risk, effectiveness, and cost in potential DOTMLPF solutions 
and for testing materiel solutions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.  
3.  Ensure only validated threat assessments are used in concept 
development and any modeling efforts supporting capabilities 
determination.  
4.  Ensure the appropriate experimentation is conducted to validate 
concepts. (HQDA, 2009, p. 8) 
CBTDEVs are involved in the process of developing and writing the MNS and ORD 
from the RGS process.  During the development of the ORD, they serve as the leader from 
the ICT through program initiation, which includes being responsible for the mission area 
where the deficiency or opportunity was identified.  After MS C, the CBTDEV is responsible 
for determining if a need exists or if a change is required in the performance envelope within 
the threshold values for a materiel solution captured in the ORD. 
As documents changed during the transition from the RGS to the JCIDS, so did the 
CBTDEV’s responsibilities for documents.  CBTDEVs retained the same developmental 
responsibilities for documents as in the RGS.  However, in JCIDS they are responsible for 
the previously listed development responsibilities, but the input medium of requirements 
documents shifted from the old RGS documents to the ICD and CDD.   
3. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
As the main developers and implementers for training and doctrine, they also 
have a role within the process of developing requirement documents.  TRADOC 
examines the possibility for non-material solutions, material solutions, or some 
combination of both to satisfy a specified capability gap.  Their decision is based on 
DOTmLPF-P.  In this regard, TRADOC examines a capability gap in terms of functional 
area, the relevant range of military operations, desired effects, time, DOTMLPF, and 
policy implications and constraints (HQDA, 2009).  The analysis requires the 
development KPPs.  These are the essential attributes to achieve the desired capability.  
The attributes are expressed in terms and values of thresholds and objectives.  The values 
are the required minimum and desired maximum capability for an attribute’s stated 
performance within a given performance specification.  This creates a small range of 
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flexibility in capability that the program manager can use as trade space between 
performance and cost.  Additionally, KPPs are identified in the CDD/CPD directly 
traceable to attributes identified within the ICD.   
All of the analysis, such as the capabilities based assessment, from TRADOC is 
captured in the ICD.  The ICD serves as the medium for the TRADOC commander to 
submit an evaluation and or recommendation to Headquarters, Department of the Army 
(HQDA) for approval (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  TRADOC also assumes the 
responsibility for submitting additional documents throughout the RGP.  One such 
document is the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD), submitted to the Army deputy chief 
of staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 (HQDA, 2009).  TRADOC outlines KPPs, key system attributes, 
and other attributes within the document (HQDA, 2009).  Finally, TRADOC uses the 
CDD to develop and write the CPD, which is submitted to the DCS, G-3/5/7 (HQDA, 
2009).  The formats for the documents are similar, and the CPD provides the number of 
items to be produced for fielding based on the analysis of what is needed within Army 
units’ MTO&Es. 
4. Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 
The DCS, G-3/5/7 serves as the “current and Future Warfighting Capabilities 
Division Gatekeeper for staff coordination, validation, and approval, and forwarding to 
Joint staffing” (HQDA, 2009, p. 20).  As per Army Regulation 70-1, DCS, G-3/5/7 is to 
“develop Army policy and guidance for materiel requirements and capabilities 
development programs, to include the development and integration of capabilities 
documents and horizontal requirements integration processes” (HQDA, 2011a, p. 19).  
The DCS, G-3/5/7 performs the gatekeeper role for the ICD, CDD, and CPD.  The 
gatekeeper role is the single point of entry and exit for requirements documents.  “Army 
Gatekeepers manage the CAMS [capability and AROC management system tool] to 
ensure consistency of staff coordination as JCIDS proposals progress through the 
validation and approval process” (HQDA, 2009, p. 15).  All requirements documents that 
are submitted for review and approval are required to go through the DCS, G-3/5/7.  This 
is the entity responsible for validating and integrating a DOTmLPF-P review (HQDA, 
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2011a).  Additionally, the DCS, G-3/5/7 conducts an evaluation of materiel requirements 
and critical operational issues and criteria for all ACAT programs (HQDA, 2011a). 
5. Headquarters, Department of the Army 
This entity was responsible for managing the requirements determination process 
during the RGS.  It served as the approval authority for materiel requirements through the 
Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC).  Additionally, HQDA validated and 
approved all RGS documents (MNS, CRD, and ORD).  As the approval authority, it also 
examined and identified possible alternatives to meet a capability gap prior to entering 
MS A.  However, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approves 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID or Joint or other Service-specific programs (HQDA, 
2009).  Although the JROC serves as the approval authority for main ACAT programs, 
some approval is left with the Services.  Some capability documents are validated by the 
Services based on the level of the ACAT program, which also takes into account the cost 
of the particular acquisition program. 
6. Army Requirements Oversight Council 
The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) is responsible for reviewing 
all requirements that went into the materiel requirements documents.  For the RGS 
process, this was the MNS document and now for the JCIDS process this is the ICD.  
Additionally, the AROC approves the CDD and CPD as well.  Plus, the Council is 
responsible for evaluating the relevancy of materiel requirements for the Army’s needs.  
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) serves as the AROC’s chair during both the 
JCIDS and the previous RGS process.  The council considers requirements in terms of 
affordability and interoperability.  Additionally, the AROC advises the Chief of Staff of 
the Army (CSA) on warfighting requirements.  The AROC consists of the following 
permanent principal members: 
Vice Chief of Staff, Army (Chair) 
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology) 
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Chief Information Officer (CIO)/Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6 
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 (Secretary) 
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 
Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Cost & Economics 
CG, Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC). (U.S. Army War 
College, 2011, p. 217) 
7. Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
The Council reviews and validates that a mission is incapable of being satisfied 
through a non-material solution.  In this role, the Council recommends warfighting 
capabilities and requirements for acquisition programs.  Additionally, the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) assigns Joint priorities among major programs 
with valid requirements identified by CCDRs, Services and others.  Based on assigned 
priorities, the Council identifies, evaluates, and designates potential candidates for Joint 
acquisition programs while resolving requirement issues across the Services.  One of the 
more critical functions of the JROC is to “review military needs and acquisition programs 
with emphasis on ensuring interoperability, pursuing opportunities for Joint or multi-
Service applications, eliminating unnecessary duplication, and promoting cost savings” 
(HQDA, 2009, p. 18). 
During the RGS, the JROC’s role was slightly different when dealing with the 
requirement documents.  The JROC would examine the validity of the identified need, 
assign joint priority when appropriate, and forward the MNS to the USD(AT&L) for 
action.  However, the JROC was the approval authority for the ORDs for ACAT ID 
programs. 
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The JROC’s focus for documents changed as the transition to the JCIDS occurred.  
In JCIDS, the JROC is responsible for identifying and prioritizing warfighter 
requirements.  As the council validates and approves KPPs, even when the authority for 
the capabilities documents has been delegated to the Army (HQDA, 2009).  Additionally, 
the JROC ensures the KPP attributes are expressed with a threshold and objective values.  
In addition to KPP approval, the JROC has “…advisory responsibilities to the CJCS in 
identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements” 
(JROC, 2012b, p. 2).  Additionally, the JROC became the approval authority for the ICD.  
Approval of the capability document does not mean the JROC has the ultimate decision 
on whether a non-materiel or a materiel solution should be pursued.  Instead, they provide 
advice to the MDA on an approach that best satisfies the capability requirement (JROC, 
2012b).  The MDA is the ultimate approving authority to pursue a materiel solution or to 
go with a non-materiel solution. 
The main differences for the JROC’s responsibilities between the RGS and the 
JCIDS are identified in Table 3.  The table shows the JROC’s actions for each of the 
processes.  Although some of the processes and responsibilities changed, one main 
responsibility remained intact.  The JROC was and still is the reviewing and approving 
authority for requirements documents. 
Table 3.   JROC Responsibilities in the RGS and JCIDS Processes 
RGS JCIDS 
Validates need and assigns 
priority 
Identifies and prioritizes requirements 
Forwards MNS to USD(AT&L) Provides approval authority for ICD 
Approves ACAT ID ORDs Recommends materiel/non-materiel solutions 
 
Validates KPPs 
Ensures attributes have thresholds & objectives 
 
Figure 12 displays the flow of the documents from each of the stakeholders to the 
approval authority.  The starting point is with TRADOC, where the CBTDEVs reside, 
and the final approval ends with the JROC.  The figure can be found in Army Regulation 
71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination (HQDA, 2009). 
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Figure 12.  JCIDS Validation and Approval Process (From HQDA, 2009, p. 18) 
8. Milestone Decision Authority   
The milestone decision authority (MDA) serves as the main approval authority for 
an acquisition program to begin or proceed to the next phase within the acquisition life 
cycle.  The MDA is responsible for reviewing and evaluating requirements and 
documents, while paying particular attention to military needs and risk, synchronization 
with Army Modernization and Transformation Campaign plans, and affordability and 
interoperability (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  Additionally, the MDA is responsible 
for issuing the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) at the material development 
decision (MDD).  The ADM determines at what phase an acquisition program enters into 
the acquisition life cycle, whether that is at MSA, TD, EMD or P&D. Entry into the MSA 
phase requires the following to occur: concept studies are initiated, a lead agency is 
designated, and concept exploration exit criteria are approved (U.S. Army War College, 
2011).  Starting in the EMD or P&D phases is based on the MDA’s decision from 
provided reviews of technology readiness levels (TRLs) and based on whether 
component development is still needed (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  In conjunction 
with all of these responsibilities, the MDA identifies the minimum documentation for 
milestone review (U.S. Army War College, 2011). 
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9. Materiel Developer 
The personnel that compose this entity are normally within the acquisition 
program’s office.  This body used the ORD, and now uses the CDD, for developing 
system performance requirements for contract specifications during each acquisition 
phase.  The materiel developer (MATDEV) translates the CBTDEV requirements, based 
on the warfighter’s needs, into performance requirements or specifications from the 
requirements listed in the ORD and CDD.   
10. Program Executive Office, Program Manager, and Other Associated 
Managers   
Several echelons of personnel exist within any given program office.  Using the 
Ground Combat System (GCS) program office as an example, we show how the 
hierarchy appears in a program.  The program executive officer (PEO) is the main person 
in charge of the overall program.  Program managers (PMs) fall into the next level.  PMs 
are in charge of specific vehicle platforms such as the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle 
(JLTV) or the Stryker vehicle.  Other associated managers are the different product 
managers.  In the case of the Stryker vehicle program, this is the person in charge of the 
infantry carrying vehicle (ICV) variant or the mobile gun system (MGS) variant.  Serving 
as the leaders of the program/product causes each of these personnel to have many 
assigned responsibilities within JCIDS.  However, we will focus on their roles and 
responsibilities with requirements documents.  The main role PEOs, PMs, and others 
serve is as the executor of approved requirements documents. 
One of their foremost responsibilities with requirement documents is to assist the 
CBTDEV with developing CDDs and CPDs.  They aid in providing schedule, 
performance, estimated materiel acquisition cost, availability, and technical information 
(HQDA, 2009).  Additionally, they incorporate capabilities for system training into the 
materiel system in compliance with the approved CDD and CPD, while integrating 
involvement from the CBTDEV and TNGDEV (HQDA, 2009).  Another responsibility is 
the creation of the request for proposal (RFP) based on the approved CDD and CPD.  
This occurs through coordination with the CBTDEV and by conducting a crosswalk of 
the CDD and CPD to ensure all specifications and statements of work (SOWs) accurately 
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reflect the operational requirements.  Once this occurs, the CBTDEV then certifies the 
RFP prior to the program or OIPT review (HQDA, 2009). 
Although many of the roles of the PEO, PM, and others occur with the CDD and 
CPD, they do have a role earlier in the process.  They lead the IPT for cost performance.  
Additionally, they institute cost as an independent variable.  Cost as an independent 
variable allows the managers to examine what the associated cost would be for a specific 
level of performance stated within the requirements documents.  This allows the ability to 
monitor cost and possibly produce savings by mapping out the associated costs at the 
threshold and objective levels of performance.  The PM can then conduct analysis on 
how to best achieve the requirements expressed within the documents to achieve cost 
savings to the government.  Cost savings is achieved by the tradeoff space between the 
threshold and objective values.  Another responsibility they have with the ICD and CDD 
is to translate the requirements in these documents into system specifications and designs 
that are testable and verifiable (U.S. Army War College, 2011).  Plus, the personnel give 
the MATDEV perspective when providing recommendations to Army Modernization 
Plans (HQDA, 2009). 
11. Summary 
In summation, many stakeholders are involved throughout the development of 
any one materiel requirement document.  Special care of the information placed in a 
requirement document is a necessity.  Both the stakeholders and the users use this 
information.  A lack of information or poor quality of information can pose a severe 
strain on the users as they execute the documents for their acquisition program.  Table 4 
captures the stakeholders and users and displays their role(s) for a particular document.  
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In addition, Table 4 helps illustrate the multiple connecting roles that exist and 
how important the correct information is within each requirement document.  
Stakeholders, such as the MATDEV and PM, are involved with each of the requirements 
documents throughout the entire JCIDS process.  Thus, correct, concise, and clear 
information allows for a successful acquisition program that provides the warfighter with 
a system or piece of equipment that meets its desired need. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Overall, CJCSI 3170.01 has evolved from CJCSI 3170.01C (CJCS, 2003) to 
CJCSI 3170.01H (CJCS, 2012).  The requirements documents have continuously evolved 
with more precise regulations and formats.  CJCSI 3170.01 version C was published in 
2003, verision D in 2004, version E in 2005, version F in 2007, version G in 2009, and 
the most recent version H in 2012.  These evolutionary changes were refinements to the 
JCIDS process over a span of nine years to improve efficiency in the RGP.  The intent to 
redefine these requirements documents has been to systematically focus the requirements 
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of the warfighter in order to accommodate the rigors of the Army’s acquisition process.  
A change was necessary to shift concepts from requirements based to capabilities based. 
Emerging capability gaps were rapidly being identified as materiel and non-materiel 
solutions attempted to keep up with the inflow.  The key stakeholders involved in the 
RGP did not need to know what warfighters wanted, but the capability that the 
warfighters needed to execute their missions.     
The next chapter reveals our comparative analysis of ground vehicle programs 
that have been developed under both the RGS and the JCIDS.  We have conducted 
qualitative analysis of materiel requirements documents on pre-GWOT platforms, 
GWOT platforms, and future post-GWOT platforms.  Additionally, we draw conclusions 
about future considerations for efficient and effective materiel requirements documents. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, we outline the detailed research methodology that we selected in 
order to execute and meet the project’s intent.  The research methodology was 
constructed based on the data provided in Chapter II, Background, and on the documents 
related to three specific Army vehicle programs: HMMWV, M-ATV, and JLTV.  
Furthermore, our methodology leads into the comparative analysis we implemented that, 
ultimately, allowed us to formulate our conclusions and recommendations. 
A. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
The purpose of our research is to propose future changes to enhance the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) used to 
facilitate materiel solutions.  Our recommendations are developed by a comparative analysis 
of the Army’s past and present MCDs and their efficiency in their respective requirements 
generation processes (RGPs).  “Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, 
document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, 
gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge” (Bowen, 2009, p. 27).   
A comparative analysis of MRDs from the RGS period, prior to June 2003, to 
MCDs from the current JCIDS period, provided us with the necessary data to gain 
understanding and develop recommendations for change.  The evaluation compares the 
RGS’s primary MRDs (MNS, ORD-Initial, and ORD-Revised) to the JCIDS’ primary 
MCDs (ICD, CDD, and CPD).  Inclusive to the assessment are the implementation of 
other MRDs/MCDs used for a more rapid procurement of an identified materiel solution.  
These documents are the ONS, UONS, and JUONS. 
Our comparative analysis identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each document 
in relation to the stakeholders, associated timelines, and redundancies within the RGP.  
Additionally, we have identified benefits and types of change required for implementation 
of our recommendations.  Our project’s predominant purpose is to provide 
recommendations for enhanced MCDs for the future Army’s RGP.  To accomplish this 
purpose, we have used a six-step research methodology based on the Client Opinions 
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Model (Client Opinions, n.d.), and may be better comprehended with the aid of Figure 13.  
Additionally, we have tailored this model to project to enhance our analysis.  
 
Figure 13.  Six Steps of Research Methodology (After Client Opinions, n.d.) 
B. APPROACH TO RESEARCH 
Our research project used qualitative data, gathered from key stakeholders and 
subject-matter experts who have either undergone or are undergoing the implementation 
of MRDs/MCDs throughout the life cycle of ACAT I programs.  We have conducted a 
comparative analysis of MRDs/MCDs from three Army vehicle programs.   
Our research is broken down by five distinctive qualitative approaches based on 
qualitative research designs from Lindquists (n.d.): (1) Historical, (2) Phenomenology, 
(3) Grounded Theory, (4) Ethnography, and (5) Case Study. 
An historical approach examines key activities and events from the past of the 
RGP.  We have been able to understand the evolution of the RGP to the present JCIDS 
process, as well as project the potential evolution of future RGP initiatives.  We have 
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been able to gain this understanding by studying past DoD policies, documents, 
regulations, doctrine, studies, reports, and programs.  The historical data have allowed us 
to develop our research questions and ideas.  We have analyzed the quality and reliability 
of this data and developed an opinion on what has been beneficial in the past, and what 
factors have constrained the RGP.  By doing so, we have also been able to develop and 
refine the organization of our research methodology and how we have continued to 
gather additional data that we formulated in our interview questions.  The historical 
approach has also allowed us to recognize contradicting data necessary to analyze the 
evolution of the RGP that was crucial to reaching our recommendations in this project.  
Ultimately, this approach defines our ability to present our information in the most 
effective order. 
The stakeholders primarily drive the phenomenology approach.  We have utilized 
this approach to construct our list of interviewees and interview questions, and to guide 
conversations with our selected stakeholders.  Our goal with the approach is to 
understand the experiences of those who have had key roles in past MRDs and who are 
currently executing MCDs, and to project the effects of future changes to MCDs.  These 
stakeholders are defined by their uniqueness.  Uniqueness is identified by the 
stakeholders’ relationship to and level of involvement with requirements documents.  The 
phenomenology approach has allowed us to maximize our creative methods and has 
required the most personal interaction in our research methodology.  We have had to 
understand not only the data collected from recorded interviews but also our 
interviewees’ duty positions and levels of responsibilities to truly understand their points 
of view.  Patterns, habits, and themes are the primary outcomes from this qualitative 
approach.  We are better able to reach our recommendations and conclusions by 
comprehending the outcomes of this analysis. 
The grounded theory approach allows us to develop our understanding of the RGP 
that inevitably led us to our recommendations.  This approach identifies what the 
standard should be that benefits the preponderance of the stakeholders’ needs.  By 
understanding what should be the standard, we have been able to identify the deviations 
from the standard, to understand why the deviations exist, and to recommend how to 
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minimize these deviations.  Much of our use of grounded theory is focused on the staffing 
and bureaucracy internal to the RGP.  Grounded theory requires a continuous cycle of 
comparative analysis between documents, processes, stakeholders, and collected data.  
All of this comparative analysis is nested to the core concepts and intent of the RGP.  Our 
approach to grounded theory has been based on our evolving observations and opinions 
of the key stakeholders.  We have been able to scope down and modify our 
recommendations by using this qualitative approach. 
The ethnography approach has allowed us to understand the characteristics of the 
RGP culture, both internal and external to the DoD.  Using the ethnography approach, we 
have developed our understanding of the organization of the DoD RGP from authors, 
staffers, approvers, and executers of MRDs/MCDs.  We have also been able to recognize 
the efficiencies and effectiveness of processes from the past and the present, and to 
project recommendations for the future.  Evolutionary and revolutionary changes are the 
concepts we have derived from this approach, and implementation of changes is the result 
of this method.  The ethnography approach has provided us with the necessary 
comprehension of the required culture changes that must occur to improve MCDs. 
The case study approach has been our overarching method to tie in all of the other 
four approaches.  This approach guided us to choose our three ground vehicle platforms 
of the HMMWV, M-ATV, and JLTV.  We are able to focus our analysis by interviewing 
those stakeholders involved with these three platforms.  The case study approach has 
allowed us to synthesize the experience of these platforms’ life cycle within the 
limitations of their supporting MRDs/MCDs.  This has provided us with the necessary in-
depth understanding that has allowed us to define our conclusions and recommendations.    
In understanding the efficiency and effectiveness of MRDs/MCDs, we utilize the 
five distinctive approaches.  We analyze the RGP’s MRDs/MCDs, the MRDs/MCDs 
efficiency to facilitate past and present materiel RGPs, and data collected through 
interviews with subject-matter experts.  “The qualitative researcher is expected to draw 
upon multiple (at least two) sources of evidence; that is, to seek convergence and 
corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods” (Bowen, 2009, p. 
28).  We selected multiple sources based on the acquisition programs we analyzed. 
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Data gathered during our initial research for background information provided 
support and understanding for our analysis of the collected data.  Background 
information provides the basis for the evaluation and critique when analyzing 
requirement documents from the different periods of the RGP.  In addition, the RGS and 
JCIDS processes are differentiated in order to gain a better understanding of how the 
different materiel solution requirements documents nest within the two separate processes 
for requirements generation.  Army and Joint policies’ purposes and required formats for 
MRDs and MCDs are discussed to provide detailed information on each document and 
process.  Finally, stakeholders are identified.  Information on stakeholders provides 
insight for those responsible for generating, staffing, validating, approving, and executing 
the MRDs/MCDs.  Researched background information is essential for conducting the 
evaluation and analysis of these crucial documents. 
Interviews from subject-matter experts and stakeholders were used to gain the 
insights of those directly associated with the documents.  The interviewees varied from 
those stakeholders who have been directly involved with the MRDs/MCDs to 
stakeholders currently executing the approved MRDs/MCDs.  Individuals were selected 
from Program Management (PM) Offices for the HMMWV, JLTV, and M-ATV.  We 
also interviewed key leaders associated with the overall acquisition processes from the 
Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support (PEO CS&CSS) 
and from the Pentagon that are associated with the Chief of Capabilities and Acquisition 
Division Joint Staff J8.  Opinions from interviewees provided insight for the concepts we 
assessed in our examination of the requirement documents. 
Each vehicle program is used as a case study, and provided requirement 
documents used during a particular period of the RGP.  Compiling the documents into a 
case study provided the necessary data for reviewing and analyzing each of the different 
MRDs/MCDs. 
C. INTERVIEWS 
One part of being able to understand and analyze requirement documents is 
drawing on the experience of subject-matter experts (SMEs) currently in the program 
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office and other areas of the acquisition community.  SMEs are stakeholders for the 
requirement documents that are specific to the HMMWV, JLTV and MRAP / M-ATV 
programs as well as other individuals that are or were directly involved with the Army 
RGPs.  Interviews were conducted with personnel serving as leaders in the upper 
echelons of the acquisition career field and personnel directly associated with the vehicle 
programs.  This information provided experience, insight and opinions on what makes a 
requirement document “good” through the interviewed SME’s eyes.  Additionally, the 
SMEs for each of the vehicle platforms were able to provide insight and experience on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the requirements documents for their programs.  The 
SMEs also provided the necessary information to rate the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the requirements documents for their respective vehicle platforms and how well the 
requirements documents met the Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 initiatives. 
The SMEs selected for this project came from past and present professionals from 
three vehicle programs as well as the upper echelon leadership who have been directly 
involved with the RGP.  However, limitations in our research did not afford the 
opportunity to interview the CBTDEV from TRADOC to fully encompass all 
stakeholders.  The interviews and our analysis were primarily from the program offices’ 
perspective.  For the HMMWV program, Brad Naegle, Senior Lecturer at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and former PM for HMMWV, and COL Kevin Peterson, Chief of 
Capabilities and Acquisition Division Joint Staff J8, former military deputy program 
manager and program manager for MRAP and former product manager for HMMWV, 
were interviewed.  M-ATV interviews came from Dave Krawchuk, chief engineer for the 
JPO MRAP and former deputy program manager for the M-ATV, Michelle Minto, Lead 
Systems Engineer for the MRAP program and MAJ Anh Ha, former assistant product 
manager for M-ATV.  The program manager for tactical vehicles and the former joint 
project manager for JLTV was interviewed, COL David Bassett.  Additionally, Kevin 
Fahey, PEO for Combat Support and Combat Service Support vehicles was interviewed.  
People outside of the acquisition program offices interviewed for information pertaining 
to the RGS and JCIDS processes were: Major General Harry Greene, Deputy for 
Acquisition and Systems Management (U.S. Army) and Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Paul Mann / SES, OUSD(AT&L)/ Assistant 
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Director, Land Warfare & Munitions and former MRAP program manager, Timothy 
Goddette, U.S. Army Director Combat Sustainment Systems, and Michael Aldridge, J8 
staff (Requirements Analyst, JUONS/JEONS, Joint Capabilities Division). 
Interview questions used to collect data for the qualitative analysis can be found 
in the Appendix.  The following SMEs were interviewed using Appendix A: Major 
General Harry Greene, Paul Mann, Timothy Goddette, and Michael Aldridge.  Appendix 
B interview questions were used for these SMEs: Brad Naegle, COL Kevin Peterson, 
Dave Krawchuk, Michelle Minto, MAJ Anh Ha, COL David Bassett, and Kevin Fahey. 
Each person selected as a possible interviewee participated voluntarily and was 
not coerced into conducting the interview.  Interviewees received no compensation or 
reimbursement of any kind for participating in the research.  The Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Acquisition Research Program has provided full transcription of the interviews 
conducted by the research team with selected interviewees.  No alteration of interview 
results occurred. 
D. CASE STUDIES 
We used existing acquisition programs as our sources to obtain requirements 
documents.  Additionally, we used the requirements documents from these programs to 
conduct an analysis and answer the proposed primary and secondary research questions.  
Due to this, the term case study refers to the selected acquisition programs and the data 
obtained and reviewed for each specific program.  The selected three vehicle programs 
provided us with the desired requirement documents.  In Chapter IV, we present a 
discussion of each vehicle’s acquisition program.  Using this discussion, we have been 
able to lay out where the vehicles are within their respective acquisition cycle, the RGP 
by which they were initiated, the system they are currently following, the requirement 
documents used in the vehicle’s program, and any successes or challenges the vehicle has 
experienced.   
The first case study is the HMMWV.  From this case study we extracted 
requirements documents related to the RGP period prior to 2003.  This is the period when 
the RGS was in effect and was enhanced when the JCIDS process came into effect.  
Second, the M-ATV case provides MCDs after the 2003 RGP period.  The M-ATV 
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program also provides documents related to the JUONS process.  Last, the JLTV 
acquisition program came into existence prior to 2003 and reached MS B after the 
implementation of the JCIDS.  The program has crossed over both the RGS and JCIDS 
processes.  Due to the cross over, we analyzed documents written for both processes.  
These three ground wheeled-vehicle programs are the source of our understanding of the 
efficiency of MRDs/MCDs. 
E. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
Our document analysis and comparison occurred according to the five principles 
outlined and extracted from Glenn Bowen’s (2009) article “Document Analysis as a 
Qualitative Research Method.” 
First, as indicated above [in a previous section of Bowen’s article], 
documents can provide data on the context within which research 
participants operate—a case of text providing context, if one might turn a 
phrase. 
Second, information contained in documents can suggest some questions 
that need to be asked and situations that need to be observed as part of the 
research. 
Third, documents provide supplementary research data. 
Fourth, documents provide a means of tracking change and development. 
Fifth, documents can be analyzed as a way to verify findings or 
corroborate evidence from other sources. (2009, pp. 29–30) 
Each step provides us with the necessary technique to generate useful and relevant data 
from our analysis of the documents.  A thorough and useful analysis is provided because 
we have followed each of these principles.   
Additionally, we have linked our analysis to the BBP 2.0 initiatives.  We 
identified five key initiatives directly related to the generation of requirements to the 
requirements documents used in our case studies.  The correlation between the 
documents and the BBP initiatives in order to assess efficiencies and effectiveness helped 
us arrive to our conclusion and recommendations.      
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we outlined the methodology we used for this project.  In Chapter 
IV, we present the case studies of the three vehicle platforms used for this project.  We 
also provide an overview of each platform’s mission, the associated requirements 
documents used for each platform, and data collected from stakeholders who have been 
directly involved in the creation of the wheeled vehicles.  Finally, we provide a rating of 
the requirements documents used in each vehicle platform and a summarized comparison 
for efficiency, effectiveness and BBP 2.0 initiatives. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we display our analysis and the findings from our research.  We 
have used the techniques outlined in our third chapter, Methodology, which described the 
five distinctive qualitative approaches we are focusing on, which are (1) Historical, (2) 
Phenomenology, (3) Grounded Theory, (4) Ethnography, and (5) Case Study.  First, for 
the historical approach we have collected data from past reports, requirements 
documents, records, and other professional studies.  Second, we have conducted multiple 
interviews with SMEs and stakeholders (refer to interview section in Chapter III.C), and 
have assessed our own personal experience to gather information to support the 
phenomenology approach.  Third, we used the baseline of the RGS and its supporting 
requirements documents to assist us in our analysis on why the JCIDS and its supporting 
capabilities documents were created.  We extended our research with a secondary 
baseline of the initial JCIDS document and its several modifications over the past decade 
to analyze why modifications were necessary.  An outlying factor we considered 
throughout our analysis was the state of the nation throughout these modifications and the 
effects on the MRDs/MCDs.  Fourth, we examined the culture of the key stakeholders’ 
execution of the requirements documents and reviewed initiatives to refine the culture for 
better efficiency.  Finally, we focused our research on three case studies of existing 
program offices with similar ground vehicle platforms that have undergone different 
phases of the RGP.  We compared and contrasted their requirements documents to 
identify strengths and weaknesses of requirements documents apparent in these 
acquisition programs based on the efficiency and effectiveness of the MRDs/MCDs. 
We have taken the data from these five distinct qualitative approaches and have 
methodically tailored our analysis towards the key concepts of efficiency and 
effectiveness, change management, areas of the BBP initiatives, and the core ideals of the 
future NSS.  By doing so, we have been able to arrive at our conclusions, 
recommendations, and benefits, which we outline in our final chapter of this project. 
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A. ANALYSIS CRITERIA 
1. BETTER BUYING POWER 
On September 14, 2010, the Honorable Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)] from 2009–2011, 
issued his guidance known as Better Buying Power (BBP; USD[AT&L], 2010a).  The 
purpose of the BBP initiative was to rapidly establish ideals for improved efficiencies 
within the DoD, primarily in the acquisition community, as the defense budget was 
slowly being reduced.  The USD(AT&L)’s guidance comprised 23 key principles 
separated by five major areas: (1) target affordability and control cost growth, (2) 
incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, (3) promote real competition, (4) 
improve tradecraft in services acquisition, and (5) reduce non-productive processes and 
bureaucracy. 
In the fifth major area, one of the sub-principles was to “reduce the number of 
OSD-level reviews to those necessary to support major investment decisions or to 
uncover and respond to significant program execution issues” (USD[AT&L], 2010a, p. 
14).  BBP acknowledged that there were areas of opportunities for better efficiency 
within the DoD’s process for producing a materiel solution.  Carter understood that the 
process had often become cumbersome and inefficient.  If the goals of his BBP initiatives 
were to be achieved, he would have to assemble a group to analyze the process and, 
among other things, eliminate waste in requirements generation.   
Carter believed that in order to prepare his workforce and industry partners for the 
inevitable reduction in the defense budget, the efficiency of the clearly defined 
requirements would be an essential element for DoD acquisition operations. 
When requirements and proposed schedules are inconsistent, I will work 
on an expedited basis with the Services and the Joint Staff to modify 
requirements as needed before granting authority for the program to 
proceed. In particular, I will not grant authority to release requests for 
proposals until I am confident requirements and proposed schedules are 
consistent. (USD[AT&L], 2010a, p. 5) 
One of the core concepts of Better Buying Power looked internally to the acquisition 
workforce and how they conducted their operations.  Carter recognized that he would 
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also have to make dramatic changes in-house as well.  The acquisition processes would 
have to eliminate redundancies in materiel solutions and “counterproductive overhead” 
(USD[AT&L], 2010a, pp. 4 and 13) if the DoD was to continue its mission and meet the 
needs of the NSS.  
The defense industry is also a key stakeholder within the DoD RGP.  The 
relevance of the defense industry was apparent when a representative of the collective 
defense industry reached out in a letter to the Honorable Frank Kendall, the then newly 
appointed and present USD(AT&L).  Stan Soloway, president and CEO of the 
Professional Services Council (PSC), wrote to Kendall to emphasize the defense 
industry’s recommendations for consideration during the development of the key 
principles of the next iteration of BBP.  Soloway (2012) stated in his letter,  
The key to driving quality competitions lies in the quality of the 
requirements, far more so than the frequency with which competitions are 
held.  Thus, it is important that Better Buying Power 2.0 stress to DoD 
components the importance of focusing on their requirements and on 
seeking and rewarding new solutions and innovation. (p. 1)     
On November 13, 2012, Kendall issued his updated key guiding principles in 
BBP 2.0.  Kendall still echoed the same crucial themes as his predecessor.  BBP 2.0 
comprised 36 key principles that are separated in seven major areas: (1) achieve 
affordable programs, (2) control costs throughout the product life cycle, (3) incentivize 
productivity and innovation in industry and government, (4) eliminate unproductive 
processes and bureaucracy, (5) promote effective competition, (6) improve tradecraft in 
acquisition of services, and (7) improve the professionalism of the total acquisition 
workforce (Kendall, 2012).  The principles complement each other.   
The importance of requirements was one theme that is emphasized in multiple 
areas.  Four of BBP 2.0’s key principles that focused on the requirements generation 
process are (1) eliminate redundancy within warfighter portfolios (sub-initiative to the 
“control costs throughout the product life cycle” initiative), (2) build stronger 
partnerships with the requirements community to control costs (sub-initiative to the 
“control costs throughout the product lifecycle” initiative), (3) reduce cycle times while 
ensuring sound investment decisions (sub-initiative to the “eliminate unproductive 
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processes and bureaucracy” initiative), and (4) improve requirements definition; prevent 
requirements creep (sub-initiative to the “improve tradecraft in acquisition services” 
initiative—this principle focuses on the writing of performance work statements, quality 
assurance surveillance plans, and performance requirements summaries) (Kendall, 2012).  
Additionally, BBP 2.0 reinforces and provides further guidance for information found in 
the Product Support Manager (PSM) Guidebook (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness [L&MR], 2011) to elaborate on future evolving 
strategies of the DoD.  Figure 14 places the warfighter’s requirements at the pinnacle of 
the Product Support Strategy Process Model.   
 
Figure 14.  DoD Product Support Strategy Process Model (From Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [ L&MR], 2011, p. 34) 
It is vital that requirements are well defined in order to support future initiatives that 
affect the development of materiel solutions.   
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a. Efficiency vs. Effectiveness 
Efficiency and effectiveness are often misconstrued as similar means of 
measurement.  However, they are vastly different.  An example of this comes from a 
battlefield scenario.  For example, infantry soldiers are maneuvering across a danger area, 
preparing to assault on the main objective.  Their supporting 60-mm mortar team has 
trained to quickly fire their 60-mm rounds accurately with a high rate of speed.  The 
mortar team’s purpose during this mission is to destroy bunkers surrounding the primary 
objective and facilitate the infantry’s mission to destroy the main objective.  The mortar 
team hits the bunkers with superior accuracy while utilizing a minimum of 60-mm mortar 
rounds to zero in on their targets.  However, these bunkers are constructed very well with 
reinforced cover.  The enemy in the bunkers continues to lay down a strong base of fire, 
pinning the infantry soldiers down and denying the main assault.  The mortar team is 
efficient in its execution of its operations, but it is not effective in accomplishing its 
mission to destroy the bunkers.   
This cannot be assessed by looking at individual components or teams 
involved in the mission.  Both the mortar teams and each infantry squad must contribute 
to the mission as key stakeholders to be effective.  The lack of effectiveness is based on 
whether all stakeholders are able to efficiently conduct their roles to meet the overall 
mission success, intent, and end state.  A high level of efficiency equates to achieving the 
maximum outcome while utilizing the minimum resources.  The more the mortar team 
executes their roles correctly during the operation, the higher their efficiency.  A high 
level of effectiveness is seen by the outcome of the mortar team’s mission.  The more 
bunkers that are destroyed, the more the mortar team is effective.  Ultimately, the mortar 
team wants not only to execute their mission with accuracy, precision, and speed, but also 
to successfully accomplish their mission and allow the infantry soldiers to maneuver onto 
the main objective. 
Figure 15 depicts our baseline chart for efficiency and effectiveness of 
MRDs/MCDs.  The efficiency axis identifies low efficiency as simply “Doing Things.”  
We apply that to the documents that allow the program offices in this project to do things.  
High efficiency then is “Doing Things Right.”  We apply that to the MRDs/MCDs, which 
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allow the program office to do things right.  Additionally, low effectiveness is also 
“Doing Things.” We apply that to program offices doing things to produce a materiel 
solution.  High effectiveness is “Doing the Right Things.”  We apply that to the 
MRDs/MCDs, which facilitate program offices’ ability to do the right things.  Hence, 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness is “Doing the Right Things Right.”  Figure 15 is 
the basis of the model that we use to identify how well the documents allowed to the 
program offices use the least amount of resources required to produce the best materiel 
solution for the warfighter. 
 
Figure 15.  Efficiency and Effectiveness Model (From Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
The following five key initiatives of BBP 2.0 are what we focused our 
analysis on, per the BBP 2.0 memorandum (Kendall, 2012).  We separated these five 
initiatives linked to the requirements documents into two categories, the initiatives that 
supported efficiency and those that supported effectiveness.  
b. Efficiency Initiatives  
In our analysis, efficiency is qualitative.  Our study focuses on SMEs’ 
opinions on how well the requirements documents facilitated efficiencies in their mission 
to use the least amount of resources to produce a materiel solution with minimum 
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modifications.  Additionally, efficiency is based on the stakeholders and the individuals 
who were directly involved in the execution of the MRDs/MCDs.  We measured 
efficiency against two initiatives.  The first measures the efficiency of stakeholders’ 
collaboration to produce the documents and maximize buy-in.  This aspect deals with 
efforts between the program office and the CBTDEV to work towards establishing 
acceptable trade-offs for requirements.  The second factor deals with cycle time from 
paper to product.  Time is an essential factor to efficiency as it focuses on the program’s 
time to execute their mission based off the MRDs/MCDs.  
We measure efficiency based on two BPP initiatives: (1) Build Stronger 
Partnerships With The Requirements Community to Controls Costs and (2) Reduce Cycle 
Times While Ensuring Sound Investment Decisions.   
(1) Build Stronger Partnerships With The Requirements 
Community to Control Costs.   
This is an area of continuing emphasis in which good progress has been 
made, but more needs to be done. More than anything else, requirements 
drive costs. The requirements and acquisition communities must cooperate 
more closely and continuously to ensure that requirements are technically 
achievable and affordable so that operational and Service leadership can 
make informed decisions about the costs associated with varying levels of 
performance. For Major Programs, the DAE is working closely with the 
VCJCS and the JROC, and each Service has taken steps in the right 
direction. However, more needs to be done to ensure well informed 
requirements decisions that balance cost and performance throughout 
product lifecycles. (Kendall, 2010, p. 3) 
This initiative emphasizes the importance of the collaboration of 
those key stakeholders involved with requirements.  Building stronger partnerships with 
those who define requirements allows the program offices to minimize the resources 
needed to execute their operations.  It is essential that the program offices are aligned 
with other external stakeholders to fully understand and clearly define requirements to 
execute their mission with the utmost efficiency.   
(2) Reduce Cycle Times While Ensuring Sound Investment 
Decisions. 
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This initiative will assess the root causes for long product cycle times, 
particularly long development cycles, with the goal of significantly 
reducing the amount of time, and therefore cost, it takes to bring a product 
from concept to fielding. A full range of factors—oversight activities, 
funding stability, contracting lead time, requirements processes, technical 
complexity, use of risk reduction activities, and testing requirements—will 
be considered as possible contributing factors. (Kendall, 2010, pp. 4–5) 
This initiative also is inclusive to the MRDs/MCDs.  We analyzed 
the documents to understand the effects of their impact on cycle time.  Efficient 
MRDs/MCDs would allow cycle time to either decrease or remain constant.  Clarity and 
specificity allow requirements to be thoroughly understood and efficiently guide the 
program office to manage the development of the materiel solution.  Furthermore, 
MRDs/MCDs with a low efficiency can result in increase of a program’s cost, schedule, 
and performance due to misinterpretation of the requirements.  For example, if a CDD is 
not clearly understood by the program office because of lack of collaboration, the 
program office may dedicate resources towards a materiel solution that does not fill the 
capability gap, thus, resulting in a decrease in efficiency.  
c. Effectiveness Initiatives     
In addition, the warfighter requires materiel solutions to effectively 
overcome their capability gaps.  Three measures were used to analyze the effectiveness of 
the MRDs/MCDs in the creation and production of a materiel solution.  For the first 
measurement, we evaluated the effectiveness of the documents by identifying whether 
redundancy has been created within the Army’s portfolio.  The second measurement was 
based on the quantity of modifications required within the program after the 
MRDs/MCDs.  The final measurement for effectiveness was establishing stronger 
qualification requirements for those involved with the execution of the MRDs/MCDs.  
This provided the ability to measure the level of effectiveness for MRDs/MCDs that 
allow key stakeholders to operate within their own organizations and successfully 
complete their respective missions. 
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Effectiveness is represented by two other initiatives: (1) Eliminate 
Redundancy within Warfighter Portfolios and (2) Improve Requirements Definition; 
Prevent Requirements Creep. 
(1) Eliminate Redundancy Within Warfighter Portfolios.   
Duplicate or redundant efforts occur at the program level due to 
constraints in the component requirements process. The Department will 
identify synergies for existing and planned programs across the Services 
during MDD reviews, Program Budget Reviews (PB build), and across all 
levels of the buy. (Kendall, 2012, p. 2) 
This initiative is our first measure of effectiveness.  A program 
office is able to produce a more effective product if the warfighter portfolio is reduced to 
those capabilities the warfighter needs to fill the identified capability gaps.  This requires 
clearly defined requirements in MRDs/MCDs.  The MRDs/MCDS are then effective 
when the program office prevents programs from developing systems with similar 
capabilities.    
Mr. Robert L Gustavus, a certified public accountant and faculty 
member of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), elaborates further in DAU class 
entitled, “Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending.”  Gustavus explains that this initiative exists because 
the future budget of the DoD cannot effectively support capabilities that are duplicated.  
The DoD must minimize redundancy with the warfighter portfolio to maximize cost-
effectiveness.  Gustavus outlines that by eliminating unnecessary capabilities that are 
duplicative, acquisition and procurement costs will reduce by 30% of total cost, and 70% 
of the total costs of sustainment.  Furthermore, he elaborates that this must be conducted, 
managed, and tracked across all Services.  Lastly, Gustavus recognizes that this is not a 
simple process, however it is key to success in effectively implementing this initiative 
(Gustavus, 2012, slides 33 and 34). 
An example illustrating his explanation is the M-ATVs KPP 
capabilities outlined in the CPD.  These programs expected C4ISR performance to 
support both interoperability and open architecture for existing products.  However, the 
M-TAV was integrated with service specific jammers and internal communication 
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technologies.  By the capabilities not clearly defined in the MCD, PM M-ATV was 
required to engineer multiple capabilities integration.  This created to separate platform 
configurations.  A base model M-ATV, after it received CONUS integration, could not be 
fielded to the warfighters, but had to be fielded to a service specific warfighter due the 
redundancies within the platform’s portfolio.  A USMC configured M-ATV could not be 
fielded to Army units.  This also added increase cost and planning to deliver service 
specific M-ATVs to the best location.   
Thus, MRDs/MCDs that clearly define requirements minimize 
redundancies in a final materiel solution and allows program offices to define their goals 
necessary to meet the expectations of the capabilities gap, and be more effective in the 
finalized materiel solution.   
(2) Improve Requirements Definition; Prevent Requirements 
Creep.   
This initiative is located under the heading “Improve Tradecraft in 
Acquisition Services” (Kendall, 2010).  This point focuses on the writing of performance 
work statements, quality assurance surveillance plans and performance requirements 
summaries (Kendall, 2010).  However, in Mr. Kendall’s memorandum in 2010, subject: 
Improving DoD Acquisition Requirements Development, he states this he has put 
together a panel to review the “…progress made by the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
eliminate areas of vulnerability…” (USD[AT&L], 2010b, p. 1).  He then explains what 
the panel determined from these reviews: 
The need to address requirements development, which has been identified 
as a weakness in the Department and has led to cost and schedule overruns 
on many programs.  Requirements development is paramount to 
successful acquisition outcomes.  Properly developed requirements 
enhance competition, ensure sound business strategies, provide the basis 
for realistic Government estimates, mitigate requirements creep, and help 
enable the Department meet critical acquisition timelines. (USD[AT&L], 
2010b, p. 1) 
While this specific initiative may be focused on the domain of 
acquiring services such as LOGCAP or analytical support services, the initiatives still is 
linked to Mr. Kendall’s emphasis the effects of requirements creep on producing a 
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materiel solution.  We analyzed this initiative to study the concept that if MRDs/MCDs 
are not written effectively enough to consider and project future capabilities, an increase 
of requirements creep will ultimately decrease the effectiveness of MRDs/MCDs.     
The Department will continue this initiative. We have developed tools to 
assist users in writing Performance Work Statements, Quality Assurance Surveillance 
Plans, and Performance Requirements Summaries, and we will increase the training of 
cross-functional teams involved in formulating requirements for service contracts. 
(Kendall, 2010, p. 6) 
This statement reinforces Kendall’s emphasis on developing quality 
requirements for all stakeholders.  This initiative provides guidance to continue due 
diligence to produce clear requirements within the MRDs/MCDs, and to prevent 
programs from continually executing capability insertions.  Programs with expanding 
requirements increase the risk of issues arising later on in their acquisition life cycle, 
which inevitably leads to increased program cost, schedule, and performance.  Even 
though this BBP initiative came after many of the programs, we analyzed the concepts of 
BBP 2.0 in our case study to understand how well these programs adhered to this 
initiative.   
We analyzed this initiative and focused on the aspect of preventing 
requirements creep.  Requirements creep takes away from the effectiveness of approved 
MRDs/MCDs.  Approved MRDs/MCDs generate the forward momentum to begin 
development of a materiel solution.  Additional requirements outside of the scope of the 
MRDs/MCDs creates requirements creep, which impacts the program through the means 
of engineering change proposals (ECP) and modifications to the platform.  Additionally, 
MRDs/MCDs can mitigate requirements creep by identifying requirements and 
capabilities up front.  This mitigation may occur by conducting analysis in the form of 
past DOTMLS and DOTMLP-F, or the present DOTmLTF-P.  Effective analysis 
provides the means to identify and address needs and future capabilities, such as 
interoperability and open architecture, to be fully considered in MRDs/MCDs.  Thus, the 
more requirements added outside of the scope of the MRDs/MCDs, the less these 
documents are effective. 
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Based on these initiatives, we rate an alternative as “poor,” “average, or 
“excellent” based on comments received from SMEs in relation to the definitions of each 
BPP initiative during our interviews.  A poor rating indicates the requirement documents 
did not sufficiently support the program office in meeting the intent of the initiative.  
Average means that the requirements documents had minimal impacts on the program 
office meeting the intent of their initiative.  Finally, an excellent rating was assigned to 
requirements documents that did not impact a program’s performance in meeting the 
BBP initiative. 
Figure 16 is the scorecard that we used in each of our case studies.  We 
assessed each wheeled vehicle platform’s MRDs/MCDs in relation to efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Later, Figure 16 is combined with Figure 18 to provide our analysis results.   
 
Figure 16.  BBP 2.0 Scorecard 
In our research, we conducted interviews with stakeholders from three 
program offices as well as others within the acquisition community.  We tailored our 
questions to the efficiency and effectiveness of MRDs/MCDs linked to BBP 2.0.  Even 
though these programs were initiated prior to the BBP 2.0, the SMEs provided their 
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insights on how they felt their documents adhered to these initiatives.  Additionally, they 
provided opinions on the effects of the documents in regards to efficiency and 
effectiveness.     
2. CHANGE: EVOLUTIONARY VERSUS REVOLUTIONARY 
Dr. H. James Harrington, a business consultant for quality improvement and 
change management within organizations, described the ability to improve quality and to 
reach change: 
[M]easurement is the first step that leads to control, and, eventually, to 
improvement.  If you can’t measure something, you can't understand it. If 
you can’t understand it, you can’t control it.  If you can’t control it, you 
can’t improve it. (Harrington & McNellis, 2006) 
Change is absolutely imperative to process improvement and improvement of the 
MRDs/MCDs that support the RGP.  However, change is often a very difficult task, 
especially in well-established organizations with developed processes, history, and 
traditions, like the DoD.  Constructive change comes from the recognition of the current 
state of an organization or process, the necessity to alter that current state for 
improvement and better efficiencies, and implementation of appropriate modifications to 
better the current state.  Change management is the art of planning a strategy for change, 
effectively employing that strategy, and sustaining the change until it becomes the new 
current state.  Additionally, change may also come in two different forms, evolutionary or 
revolutionary. 
The two changes evaluated in our study are evolutionary change and 
revolutionary change (Cunningham & Harney, 2012).  Evolutionary change is reactive 
change.  It is the continual adjustment or modification to the existing process.  
Evolutionary change is directed when there is the desire to be more efficient.  Since the 
establishment of the JCIDS in 2003, CJCSI 3170.01 has undergone eight evolutionary 
modifications to improve the JCIDS process and its associated requirements documents.  
This is seen in CJCSI 3130.01 versions C–H.   
Alternatively, revolutionary change is proactive change that is necessary to adapt 
to a new environment once the current reality has changed.  The switch from the RGS to 
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the JCIDS was a revolutionary change when SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld identified that a 
new method was needed in order to meet the current challenges of the warfighter as well 
as the future challenges presented in the NSS.  Revolutionary change often encompasses 
an overhaul in strategy, structure, processes, and culture (Cummings & Worley, 2008). 
We have analyzed the efficiency and effectiveness of requirements documents, 
not the efficiency and effectiveness of the vehicle platforms themselves, within their 
respective RGP.  We have identified whether the MRDs/MCDs efficiently served their 
purposes during the RGS and whether the JCIDS documents are currently serving their 
purposes.  We implemented consideration on why the RGS MRDs lost their effectiveness 
and were replaced by the JCIDS MCDs.  Additionally, we have tried to determine 
whether the current JCIDS requirements documents have reached the end of their 
effectiveness and whether new revolutionary change is needed.  We have accomplished 
this by reviewing the MRDs/MCDs from three vehicle program offices and by 
conducting interviews with the SMEs who were directly involved with the execution 
documents for each platform. 
In the chapter conclusion and from each of the individual case studies, we 
analyzed the type of change that may be needed based on the MRDs/MCDs’ placement 
on the efficiency and effectiveness model.  Figure 17 depicts the integration of change 
with the previous efficiency and effectiveness model shown in Figure 15.   
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Figure 17.  Efficiency and Effectiveness Linkage to Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change 
Linkage (After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013)       
The enlarged block arrows show that a need for evolutionary change increases as 
efficiency decreases.  Conversely, the enlarged, block arrows show that a need for 
revolutionary change increases as effectiveness decreases.  The less efficient the 
MRDs/MCDs were for a program office to execute their mission to produce a materiel 
solution, the greater the need for evolutionary change.  On the other hand, as RGS 
MRDs’ effectiveness decreases, the more the need for revolutionary change increases to 
create the JCIDS MCDs.  Therefore, we analyzed the reasons that both MRDs and MCDs 
have evolved, as well as the reasons MRDs were revolutionized into MCDs.  
3. RATING SCHEME 
The final compilation of our analysis is with the efficiency and effectiveness 
model and the integration of a rating scheme.  These ratings are tied into our concepts of 
efficiency and effectiveness, evolutionary and revolutionary change integration, and 
Better Buying Power 2.0 initiatives.  Figure 18, below, is the model we used to evaluate 
three vehicle programs in two different acquisition processes.    
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Figure 18.  Efficiency and Effectiveness, Revolutionary and Evolutionary Change, and 
Rating Model (After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
We examined the MRDs/MCDs of the HMMWV, M-ATV, and JLTV and how 
well they rank in terms of efficiency and effectiveness according to BPP initiatives.  For 
efficiency, we assign a qualitative measure based on SME responses across the two BBP 
2.0 initiatives noted above. For effectiveness, we assign a qualitative measure based on 
SME responses to the three BPP initiatives mentioned earlier.  Figure 19 shows the 
criteria we use to assess efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
Figure 19.  Overall Rating Model (After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
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B. CASE STUDIES 
1. High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 
An image of the M1151 model of the HMMWV FoV is shown in Figure 20 
below. 
 
Figure 20.  M1151 HMMWV (From Banyai-Riepl, n.d.) 
a. Mission 
“To develop, acquire, produce, field, and sustain safe, reliable, effective 
and supportable light tactical vehicles for the joint war fighting community” (Product 
Manager Light Tactical Vehicles [PM LTV], 2013). 
b. Vision 
“Providing our war fighters with superior and comprehensive program 
management services, world class light tactical vehicles, and responsive life cycle 
support” (PM LTV, 2013). 
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c. Focus 
“Close capability gaps, while increasing performance and protection, to 
meet our customer’s needs” (PM LTV, 2013). 
d. HMMWV Background 
The HMMWV began as a joint Service program in support of the Army, 
Air Force, and USMC and was led by the U.S. Army as an ACAT IC program.  The 
initial intent for the HMMWV was to replace some of the family of tactical vehicles such 
as the M151 Jeep, M880 and M561 Utility Trucks, and the M792 Ambulance.  The 
HMMWV program’s purpose was to provide commonality for a chassis to minimize 
future life-cycle sustainment costs.    
The HMMWV program took five years from MNS approval to full-rate 
production, excluding time required to draft the MNS.  Also known as the Joint Mission 
Element Needs Statement (JMENS), the MNS for the HMMWV was approved on July 8, 
1980.  On July 1, 1981, one year after the approved MNS, the Program Office of 
HMMWV awarded contracts for prototype to three vendors: AM General, General 
Dynamics, and Teledyne Continental.  Prototypes came one year after the contracted was 
awarded. At MS C, in 1983, AM General received the award for a multiyear contract to 
produce approximately 55,000 HMMWVs.  Not long after, the requirement increased to 
70,000 HMMWV for production and the cost grew from $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion.  
Then, an additional three years of testing, source selection, contract award, and ORD 
approval occurred before first HMMWV was produced. Finally, in the year 2000, all of 
the HMMWVs produced reached the end of their project 15-year life cycle.  By 2001, the 
HMMWV fleet’s “average age was approximately 10.8 years old” (DAU, 2005, p. 1). 
The aging HMMWV fleet brought about the recapitalization effort for the 
vehicles that were approaching the end of their life cycle.  Recapitalization efforts were a 
recognized need as the HMMWV fleet was becoming costly in terms of operation and 
support (O&S) and maintainability.  The recapitalization program for the HMMWV 
meant that the truck would have to meet new conditions of zero hours and miles.  This 
would require a new engine and drive train, as well as 50 new modernized parts.  The 
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cost estimated by the PM offices was $42,000 to recapitalize a $48,000 truck.  The PM 
HMMWV did not find it cost-effective to recapitalize a HMMWV when it would cost 
$6,000 more for a new truck.  Investing in a new truck seemed to make more sense.  
Investing in a production line that was still producing HMMWVs, versus competing a 
new contract for tear-down and reassembly of an old HMMWV, was the preferred 
approach (DAU, 2005).  Investment in the recapitalization program was also desired from 
the influence of generated ONSs to support the warfighter in the GWOT. 
In the beginning of the GWOT, the threat of IEDs was increasing in Iraq.  
This threat would later increase in Afghanistan as well.  By September 2003, add-on 
armor kits for HMMWVs were acquired in response to an ONS from theater.  The 
original ONS request was for 8,400 kits.  In July 2004, the ONS requested an additional 
4,760 kits to meet the CENTCOM AOR requirement.  The PM HMMWV assisted the 
CMBDEV in writing another ORD in support of the block upgrades and new HMMWVs 
to their family of vehicles (FoV).  This ORD was approved by JROC in September 2004.  
Even though the JCIDS had already been implemented, the existing approved ORD was 
still valid through 2005.  These additional HMMWVs are seen on the bottom row of 
Figure 21.  In January 2005, the first five add-on armor kits were delivered to Iraq, and 
one month later, the AOR commander implemented a policy that no HMMWVs were 
allowed to leave a forward operating base without an add-on armor kit installed on the 
vehicle (A. H. Ha, personal communication, April 13, 2013). 
 84 
 
Figure 21.  HMMWV Family of Vehicles (From Bassett, 2011, p. 6) 
To place this program in perspective, the HMMWV is a materiel solution that 
existed through the RGS, and its life cycle continued through the inception of and 
modifications to the JCIDS.  Although the JCIDS was enacted in June 2003, as per 
CJCSI 3170.01C (CJCS, 2003), 
[d]ocuments that were approved under the Requirements Generation 
System remain valid, except as detailed below: 
(2) Mission Need Statements (MNSs) that have initiated staffing in the 
JCPAT will continue through the normal staffing process. No new MNSs 
will be accepted for staffing. Initial Capabilities Documents (ICD), 
developed in accordance with this instruction, will be used instead. 
Programs that have already completed acquisition Milestone A or beyond 
are not required to update the MNS with an ICD. No MNS greater than 2 
years old will be used to support a Milestone A (or programs proceeding 
directly to Milestone B or C) acquisition decision. 
(3) Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) will be accepted for 
Joint Staff review for a period of 6 months after approval of this 
document.  After the 6-month period, only ORD updates/annexes, CDDs 
and CPDs developed in accordance with this instruction will be accepted. 
A validated and approved ORD, developed under a previous version of 
this instruction, may be used to support a Milestone B or C decision in lieu 
of a CDD or CPD for up to 2 years following approval of this instruction. 
(p. 3)   
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The PM HMMWV continued to use RGS documents to support their program even after 
the JCIDS was enacted.  Up-armored HMMWV were an urgent and compelling need by 
2004 due the growing threat of the GWOT.  The following requirements documents have 
been used to support our analysis: JMENS, ORD-Initial, and ORD-Revised.  
e. HMMWV Better Buying Power 2.0  Efficiency Analysis 
(1) Build Stronger Partnerships With the Requirements 
Community to Control Costs. 
Rating: Poor 
Initial stages of the HMMWV program could have benefited from 
stronger communications between PM HMMWV and the CBTDEV to define the 
requirements in the MRDs.  Requirements outlined in the initial HMMWV MRDs were 
mission-focused to serve the warfighter in a tactical capacity.  There was minimum 
consideration for cost.     
The requirements generation process for the HMMWV were [sic] 
conducted well before there was any cost consideration by the user 
community.  The requirements were transmitted to the PM with the 
performance level the user specified.  The PM was nearly solely 
responsible for cost control and only rarely went back to the user for 
changes in performance requirements to achieve any affordability goals.  
Funding levels typically dictated procurement quantities, not design 
decisions. (B. Naegle, personal communication, April 26, 2013) 
A stronger partnership between the program office and the 
CBTDEV would have allowed for more trade-offs to have more efficiently executed their 
mission to serve the warfighter.  Later, in the program’s life cycle, during the GWOT, a 
communication system was established to help develop efficiencies. 
Additionally, PM HMMWV wanted to collaborate with a user 
representative from the combat arms community to ensure they were meeting the 
expectations of the warfighter.  However, “the TRADOC system manager (TSM) for the 
HMMWV was an O-6, Army branched Quartermaster by trade and still serving the 
Quartermaster Branch” (B. Naegle, personal communication, April 26, 2013).  PM 
HMMWV recognized the importance of the TSM to clearly ensure that the CBTDEV 
 86 
authored effective MRDs.  The TSM had a key role in the requirement generation and 
refinement process.   
The TSMs represented all major weapon and materiel systems in 
development and functioned with power and authority comparable to 
those of the program and project managers within the U.S. Army Materiel 
Command (AMC). (Harris & Robertson, 2011, p. 67) 
TSMs served as user advocates—the “voice” of the warfighter—and 
worked in complement with the system developers. (Harris & Robertson, 
2011, p. 67) 
The PM HMMWV found it very difficult to produce the vehicle to 
satisfy the requirements documents.  Requirements documents must have full attention by 
all stakeholders throughout each step of the RGS process in order to be efficient.   
PM HMMWV reassessed what they believed needed to take place 
to establish collaboration and took the initiative to seek out feedback from the combat 
arms branches.  This became even more prevalent as the ONS came down to produce an 
up-armored HMMWV in support of Kosovo and eventually Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
original ORD called for an up-armored platform.  However, the ONS brought a 
requirement to increase survivability for up-armored HMMWVs that was specifically 
shaped towards the ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  “Capabilities 
delivered in response to ONS documents that required significant research and 
development efforts included armor solutions, such as body armor and HMMWV 
fragmentation kits…” (Office of the USD[AT&L], 2009, p. 13).  The PM office’s intent 
was to get the right solution based on the users that would utilize the vehicle for combat 
operations. 
We ramped up the production line for an up armor HMMWV.  We had to 
design, develop, test, modify and field an add-on armor kit, and then just a 
series of upgrades.  It’s been a case of where you get a basic capability to 
the field as quickly as possible, have some type of feedback mechanism 
forward in the field, you know, once the soldiers tell you what works and 
what doesn’t and the threat continues to evolve and you’ve got to have a 
system to set up here and upgrade. (K. Peterson, personal communication, 
October 23, 2012) 
 87 
Nonetheless, even feedback from the mounted combat arms community to the PM office 
was limited.  At the time, there seemed to be more focus on their primary platforms, such 
as the Bradley fighting vehicle and Abrams tanks, and preparing for combat.   
As a result, the HMMWVs produced would not meet the needs of combat arms 
personnel.  In Kosovo, there were many places mounted warfighters could not take their 
Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks.  They would have had to rely on the lighter and more 
maneuverable platform of the HMMWV if they wanted to successfully traverse the 
terrain.  However, they were not satisfied with the performance of the HMMWV and 
requested additional modifications and capabilities.  Years later, this predicament 
surfaced again in both Afghanistan and Iraq during the GWOT.  These capabilities could 
have been better projected had the collaboration between the right stakeholders occurred 
with the generation of the requirements.  As a result, the HMMWV’s cost increased 
throughout its life cycle to accommodate these many modifications and retrofits (B. 
Naegle, personal communication, April 26, 2013).   
(2) Reduce Cycle Times While Ensuring Sound Investment 
Decisions. 
Rating: Average 
In the 1980s, there was no urgent need for materiel solutions.  
Pressures to fulfill urgent and compelling needs to meet the demands of war were not 
great. Thus, there was not a great deal of pressure to rapidly produce a materiel solution.  
This did afford the program the opportunity to execute the materiel solution in a steady 
state environment.  The MRDs provided clear requirements to the program office to 
identify the ability to use a non-developmental item for the materiel solution.  “HMMWV 
was a non-developmental item (NDI) procurement, leveraging as much automotive 
maturity as possible.  This made it possible to truncate the process, with parts of phases 
and events eliminated, speeding the development process” (B. Naegle, personal 
communication, April 26, 2013).  Non-developmental items yield the opportunity to 
proceed through the acquisition life cycle quicker than developmental programs. 
 88 
The MRDs fostered the program’s acquisition cycle to reach FRP 
in five years.  This short timeframe fosters cost savings for the program compared to 
other large ACAT I programs from the 1980’s.  A report from the President’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management provides the information for the time 
period. 
But a much more serious result of this [acquisition] management 
environment is an unreasonably long acquisition cycle – ten to fifteen 
years for our major weapon systems.  This is a central problem from 
which most other acquisition problems stem: 
 It leads to unnecessarily high costs of development.  Time is money, and 
experience argues that a ten-year acquisition cycle is clearly more 
expensive than a five-year cycle. 
 It leads to obsolete technology in our field equipment.  We forfeit our five-
year technological lead by the time it takes us to get our technology from 
the laboratory into the field 
 And it aggravates the very gold-plating that is one of its causes.  Users, 
knowing that the equipment to meet their requirements is fifteen years 
away, make extremely conservative threat estimates.  Because long-term 
forecasts are uncertain at best, users tend to err on the side of overstating 
the threat. (1986, p. 47) 
The commission provides analysis on the impacts of long-term 
programs.  The HMMWV’s MRDs provide efficiency to the program by keeping the 
program from having a long acquisition cycle.  This also keeps the program from wasting 
money on requirements for expired technologies. 
Factors such as oversight, contracting lead time, requirements 
generation, complexity of the system, and testing requirements were more methodically 
thought out with little pressure to minimize cycle time.  Requirements documents took a 
long time to write, staff, finalize, and approve.  CJSCI 3170.01B directs that the time 
period required to process and approve MRDs should not surpass 121 days (CJCS, 2001, 
p. B-10).  However, in the newer versions of CJSCI 3170.01C–H there is no reference to 
outline time required for MCDs to be processed and approved.  This provided a standard 
time for program offices to expect to receive approved MRDs during RGS.  The program 
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office would know, within reason, the length of time to receive approved MRDs and have 
a greater opportunity for staying on their program’s projected schedule.    
Then in 1996, the DoD put guidance out to the acquisition 
community to reduce program costs by 10% while maintaining the same required number 
of platforms.  The PM HMMWV conducted an additional analysis for cost savings.  This 
analysis provided two examples of requirements in the MRD that could be eliminated to 
increase efficiencies for cycle time and cost.  One example is a requirement for tire jacks.  
Each HMMWV was issued a tire jack but was not issued a spare tire.  An efficiency that 
could have been gained from the removing the requirement was cost savings.  Since there 
is no requirement for a spare tire, the requirement for a jack should be removed.  
Recovery support would be needed to bring a new tire, and the same support could also 
provide the jack, thus producing cost savings in PM HMMWV by not having to purchase 
jacks for each vehicle.  Costs are being created for a requirement that does not directly 
associate to a need for the warfighter operating the vehicle.  This cost translates into an 
unsound investment by purchasing unneeded tire jacks for each HMMWV which detracts 
from efficiency for the program.   
The HMMWV also had the requirement to be painted with a 
special coating that makes it resistant to chemical agents (B. Naegle, personal 
communication, April 26, 2013).  Unlike the armored-track vehicles, the paint is 
ineffective for the HMMWV.  It serves to make the body of the HMMWV resistant to 
chemicals, but the rest of the HMMWV could not be decontaminated with its rubber 
wheels, exposed wires, and open engine system (B. Naegle, personal communication, 
April 26, 2013).  This example shows an increase in program cost and time required to 
produce a vehicle.  Had collaboration occurred to produce a more efficient MRD there 
would have been benefits to costs and time.  The example demonstrates that the inability 
to remove the chemical paint requirement continued to maintain a program at the same 
level of costs, when there could have been savings by removing the paint.  Additionally, 
the paint process increases the cycle time for the vehicle to be ready to be released to the 
warfighter. Thus, this reduces the efficiency, in the form of cost savings and time, by 
being unable to eliminate the requirement for tire jacks and the special paint coating. 
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The PM HMMWV recognized the constraints of the requirements 
outlined in the documents.  In many cases, the PM worked within these constraints to 
make sound investments and avoid costs.  However, the same responsibility exists with 
all other stakeholders in the requirements process to examine the requirements to 
determine whether cost savings are achievable.      
f. HMMWV Better Buying Power 2.0 Effectiveness Analysis 
(1) Eliminate Redundancy Within Warfighter Portfolios   
Rating: Poor. 
The HMMWV accomplished the initial intent of the requirements 
documents.  The M151 Jeep, M880 and M561 Utility Trucks, and the M792 Ambulance 
were all decommissioned from the active Army fleet as the HMMWV FoV were fielded 
to units.   
HMMWV was a joint program from the beginning as it replaced 1 1/4 ton 
trucks, 3/4 ton trucks, and the “1/4 ton light truck, General Purpose,” or 
GP (Jeep) which were ubiquitous through all of the [S]ervices.  The multi-
purpose moniker is real, and numerous different vehicles were replaced 
with the HMMWV. (B. Naegle, personal communication, April 26, 2013) 
The requirements document outlined four land warfare mission 
areas of close combat, fire support, ground air defense, and land combat support.  The 
HMMWV program provided variants for each of these needs while maintaining 
commonality of the chassis and adhering to its functional objectives of mobility, payload, 
survivability, and transportability.   
The issue with the HMMWV was the additional utilization as it 
became the largest wheeled vehicle fleet in the military for its time.  The more the 
HMMWV was being used by the Army, the more the warfighters needed the HMMWV 
to do in order to meet their various missions.  The warfighters began to push the 
limitations of the HMMWV to augment other areas within the warfighter portfolio.  The 
logistics community continued to load the HMMWV beyond its initial payload for 
resupply operations.  The HMMWV could not meet this need.  Requirements expansion 
continued to the point where a 2-1/2–ton truck was considered by the PM Light Tactical 
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Vehicles to meet the additional needs of the logistics community (B. Naegle, personal 
communication, April 26, 2013).  The HMMWV was no longer relevant to the needs of 
the logistics community.  However, that platform consideration was cancelled.  Had the 
program not been canceled, then redundancy would have been created from the existence 
of two programs with similar requirements for managing materiel solutions.  Instead, 
greater increases in the HMMWV’s requirements, such as payload capabilities, occurred 
to meet the emerging capabilities of the warfighter.   
The PM HMMWV conducted interchange conferences with the 
other PM offices that wanted to integrate their product on the HMMWV.  However, once 
the HMMWV was in the fleet, the PM HMMWV soon lost control of configuration 
management.  The PM HMMWV began to receive redundant requirements, such as 
additional lighting, improved global positioning system (GPS), jammers, and improved 
armor capabilities. Thus the program had to continually conduct new testing that 
absorbed a great deal from their budget.  As the new capabilities were integrated into the 
system the older capabilities were still being used.  For example, company commanders 
could use a PLGR (precision lightweight GPS receiver) in one vehicle or use a DAGR  
(defense advanced GPS receivers) in a different vehicle within their company’s vehicle 
fleet (Aboona, 2007).  TRADOC, external PM offices, and PM HMMWV efforts were 
not coordinated in managing or developing the requirements.  The other PM offices no 
longer needed to go to PM HMMWV to acquire a vehicle to conduct integration.  The 
other PM offices could easily acquire a HMMWV almost anywhere and conduct their 
own integration, Figure 22, without fully understanding many important aspects of the 
HMMWV, such as its power capacity.   
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Figure 22.  M1114 Golden HMMWV Power (From Aboona, 2007, slide 1) 
The issue of configuration management was compounded once 
soldiers could purchase commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and conduct their own 
integration of whatever they wanted, such as loudspeakers and reinforced bumpers. 
(2) Improve Requirements Definition; Prevent Requirements 
Creep. 
Rating: Poor 
The MNS and ORDs’ requirements for the HMMWV were 
outlined by the CBTDEV; however, the HMMWV became the victim of being the 
platform of choice.  This resulted in PM HMMWV continuously inserting capabilities to 
fill additional capability gaps.  The HMMWV fleet eventually reached approximately 
100,000 trucks used in full spectrum operations across the Army and the other Services.  
“We could not control the appetite for people wanting to change the HMMWV,” stated 
Brad Naegle (personal communication, April 26, 2013).  Moreover, as the CBTDEV 
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identified capability gaps, and new requirements were generated for PM HMMWV to 
integrate into the material soution, (B. Naegle, personal communication, April 26, 2013). 
The PM HMMWV was constantly catching up to everything that 
was being integrated on their vehicles.  The PM could not fully identify what was in the 
warfighter’s portfolio or the many capabilities being used on the platform.  Moreover, as 
the CBTDEV identified capabilities, it would write new requirements for the PM 
HMMWV to integrate.  One such requirement was to increase the payload capability of 
the platform (B. Naegle, personal communication, April 26, 2013).   
Much like the BBP 2.0 initiative of building stronger partnerships 
with the requirements community to control costs, the CBTDEV needed to assist the 
program office in defining the requirements and minimizing requirements creep.  
TRADOC had established guidance that units could not modify the HMMWV.  Instead, 
they leveraged these HMMWV modifications to produce new requirements.  That is not 
to say that the warfighter does not produce great ideas for modification.  Soldier 
innovations have proven this time and time again.  Nevertheless, requirements creep must 
be identified and not perpetuated.   
Cross-functional teams did not exist to formulate and manage 
requirements.  The PM HMMWV was overwhelmed by the constant flow of additional 
requirements.  This issue was only exacerbated as the HMMWV was being used more 
and more in the GWOT.  Another ONS was submitted in 2003, for a modified HMMWV 
with additional protection.  The 2004 ORD in response to the ONS was as follows: 
Overall Mission Area. The HMMWV mission is to provide a light tactical 
wheeled vehicle for command and control, troop transport, light cargo 
transport, shelter carrier, ambulance, towed weapons prime mover, and 
weapons platform throughout all areas of the battlefield or mission area 
(e.g., peacekeeping).  For units that require specific vehicle configurations, 
the detailed requirements will be provided in kit form, capable of being 
installed at GS maintenance level or below, or by incorporation of 
Component of Major End Items (CMEI)/Component of End Items (COEI) 
by the system integrator. (JROC, 2004, p. 1) 
 94 
The 2004 ORD based on the receipt of the ONS drove the 
production of upgrades to produce a desired survivability capability.  However, this 
capability continued to grow and evolve with the enemy threat, as expected.   
We ramped up the production line there from a [sic] up armor Humvee.  
We had to design, develop, test, modify and field an add-on armor kit, and 
then just a series of upgrades.  It’s been a case of where you get a basic 
capability to the field as quickly as possible, have some type of feedback 
mechanism forward in the field, you know, once the soldiers tell you what 
works and what doesn’t and the threat continues to evolve and you’ve got 
to have a system to set up here and upgrade. (K. Peterson, personal 
communication, October 24, 2012). 
The MRDs, on the other hand, did not capture the growing 
requirement all at once.   
Within the ORD, there were no requirements for electronic warfare 
systems, Objective Gunner’s Protective Kit (OGPK), additional radio mount, navigation 
system, driver’s vision enhancement systems, automatic fire extinguishing systems, air 
conditioning, or other additional requirements.  “Some things [requirements] have the 
right traceability, but you’ll see other things like a gunner protection kit on top of a 
HMMWV and there’s no requirement for that where it started” (K. Peterson, personal 
communication, October 24, 2012).  These additional requirements were the products of 
warfare, emerging warfighter needs, other PM initiatives, and ever-changing threats on 
the battlefield.  These requirements were not anticipated in the writing of the 2004 ORD 
because the CBTDEV was not aware of the requirements for these special items.     
In spite of this, in the race to contribute to GWOT, requirements 
creep grew at an uncontrollable rate for the HMMWV.  Every additional requirement 
added to the HMMWV’s size, weight, and power requirements.  Eventually, the 
HMMWV would fail in many of its requirements.  It was no long air transportable by any 
aircraft or air droppable by any rotary-wing asset during sling-load operations.  It met the 
requirements of the initial documents but simply could not keep up with requirements 
creep from new and emerging technologies.   
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The HMMWV would be replaced in Iraq and Afghanistan by the 
MRAP because the HMMWV platform could not meet the challenges of creeping 
requirements.  The warfighters needed a more survivable and maneuverable platform that 
could handle the size, weight, and power requirements of both theaters of war.  This 
revolutionary change was necessary because the HMMWV was no longer efficient in 
meeting the challenges of the GWOT.  The HMMWV met its initial mission to replace 
older vehicles in the DoD’s fleet, although it was never designed for the requirements 
that continued to grow during the GWOT.  It is essential that performance requirements 
are scrutinized and that cross-functional teams are created in order to better manage 
emerging capability gaps and prepare more requirements documents.  Figure 23 is the 
HMMWV’s MRDs scorecard.   
g. HMMWV Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
  
Figure 23.  HMMWV Overall Rating Scorecard 
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Overall Score   
Efficiency: 1 × Poor, 1 × Average  
Effectiveness: 2 × Poor  
Figure 24 depicts our overall rating of the HMMWV’s MRDs.   
  
Figure 24.  HMMWV Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
(After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
Overall Rating   
Efficiency: Poor–Average  
Effectiveness: Poor  
The HMMWV MRDs receives an efficiency rating of poor–average.  Our 
analysis reveals that efficiency was gained by the HMMWV’s acquisition cycle.  The 
program’s acquisition cycle was less than half the time of other ACAT I programs during 
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the 1980’s.  Additionally, efforts between key stakeholders were poorly synchronized and 
the  PM office had difficulty establishing collaboration.  Their initial relationship with 
their requirements’ partners could have been improved to be more synchronized.  Better 
collaboration between stakeholders would have increased the efficiency of the 
partnership between the user community and the program office required to meet the 
needs of the warfighter.  Lines of communication between the stakeholders started out 
with little collaboration and eventually transitioned to receiving direct feedback from the 
warfighter.  Thus, MRDs yielded low efficiency for PM HMMWV to execute their 
mission and make sound investments with their funding.  
The HMMWV receives a rating of poor for effectiveness.  The HMMWV 
provided a truck that effectively replaced the M151 Jeep, M880 and M561 Utility Trucks, 
and the M792 Ambulance with commonality based off its requirements documents.  
However, requirements creep and redundancy became an issue for the platform as 
changes and modifications were being made to the platform.   The HMMWV MRDs 
began creating redundancy for the program through the analysis of adding the 2 ½ ton 
truck program.  Requirements creep also emerged in the form of increased capabilities in 
response to the 2 ½ ton truck program and the vehicles role and utilization within 
GWOT.  Each of these instances produced the MRDs effectiveness rating observed in 
Figure 24. 
The HMMWV has been in the Army’s fleet for nearly three decades and 
has undergone the experience of both the RGS and the JCIDS.  While the PM HMMWV 
has never had to execute the documents of the JCIDS, it has experienced the dynamics of 
a new requirements generation process.  Also, many of the additional retrofits integrated 
on the platform have had to undergo these new requirements documents.  The transition 
between RGS and JCIDS has often made it difficult for the HMMWV to adapt to the 
many emerging requirements.  The RGS had been a well-established process adopted by 
the workforce.  The HMMWV was in the transition between one RGP to the next.   
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2. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) 
Of note, some information was drawn directly from the researcher’s (Anh Ha) 
personal experience serving as the APM M-ATV prior to this project.  Information 
referenced from the researcher was done in an objective manner only to provide 
information about specific sub-systems integrated onto the M-ATV platform.  An image 
of the M-ATV is shown in Figure 24 below.   
 
 
Figure 25.  M-ATV (A. H. Ha, personal communication, April 13, 2013) 
a. Mission  
“The MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) is used in small unit combat 
operations in highly restricted rural, mountainous, and urban environments. Missions 
include mounted patrols, reconnaissance, security, convoy protection, communications, 
command and control, and combat service support” (PM M-ATV, 2013). 
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b. Vision 
“We are a cohesive, people-oriented, rapid-response, jointly coordinated 
program, focused on new technologies, organized and coordinated to efficiently provide 
effective capabilities to Warfighters and customers” (PM M-ATV, 2013). 
c. Focus 
The Product Manager MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (PdM M-ATV) 
manages the M-ATV, designed to provide MRAP levels of protection with 
greater off-road mobility in the Afghanistan theater of operations. The first 
M-ATVs were issued to combat units in Afghanistan in December 2009, 
just 160 days after contract award. The fielding of these lifesaving 
vehicles marked a significant milestone achieved by the MRAP Joint 
Program Office (JPO) to protect the Warfighters with a highly survivable 
and off-road–capable vehicle. In addition to its ability to traverse a wide 
variety of terrain, its speed transforms it from simply a means of 
transportation to an offensive capability. The lighter weight and smaller 
size also lend the vehicle to somewhat easier transportability. The M-ATV 
can carry up to five personnel—four plus a gunner. (PM M-ATV, 2013) 
d. M-ATV Background 
The M-ATV was acquired and fielded as a result of rapid acquisition 
initiatives in support of the GWOT.  In September 2008, the capability need for the M-ATV 
came from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  The M-ATV was developed from 
the minimum amount of requirements documents due to the urgent and compelling needs of 
the warfighter.  The M-ATV program was an amendment to the original JUONS CC-0326 
from November 2006 and did not require a CDD since it was a COTS materiel solution and 
used an amended CPD V1 approved in May 2007 for production. 
By December 2008, a request for proposal was released, and source 
selection was completed by the end of June 2009.  Oshkosh Defense was awarded the 
initial contract for over 5,000 vehicles.  CPD 1.1 for the M-ATV was approved in the 
beginning of July 2009 and the start of work began by the end of July.  The M-ATV 
received its first major ECP in order to support the Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) upgrade, after the first 
200 M-ATVs had already been accepted by the government in mid-August.  The approved 
solution was tested and cut into integration at SPAWAR (Space and Naval Warfare 
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Systems Command) South Carolina by the end of September 2009.  In the beginning of 
October 2009, the first M-ATV arrived in Afghanistan and was fielded to the warfighter.  
Figure 26 outlines the life cycle of the M-ATV and the MRAP Programs’ requirements 
documents. The squares outlined in red show the events specific to the M-ATV. 
 
Figure 26.  MRAP Requirements Timeline (After Johnson & Iovannitti, 2010, p. 8) 
The JPO MRAP used many tools to ensure the vehicle met the desired 
capabilities and requirements of the warfighters during its development.  One of the main 
tools used by the program office was a requirements traceability matrix (RTM).  The 
RTM provides a way to ensure traceability of all requirements for the specific product or 
system (Ofni Systems, n.d.).  This traceability allows the ability to trace each requirement 
to a measureable factor that can be tested (Ofni Systems, n.d.).  This allows for validation 
and verification of each requirement and capability. 
While the M-ATV has never undergone full-rate production, the program 
has produced over 8,000 M-ATVs in five separate LRIPs.  The M-ATVs were produced 
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in LRIPs 15, 16, 17, 21, and 22. The JUONS and CPD were the requirements documents 
we evaluated in our analysis. 
The M-ATV is a materiel solution that existed after the inception of the 
JCIDS.  The M-ATV’s life cycle continues through the modifications of the JCIDS.  
While the JCIDS was enacted in June 2003, as per CJCSI 3170.01F (CJCS, 2007), 
c. JCIDS recognizes that there are many sources for capability needs 
including: Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs)…for immediate 
needs, combatant commander’s integrated priority lists (IPL), lessons 
learned, transitioning improvised explosive device (IED) initiatives …, 
etc.  Once these sources have been reviewed and approved by the JROC, 
they will enter the JCIDS and acquisition processes at Milestone B or C. 
(p. A-1) 
Additionally, 
(10) Other sources may be used to justify entering the JCIDS process 
without a JCD or ICD. These sources include combatant commander IPL, 
joint and Service lessons learned, joint assessments (e.g., War on 
Terrorism), JUONs, Service urgent needs, IED defeat initiatives, 
JCTDs/ACTDs, qualified prototype projects, and quick reaction 
technology projects. Once the JROC has validated the gap identified in the 
source, the sponsor can initiate development of a CDD or CPD as 
appropriate. (CJCS, 2007, pp. A-7–8) 
Requirements/Capabilities Documents 
ICD: None. The M-ATV initial capabilities document was an amendment 
to JUONS CC-0326.  The M-ATV went from JUONS to CPD. 
General Description   
JUONS CC-0326 was the document that facilitated the MRAP family of 
vehicles (FoV).  The JUONS identified the urgent need for a protected vehicle capability 
that increased survivability and mobility of forces operating in a hazardous fire area or 
combat zones against threats that included mines, IEDs, Explosively Formed Penetrators 
(EFP), RPGs, RKG-3 grenades and small arms fire (SAF) in the Area of Operations (AO).  
The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy shows the development of the current M-
ATV from its operational requirements that were contained in the original JUONS. 
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M-ATV—Used for combat operations in complex and highly restricted 
rural, mountainous, and urban terrain.  The M-ATV provides better overall 
mobility characteristics than the original CAT I, II, and III MRAP vehicle 
variants and provides better survivability characteristics than any variant of 
HMMWV. The M-ATV supports mounted patrols, reconnaissance, 
security, convoy protection, casualty evacuation, DI and C2 functions; 
carries up to five personnel. (Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, 2010, p. 12) 
Because the enemy exploits known ground lines of communications 
(GLOCs) with ambushes and IED and small arms fire, Joint Forces need vehicles that 
enable them to survive the first attack and counter attack (JPO MRAP, 2010). 
The amendment to JUONS CC-0326 requested a smaller variant of the 
MRAP in support of OEF.  The warfighter needed a lighter vehicle platform with the 
capability to traverse the rigorous terrain of Afghanistan.  The PM M-ATV continues to 
use the JCIDS documents to support their program.   
e. M-ATV Better Buying Power 2.0 Efficiency Analysis 
(1) Build Stronger Partnerships With the Requirements 
Community to Control Costs. 
Rating: Average   
Initially, the requirements community and the PM office were well 
synchronized in producing the MCD for the base model of the M-ATV (D. Krawchuk, 
personal communication, April 13, 2013).  Everyone at every echelon understood the 
urgency of the capabilities needed by the warfighters in Afghanistan and that a quality 
CPD was needed to maximize the efficiency of the M-ATV’s production.  The 
requirements of the base model were dutifully coordinated and portrayed by the 
CBTDEV to the JPO MRAP.  Most discrepancies were quickly defined by the CBTDEV 
in order to ensure the right solution would be fielded in OEF.   
I would say the only ones that we saw staffed and we had an opportunity 
to chop off on was the MATV CPD.  I mean we did go back and forth 
with them so that—because they were writing it very performance 
oriented.  So that was a good thing. Some of the performance that they had 
in and their thresholds were kind of beyond what we believe the state of 
the art to be, so we negotiate with them so that it wasn’t.  That was kind of 
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the whole staffing part of it.  We will try to get you as much as we can 
within the confines of what is written, but we don’t want to agree at a 
threshold level to give you something that we do not know can be met. (D. 
Krawchuk, personal communication, February 13, 2013)   
Additionally, the CBTDEV assisted in the source selection process 
to represent the requirements community.  This is a one of the biggest reasons that M-
ATVs were able to be fielded in 16 months (D. Krawchuk, personal communication, 
February 13, 2013).  
However, the CBTDEV continuously received capability gaps 
from theater and contacted the program office for a potential solution to meet each 
capability gap.  The JPO MRAP and the CBTDEV did have an open line of 
communication between their organizations; although the lack of fully understanding the 
dynamics of each other’s organizational processes inhibited them from fully efficiently 
developing requirements for both stakeholders.  The program office did not fully 
understand the operations of TRADOC, nor did the CBTDEV understand the acquisition 
process that a program office must follow.  Although TR 71-20 outlines the process for 
requirements determination, the actual process was not strictly adhered to due to the lack 
of knowledge and understanding.   However, MRAP CBTDEVs did their due diligence 
and wanted to meet the warfighter’s needs as quickly as possible.      
As mentioned previously, the CPD v2 was amended for the M-
ATV and was based on the experiences with the original MRAP CPD v1.  PM M-ATV 
and the MRAP office were persistently doing more with less.  It was difficult for them to 
train sufficient personnel for translating user requirements into system specifications 
since their workforce was so overstretched with ongoing operations to meet the 
warfighter’s continuously growing needs.  The JPO MRAP relied heavily on those with 
past experience.  Many of these personnel were also in key leadership positions, and 
writing the system specifications was an additional duty to their daily roles.  The lack of a 
knowledgeable acquisition workforce from the younger generation limited their 
collaboration with the CBTDEV.   The collaboration between the program office and the 
CBTDEV was crucial for all stakeholders to clearly meet the needs of the warfighter 
from inception to materiel solution.   
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The memorandum on the MRAP FoV, shown in Figure 27, shows 
the DoD’s acceptance of the requirements documentation of the MRAP thus far.   
 
Figure 27.  Memo on the JPO MRAP From the Vice Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff 
(From JROC, 2012c, p. 1) 
As the JPO MRAP grew as an organization, the workforce’s 
expertise also grew from both adaptable senior leadership as well as a new and talented 
workforce across several generations.   
Other non–programs of record may want to emulate what JPO 
MRAP has done to validate their requirements by reaching approval through a program-
created tool, a “Performance Baseline Matrix.”  This was a tool used by the program to 
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explain what requirements each vehicle within the MRAP FoV met.  Overall, the 
shortfalls and best practices of the JPO MRAP must be recognized for future evolution of 
requirements generation and validation processes.  The M-ATV program has been 
identified as being very costly but necessary for preserving life.    
The MRAP team was already overtasked.  The MRAP FoV had the 
largest footprint in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  The program office was working all five 
phases of the DAS simultaneously.  They were constantly receiving new requirements 
from both theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, they were conducting technology 
development for additional capabilities required for the MRAP FoV, they were executing 
additional testing on new capability insertions, they were still in production of many of 
their different variants, and they were fielding and sustaining the MRAPs in both theaters 
as well as home station training (M. Minto, personal communication, February 13, 2013).  
Since 2004, the JPO MRAP has had to respond and answer nearly 50 JUONS to enhance 
the MRAP FoV and balance their efforts with multiple OEMs (D. Krawchuk, personal 
communication, February 13, 2013).  Figure 28 shows the MRAP FoV.  
 
Figure 28.  MRAP Family of Vehicles (From Johnson & Iovannitti, 2010, p. 9) 
 106 
From CPD V1 to CPD V2, the JPO MRAP incorporated over 30 
additional JROC approved requirements (D. Krawchuk, personal communication, 
February 13, 2013).  These additional requirements were above and beyond the initial 
JUONS and CPD.  The JPO MRAP conducted its own case study in order to assist the 
DoD and CBTDEV in divesting its FoV to meet the needs of Army MTO&E (Office of 
the Vice Chief of Staff, 2010).  Traditional programs of record must follow the process of 
the life cycle management system.  If the JPO MRAP were to become a program of 
record, they realized that all required documentation would have to be completed.  This 
meant that the MRAP program would have to start from the beginning of the life cycle 
management system to validate their program.   
The JPO MRAP and M-ATV executed requirements validation.  
The JPO MRAP and the CBTDEV accomplished this by cataloging and identifying the 
requirements outlined in multiple documents to meet definitive requirements as a result of 
requirements creep (D. Krawchuk, personal communication, February 13, 2013).  The JPO 
MRAP would strategically analyze their governmental emails, orders, requirements, 
presentations, papers, and studies to understand what was expected from the program by 
the JROC and CBTDEV.  The purpose of their study was to leverage current acquisition 
best practices to understand their own developmental challenges and constraints.  The JPO 
MRAP objectively examined its program and created its own path on how to defeat the 
bureaucracy and rigors of the RGP (M. Minto, personal communication, February 13, 
2013).  There was no need to reaffirm the DAS since the platform was already showing 
success in a combat environment (M. Minto, personal communication, February 13, 2013).   
Steps taken by the program office and the CBTDEV to begin 
remedying the situation included providing a validation matrix for existing MRAP 
platforms to receive the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s approval for future 
procurements (D. Krawchuk, personal communication, April 13, 2013).  In our analysis, 
this may have increased the efficiency to solve an issue to JROC approved requirements.  
However, this alternative technique did not adhere to the outlined process of JCIDS or 
allow the MCDs to prevail.  This produces inefficiencies through means of circumventing 
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steps that have been developed to ensure proper collaboration and vetting with all 
necessary stakeholders. 
The JPO MRAP produced capabilities documents that validated 
vehicles already produced and utilized by the warfighter.  The JPO MRAP outlined what 
they understood to be 47 performance criteria required to meet the capability gap (D. 
Krawchuk, personal communication, February 13, 2013).  The program office identified 
what capability gap that each platform specifically met.  In summation, JPO MRAP did 
not have to spend time and effort in order to reach the end-state of all of its efforts over 
the past decade.  It received approval that it had met the JCIDS requirements (JROC, 
2012c).  This was a revolutionary change where the JPO MRAP was the first of many 
programs that were initiated by the JCIDS rapid acquisition process. 
The PM M-ATV and the requirements community did not agree on 
many requirements.  First, the CBTDEV continued to push for a TOW/ITAS variant of 
the M-ATV.  The CBTDEV believed it was as simple as integrating the TOW/ITAS 
OGPK turret with mount onto an M-ATV.  The requirements for TOW/ITAS outlined by 
the CBTDEV were to provide an M-ATV where the missiles were stored in an enclosed 
ballistic case and the missile loader did not have to dismount the truck to load the missile 
or clear the back-blast area, while at the same time not taking away from the base 
model’s survivability and maneuverability.   
In reality there were safety issues, the need to maintain the 
integrity of the hull, and space availability constraints that would not allow these 
requirements to be met.  When filled with the basic standard load of water, food, ammo, 
medical supplies, and nuclear, biological and chemical equipment, the only place to 
safely store missiles, especially when considering the threat of IEDs, was in the bed of 
the M-ATV (A. Ha, personal communication, April 13, 2013).  To meet the ballistic 
requirement to enclose the missiles would require an enclosure of the bed area.  This 
would take away from the truck’s maneuverability and add additional constraints to the 
already heavily tasked size, weight and power (SWAP; A. Ha, personal communication, 
April 13, 2013).  A back hatch at the rear of the hull would have to be integrated in order 
to meet the requirements of the loader to egress the vehicle without dismounting the 
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truck.  This would take away from the integrity of the M-ATV’s capsule-like hull and 
degrade its survivability.     
Additional research revealed that these vehicles would not be 
widely used in Afghanistan for either the TOW/ITAS or the ambulance variant of the M-
ATV.  The only units with MTO&Es that required TOW/ITAS were Infantry Brigade 
Combat Teams (IBCT), and even then there were only a few companies that had the 
TOW/ITAS.  If there were two IBCTs simultaneously deployed in Afghanistan, and they 
were to mount all MTO&E TOW/ITAS systems on their trucks, there would be a 
requirement for approximately 50 M-ATVs to have this capability.  The IBCTs seldom 
mounted their TOW/ITAS on patrols, even when they had the capability on the 
HMMWV.   
There was a great deal of conceptual separation between the 
warfighter, the CBTDEV, and the program office.  This separation could have been 
prevented by performing an overarching DOTMLPF analysis when writing the 
requirement.  A great deal of efficiency was lost by the failure to have a better 
partnership in terms of time, funding, and efforts.  Neither the TOW/ITAS nor the 
ambulance platforms were effective.      
(2) Reduce Cycle Times While Ensuring Sound Investment 
Decisions. 
Rating: Average 
The objectives of the initiative were met for all stakeholders in 
many aspects.  The JPO office, TACOM’s contracting office, the testing community, and 
the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) were well synchronized in order to quickly 
meet the needs of the warfighter.  The acquisition strategy of the PM M-ATV ensured 
that few discrepancies existed in the capabilities documents based on the PM’s 
understanding on what was required and of the CBTDEV’s writing of the CPD.  The PM 
M-ATV used many of the same personnel to assist the CBTDEV who had written the 
original CPD V1 on the amended CPD V2.  
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November 1, 2006 was our original JUONS.  We were already under 
contract award by the end of January.  Again, the beginning of May was 
when we had our CPD 1.0.  We have a CPD 1.0, the first one, which was 1 
May 2007 and our CPD 1.1, the second version, was July 7, 2009. (D. 
Krawchuk, personal communication, February 13, 2013)   
They leveraged the experience of those key stakeholders from 
original the MRAP CPD and had undergone the JROC approval process.   
Many of these personnel also had already built the essential 
relationships with stakeholders in the Pentagon.   
As for CPDs running through the JCIDS process, I don’t know what you 
have seen, but prior to MRAPs and some other programs I was on, we 
were looking at a year or a year plus to get a CPD written, staffed and 
approved.  Since we had contractors who happened to understand the 
JCIDS process.  We went from a contract with WBB [Whitney, Bradley 
and Brown, Inc.] to say, “Help us get a CPD written and approved,” to an 
approved CPD within two months.  It was on an ultra-short fuse that we 
got this stuff approved in no time at all.  The good thing is yes, you got it 
done in two months.  (D. Krawchuk, personal communication, February 
13, 2013) 
WBB is a consulting firm that provides contracted services to the 
government and private-sector companies.  One service that is provided and used by the 
JPO MRAP was consulting provided within WBB’s acquisition management function. 
As part of our customer support, we have developed every type of 
program document, analysis, and briefing required by governance, 
acquisition, budgeting, and requirements processes. Because of our 
experience and current involvement at all levels of the acquisition and 
requirements chains of command, we know who to talk to and how 
coordination processes work. So we can efficiently help program 
managers successfully navigate through the acquisition life cycle. 
(Whitney, Bradley and Brown, Inc., n.d.) 
WBB specializes in providing assistance to programs throughout 
the entire acquisition life cycle.  Additionally, they are not a company that competes for 
the contract to produce a materiel solution for an acquisition program.   
The use of consultants increased the efficiency of the MCD.  Cycle 
times were reduced for the development, staffing and approval of the document.  
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Additionally, the consultants would ensure the developed MCD would meet the desired 
needs of all involved stakeholders.  Benefits gained from using consultants whose focus 
was on JROC approval during the JCIDS, resulted in a significantly decreased MCD 
approval cycle time and the development of a sound requirements document.  
Additionally, this supported the CBTDEV’s efforts of their MCDs by providing an 
additional advocate that assisted in the JROC approval.   
In our analysis, essential collaboration and maximizing resources 
facilitates efficiencies in cycle time.  However, this technique is not outlined in 
regulations or policy.  It falls outside the scope of traditional methods.  The use of 
contracted consultants for the assistance of writing and staffing of requirements 
documents may have increased the efficiency, but it does not provide justification for a 
rating of excellent since it is not adhere to policy and regulations.       
Nonetheless, defining the requirements up front reinforced this 
initiative.  The M-ATV base model was created from the needs of the warfighter.  The 
base model of the M-ATV was to provide a lightweight survivable platform.  All other 
requirements were not KPPs but additional modifications that may have enhanced the 
platform.  The M-ATV was built capsule first.  The frame and engine were built around 
the capsule.  The idea was to preserve those who were in the vehicle.  Both the 
requirements authors and those on the source selection board focused on the requirements 
to meet the warfighter’s needs.  Force protection and survivability were the priorities in 
their analysis.  The M-ATV was the approved solution and vehicle of choice in 
Afghanistan. 
The base model M-ATV was built upon the basics of commonality 
in order to minimize logistics demands and maximize sustainability.  Oshkosh Defense 
had already provided the medium tactical vehicle for the DoD.  They utilized many of the 
parts and products that were already in the DoD’s supply system.   
The M-ATV government-furnished equipment (GFE) were all 
existing items in the Army’s inventory, and each item had already met a Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) of nine or an actual application of the technology during mission 
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operations (TEC-SHS, 2008).  This includes using the system under operational mission 
conditions.  The GFE only had to be integrated on the M-ATV.  For example, wiring 
harness lengths and human factors needed to be considered to ensure the warfighter could 
fit in the M-ATV and still operate comfortably.  This was a lesson learned from the PM 
HMMWV.   
f. M-ATV Better Buying Power 2.0 Effectiveness Analysis 
(1) Eliminate Redundancy Within Warfighter Portfolios   
Rating: Average. 
The requirements were well defined in the original approved 
JUONS.  The warfighter asked for an MRAP-like vehicle based on the same capabilities 
of the existing MRAP FoV.  However, the JUONS did require SWAP analysis.  The GFE 
that existed on all other MRAP trucks (such as the Army’s Force XXI Battle Command 
Brigade and Below [FBCB2], radios, jammers, and anti-IED Rhinos, and SPARKS II 
Mine Roller) became standard issue with the M-ATV.  There was no other ground 
tactical vehicle that matched the maneuverability and survivability within the 
warfighter’s portfolio.   
Key attributes—the [S]ervices did do a better job of laying out some KPP 
type things for in that JUONS.  So not that they were all realistic, but then 
we worked with them to help determine that. (M. Minto, personal 
communication, February 13, 2013)  
This determination allowed the key stakeholders to minimize the 
redundancies within the M-ATV’s portfolio.   
The M-ATV was frontloaded with GFE that initially provided the 
warfighter with capabilities that were commonly provided as MTO&E.  Figure 29 shows 
all the requirements by Service that the capabilities documents detailed.  
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Figure 29.  M-ATV Government-Furnished Equipment Requirements (From A. Ha, personal 
communication, April 13, 2013) 
New technologies were introduced at the same time the first M-
ATV was coming off the production line.  Configuration management became a greater 
challenge as USFOR-A(U.S. Forces-Afghanistan) identified the M-ATV as the 
warfighter’s vehicle of choice.  The M-ATV was the platform that filled the JUONS 
capability gaps that enhanced the ability for warfighters to conduct their missions. 
Another example involved the Army Medical Department 
(AMEDD).  There was also a requirement for an ambulance variant of the M-ATV.  The 
requirement was for the M-ATV to carry seven personnel: one driver, one truck 
commander, one medic, three walking wounded who could sit up, and one litter 
ambulatory who could lie down on a stretcher.  The M-ATV would need a device to lift a 
stretcher with a person on it.  Personnel standing on the ground could not do this safely 
because the upward reach was too high.  The PM M-ATV received a prototype of the 
ambulance variant and began testing.  The M-ATV failed testing with horrible results.  
The M-ATV ambulance extended the cab over the wheel base (A. Ha, personal 
communication, April 13, 2013).  Extension of the cab of the base model M-ATV’s 
capsule would not meet the survivability KPP.  Explosion impacts over the rear axle 
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caused injuries to the personnel because it overextended the capabilities of the original 
capsule.  An effective capsule could not meet the needs of the medical community for an 
M-ATV ambulance.  Nonetheless, the AMEDD continued to push the requirement.   
Additional studies also revealed that the maneuver units in sector 
were not taking their HMMWV ambulances on patrols.  It had become the overwhelming 
necessity to air MEDEVAC/CASEVAC casualties off the battlefield as this was the 
quickest means for casualties to receive medical attention.  Air assets could get the 
casualty to the required level of care in a more expedited manner.  MEDEVAC pilots 
were receiving the training to identify the nearest level of care for casualties within their 
area of operation.  Ultimately, the JROC identified that the AMEDD’s requirement could 
not be met and cancelled the requirement. 
The CBTDEV executed due diligence in their roles and continued 
to seek out new solutions for non-validated requirements.  The CBTDEV sought existing 
systems to incorporate into the M-TAV platform in order to reduce redundancy across the 
warfighter’s portfolios.  These requirements were often outside the scope of the JUONS 
and the CPD.  Without JROC-approved requirements, the PM could not support 
initiatives outside the scope of their authorized funding.  The JPO MRAP could not 
restrict the CBTDEV from conducting their mission of delivering the warfighter’s 
requirements to the program.  However, the program office clearly conveyed to the 
CBTDEV that additional initiatives could not be executed without funding. 
The JROC continued to follow through with the outlined process 
of the JCIDS for validation of new emerging requirements.  Nonetheless, the JUONS that 
outlined the requirements for the M-ATV was excellent.  The CBTDEV encompassed the 
warfighter’s needs commensurate to the current technologies being used in OEF at the 
time it was authored.  




The M-ATV became a product of requirements creep as its 
relevancy in theater grew.  The platform, much like HMMWV, became the vehicle of 
choice in OEF.  The M-ATV was the 32
nd
 variant of the MRAP (Kelley, 2012).  Initially, 
JPO MRAP had the ability to control requirements of the M-ATV by meeting the needs 
of the CPD.   
They [CBTDEV] did do a better job there, but when we look at the vehicle 
JUONS’ versus some of the other JUONS’ that we received for widgets 
and things like that, some of the things that tied our hands and didn’t allow 
us to do some of the things we wanted to do was they wrote in a specific 
type of [material specification] not a capability, but a specific [desired 
material]. (M. Minto, personal communication, February 13, 2013) 
Specific material specifications constrained the program office to 
effectively analyze multiple materiel solutions.  Exact specifications can lead to situations 
of requirements creep.  For the M-ATV, this occurred by the MCD specifying the exact 
specification instead of performance requirements.   Projection of capabilities allows for 
adequate planning to allow the materiel solution to be interoperable with other 
subsystems that may be added to the materiel solution (Figure 30).  This maximizes the 
effectiveness of the MCD.  
The CBTDEV and The JPO MRAP worked hard to ensure that the 
requirements were clearly stated in the CPD and that all key stakeholders concurred with 
the requirements, although new technologies had to be integrated on the M-ATV as the 
warfighter demanded more out of a platform.  This caused further demands on the M-
ATV platform to be the warfighters’ tool to accomplish their missions.  Only later was it 
revealed that the M-ATV also had its downside in requirements.  This became a burden 
to the program office once the M-ATV entered Afghanistan. Requirements creep did 
occur as unanticipated initiatives needed to be integrated on the M-ATV.       
The initial LRIP of the M-ATV met the requirements outlined by 
the CBTDEV’s MCD and collaborated by the program office, as a standalone materiel 
solution.  The M-ATV would later have additional LRIPs to build platforms for the 
warfighter and the Special Operations Command’s needs.  The JPO MRAP and the 
CBTDEV had projected additional power requirements for the M-ATV based upon 
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lessons learned from past MRAP vehicles and their SWAP analysis.  Technology 
advancements had to be integrated.  However, other C4ISR program offices also required 
that their technologies be integrated on the M-ATV.  Modifications to the base M-ATV 
platform had to accommodate electromagnetic compatibility/electromagnetic interference 
(EMC/EMI) testing for eight separate C4ISR end items with multiple wiring harnesses, 
antennas, and other hardware while still maintaining the integrity of the hull of the 
vehicle. Figure 30 depicts the base M-ATV produced from the CPD to the C4ISR suite 
modification that support additional technology initiatives from other program offices. 
 
Figure 30.  M-ATV Characteristics (After A. H. Ha, personal communication, April 13, 
2013) 
Once fielded in Afghanistan, requirements creep became the bane 
of M-ATV and its CPD.  Many unforeseen requirements arose as the M-ATV began to 
flood the Afghanistan battle space.  An example of this is the B-Pillar Handle.  The B-
Pillar handle was made for military personnel to easily climb up into the vehicle while 
carrying the weight of battle equipment (Oshkosh Defense, 2010).  Neither the PM M-
ATV nor the CBTDEV could foresee that soldiers would use the horizontal handle as a 
step to reach the top of the truck in order to enter the turret or to clear the OGPK weapons 
system.  Even after the PM M-ATV painted a template with the statement, “DO NOT 
STEP,” underneath the handle, the warfighter continued to do so.  Once the handle broke 
off, the soldiers used the frame of the vehicle to enter the M-ATV.  A soldier who was 
unaware that another soldier’s hand was on the frame would close the ballistic door on 
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the other’s hand and break the hand (Oshkosh Defense, 2010).  The PM M-ATV 
underwent a $3 million modification for a vertical handle that could not be used as a step, 
even though this issue could have been resolved by reinforced training.  
Furthermore, combat commanders made changes in theater to meet 
their needs.  At the initial inception of the M-ATV, the combat commanders in OEF 
required a mixture of OGPK turrets and remote weapons station (RWS) turrets.  The 
initial capability request was for a 1:1 ratio of OGPK to RWS (D. Krawchuk, personal 
communication, April 13, 2013).  The JPO MRAP built the OGPK M-ATVs to the 
established requirement and quickly deployed the vehicles to theater per the guidance of 
OEF-A (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afganistan).  After M-ATVs with RWSs had 
already begun fielding, the new commander demanded a change in the requirement to a 
3:1 ratio (D. Krawchuk, personal communication, April 13, 2013).  The new ratio 
requirement was approved by the JROC, and the JPO MRAP had to comply. 
Threat-based requirements evolved as RPGs were continually 
becoming an issue in OEF.  The M-ATV armor provided the capability against the initial 
type of RPGs required.  However, the enemy advanced the threat, and RPG nets had to be 
provided for the M-ATV.  Bar-armor already existed on the Stryker vehicle but would 
increase the weight of the M-ATV if integrated on that vehicle.  The M-ATV was 
outfitted with a lighter solution in order to stay within the weight KPP.  The IED threat 
also increased as the more survivable M-ATVs were produced and deployed to OEF from 
an increase in production numbers approved by the JROC (Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation, 2009).  The M-ATV had met its threshold solution during blast testing 
(Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2012).  Yet, the enemy countered that 
solution.  The JPO MRAP had to integrate an Underbelly Improvement Kit (UIK) in 
order to provide a more survivable platform for the warfighter (Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation, 2012). 
The SPARKS II Mine Roller was another issue that evolved from 
the combat commanders’ selection of the M-ATV as the vehicle of choice and from 
threat-based requirements.  Originally, the mine roller was used on route clearance 
vehicles.  The requirement changed so that all M-ATVs would have a SPARKS II Mine 
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Roller adapter bracket (Product Manager Close Combat Systems [PM CCS], n.d.).  The 
SPARKS II began fielding after the M-ATV.  The SPARKS II would kick up debris into 
the radiator, causing the M-ATV to overheat.  It became a question of whether this was a 
PM IED Defeat issue or a PM M-ATV issue.  More protection for the radiator required 
major changes to the vehicle, post-production.  This issue was resolved by adding mud 
flaps on the SPARKS II; however, the PM M-ATV invested a great deal of engineering 
and testing to assist in resolving this issue. 
These are just a couple of examples of the requirements creep that 
occurred on the M-ATV.  Figure 31 captures several other examples of requirements 
creep.   
 
Figure 31.  M-ATV Retrofits (From A. Ha, personal communication, April 13, 2013)  
There is a direct correlation between the necessities to align 
simultaneous materiel solution initiatives and clearly defined requirements in order to 
alleviate requirements creep from occurring.  The requirements outlined in the 
capabilities documents must consider the overall ongoing programs’ initiatives.  The 
JUONS outlined requirements at that time, although new technologies had to be 
integrated on the M-ATV as the warfighter demanded more out of a platform.  This 
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caused further demands on the M-ATV platform to be the warfighters’ tool to accomplish 
their missions.   
Furthermore, DOTMLPF must constantly considered by the 
CBTDEV when presented with new requirements.  A great deal of cost could have been 
avoided if training had been implemented in safety of use versus creating the B-Pillar 
Handle materiel modification.    
g. M-ATV Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
Figure 32 depicts our overall rating of the M-ATV’s MCDs.   
  
Figure 32.  M-ATV Overall Rating Scorecard 
Overall Score   
Efficiency: 2 × Average 
Effectiveness: 1 × Poor, 1 × Average  
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Figure 33 depicts our overall rating of the M-ATV’s MCDs 
  
Figure 33.  M-ATV Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
(After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
Overall Rating (Results)   
Efficiency: Average 
Effectiveness: Poor – Average  
The M-ATV receives an efficiency rating of average.  The requirements 
outlined in CPD V2 fulfilled the needs of the warfighter to produce the M-ATV.  CPD 
V2 by a contracted consultant was staffed due to the urgent and compelling need for the 
M-ATV in OED.  However, the use of contracted consultant may have decreased the 
cycle-time; nonetheless, this method is outside the realm of regulations and cannot 
support a higher score.   
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Additionally, urgent needs and rapid acquisition pushed for the expedited 
production of the M-ATV.  The M-ATV platform was extremely efficient in meeting the 
initial capability gaps for the warfighter.  However, well defined requirements lost some 
efficiency as new JUONSs emerged and desired capabilities grew.  Additionally, cycle 
times maximized efficiency due to the urgent and compelling needs for the M-ATV.     
The M-ATV receives a rating of poor–average for effectiveness.  The 
CPD V2 requirements were outlined for capabilities with existing technologies that had 
reached TRL nine.  This ensured that the GFE added onto the vehicle was at the highest 
TRL level to prevent M-ATVs from having different versions or upgrades of GFE.  The 
possession of different versions of GFE creates additional M-ATV variants and increases 
redundancy in the warfighter portfolio.  Thus, MCDs increased effectiveness by 
minimalizing redundancy.  However, requirements creep became an obstacle for the 
program as the M-ATV became the vehicle of choice in Afghanistan.  Additionally, it 
became the common practice for new technologies to be integrated on the M-ATV.  The 
M-ATV CPD became less relevant as every other program came to the realization that 
relevancy would be required for integration onto the M-ATV.  Furthermore, the program 
was comprised of a workforce of several generations and varying levels of experience, 
which constrained the program’s effectiveness.   
3. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 
The below images, in Figure 34, are of the three competitive prototypes for the 
JLTV. 
 
Figure 34.  Potential JLTV Vehicles by AM General, Oshkosh Corp., and Lockheed Martin 
(From GAO, 2013, p. 85) 
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a. Mission 
“The JLTV program creates a common family of vehicles consisting of 
the Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and Combat Support Vehicle (CSV).  The CTV has 
multiple combat mission role variants while the CSV has the ability to be employed as 
either a utility vehicle or shelter carrier” (PM JLTV, 2013). 
b. Vision 
“JLTV—Balancing the iron triangle (Protection, Performance & Payload) 
for the joint forces” (PM JLTV, 2013). 
c. Focus 
“The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is a 
Joint Army and Marine Corps program that provides vehicles, along with companion 
trailers, capable of performing multiple mission roles while providing protected, 
sustained, and networked mobility for personnel and payloads across the full spectrum of 
military operations” (PM JLTV, 2013). 
d. JLTV Background 
The JLTV is a major acquisition ACAT 1D program facilitated by the 
Army and Marine Corps.  The JLTV is the best materiel solution to meet the prescribed 
capability gaps outlined primarily by the Army and Marine Corps’ CBTDEV AoA report.  
The capability gap that is unfulfilled by the current system, the HMMWV, is explained 
below. 
Based upon the Technology Development phase results, the Analysis of 
Alternatives concluded that the JLTV program is the best option to fulfill 
the capability gaps. The Capabilities Development Document requires the 
JLTV program to develop two mission role variants (MRVs), a two seat 
MRV and a four seat MRV, to regain transportability and restore balance 
in the “Iron Triangle” of protection, payload and performance. (Hepner, 
2011, p. 1) 
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Additionally, the identified capability gap requires the JLTV system to 
augment a family of systems to support ground tactical operations.  Augmentation of 
existing systems led the Army to issue an EMD RFP for at least 20,000 JLTVs and 5,500 
vehicles for the Marines (Feickert, 2013). 
In 2006, the JPO JLTV was established.  Approval of the program also 
identified the Army as the lead proponent of the program, which falls under the Army’s 
PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS&CSS).  The Marines have the 
JLTV program under the leadership of PEO Land Systems (LS).  The Under Secretary of 
Defense John J. Young, Jr., approved the JLTV program to move into the technology 
development phase (JROC, 2007a).  The current timeline for the program is shown in 
Figure 35.   
 
Figure 35.  Current JLTV Timeline (From GAO, 2013, p. 85) 
The support vehicle is the two-seat variant CSV.  The combat vehicle is 
the four-seat variant CTV.  The two-seat variant is a one base vehicle platform, also 
known as the Utility (UTL) platform.  The two-seat variant has a payload capacity of 
5,100 pounds (Feickert, 2013).  The four-seat variant has a payload of 3,500 pounds 
(Feickert, 2013).  The four-seat variant has two base vehicle platforms comprised of the 
Close Combat Weapons Carrier (CCWC) and the General Purpose (GP) platform.  All 
platforms are configured through the installation of mission packages.  Mission packages 
include the UTL, GP, Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC), and CCWC.  Figure 36 shows the 
flowchart for the different JLTV variants, and Table 5 shows the relation of the 










Table 5.   Joint Light Weight Tactical Vehicle Configurations 
(From JROC, 2007b, Appendix: Configurations, p. 1) 
Mission Role 
Mission Role Variant 
(MRV) Configurations 
Mission Packages 
Move Small Units, Unit 
Leaders, and Staff 
Combat Tactical Vehicle 
(CTV) 
General Purpose (GP) (4 seats) 
 
Move Infantry Weapons 
and Security Forces 
Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC) (4 seats ) 
(Wpns Co, MP, Mounted Patrol; Convoy Escort) 
Move Anti-Armor 
Weapons 
Close Combat Weapons Carrier (CCWC) 
TOW/Saber Carrier (4 seats) 
Carry Light Cargo; Move 
Combat Support 
Elements;  Carry Light 
and Standard Shelters 
Combat Support Vehicle 
(CSV) 
Utility/Prime Mover (2 Seats) 
(105-mm Howitzer, Q-36 Radar); 




The JLTV program faced setbacks in May 2011.  Discoveries made during 
the technology development phase showed some requirements to be unattainable.  The 
JLTV was unable to achieve transportability and protection level requirements (GAO, 
2013).  These unachievable requirements led the program to the decision of canceling the 
special purpose and command and control variants from the FoV (GAO, 2013).  The 
JLTV attempted to move into MS B but was denied until the program could effectively 
show a better technology development strategy.  The JPO JLTV was forced to review the 
requirements and ensure that the technologies of the platform were mature enough to 
move into MS B.   
Additionally, the program had to overcome the inevitable obstacles of 
future funding constraints and lack of technical maturity to support the capabilities of 
these platforms, and it had to better define the requirements and their associated metrics 
to validate the materiel solution during operational testing.  Better definition of the 
requirements came through collaboration between the CBTDEV and the JPO JLTV to 
develop trade-offs within the threshold and objective values for the requirements.  The 
JPO JLTV recognized that it would have to reform its acquisition strategy (see Figure 37) 
if it was to remain a DoD program of record.  Additionally, the JPO JLTV and the 
CBTDEV came together to better understand whether the requirements written in the 
ICD and CDD were efficient if the JLTV was ever to reach production. 
 
Figure 37.  JLTV Program Structure and Schedule (From Bassett, 2012, p. 3) 
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The JLTV is a materiel solution that existed after the inception of the 
JCIDS and has followed the process outlined in JCIDS.  The JLTV life cycle continues 
through the modifications in the JCIDS.  The last RGP instruction for the JCIDS came 
into effect in June 2012.  The JPO JLTV uses the JCIDS documents to guide their 
program.  The ICD and CDD capabilities documents have been used in our analysis.  The 
program has yet to reach the acquisition life cycle phase requiring the CPD.   
Identified gaps associated with the CBTDEV’s capability-based 
assessment, in addition to protection, payload and performance, are found in the ICD. 
The JLTV family of vehicles (FoV) is intended to fill capability gaps 
identified by the combat developer’s functional-needs analysis.  These capability gaps are 
defined as: 
1 - inability to move mounted infantry/combat arms forces via 
ground 
2 - inability to move mounted combat support (CS) forces via 
ground 
3 - inability to move mounted combat service support (CSS) forces 
via ground 
4 - inability to move light infantry (airborne/air assault) via ground 
5 - inability to move long-range reconnaissance (undetected) via 
ground. (Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate [SLAD], 
2013)  
The JLTV’s ICD established the initial capability gap for the vehicle.  
These requirements for the capability gap differ from other vehicles in the Army’s 
portfolio.  JLTV’s ICD requirements are call for a vehicle to transport troops, assist with 
CS and CSS forces, and provide a lightweight vehicle for the light infantry BCTs.  This is 
different from the Bradley fighting vehicle with a sole use within the heavy BCTs and for 
tactical combat operations only.  Bradley fighting vehicles are not used with any CS or 
CSS operations or personnel.  Furthermore, the JLTV’s identified capabilities gaps 
transitioned into requirements during the process of developing the CDD.  Transition 
from a broad scope of an identified capability gap to the specific requirements was 
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accomplished through close coordination between stakeholders, specifically the product 
office and the CBTDEV. 
Upon the JROC’s validation and approval of the capabilities documents, the 
program was able to enter the first two phases of the acquisition life cycle.  Additional 
resources were used to analyze the validity of the capability gaps and requirements.  The 
RAND Corporation examined, compared, and analyzed the capability gaps and 
requirements between the ICD and CDD to ensure that overlap between new and existing 
systems would not occur (Kelly, Peters, Landree, Moore, Steeb, & Martin, 2011). 
RAND’s National Defense Research Institute was asked to conduct the 
study and, specifically, to provide a detailed discussion of requirements 
and capability needs, identify capability gaps for vehicles, identify critical 
technology elements or integration risks associated with particular 
categories of vehicles and specific missions, and recommend actions to 
address the identified capability gaps.  
The researchers found no fundamental flaws in the requirements 
development processes for the vehicles considered.  However, predicting 
future threats over the expected life spans of vehicles now in production is 
very difficult, and choices must be made and risk accepted due to the 
impossibility of designing vehicles that are optimal for all future threats.  
(Kelly et al., 2011, p. 1) 
RAND was able to show the Army’s identification of a capability gap and the Army’s 
analysis was correct for determining the need of a materiel solution. 
e. JLTV Better Buying Power 2.0 Efficiency Analysis 
(1) Build Stronger Partnerships With the Requirements 
Community to Control Costs. 
Rating: Excellent 
The JLTV ICD outlines many different requirements that are 
expected from the materiel solution.  Some of the requirements could not be met without 
neglecting other requirements.  During the testing period, May 2010 to June 2011, the 
Army and Marine Corps determined that the vehicle’s original transportability and 
survivability requirements could not be met (GAO, 2012).  Efforts taken to meet the 
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requirements and reduce the weight of the vehicle would drastically take away from the 
survivability of the platform (GAO, 2012).  Coordination and trade-offs had to be made.   
The [S]ervices have relaxed part of the requirement to transport the 
vehicle by helicopter at high altitude and at certain temperatures, which 
will permit a heavier vehicle to be transported.  As a result of the 
requirements changes, the Army and Marine Corps will shift some 
missions intended for JLTV to the HMMWV. (GAO, 2012, p. 149) 
JLTV is a program that has demonstrated how different 
stakeholders are able to work together to refine or even eliminate requirements that are 
determined to be unattainable or unfeasible.  This is the essence of trade-off between the 
CBTDEV and the program office.  A decrease in efficiency is the outcome of attempting 
to achieve unattainable or unfeasible requirements by requiring more time, money, and 
resources.  The JPO JLTV identified a means to overcome the challenges of its 
requirements while minimizing the loss of the prescribed capabilities.  The following 
quotes from COL Dave Bassett, serving as the JPM for JLTV, show how the program 
was able to closely coordinate between the acquisition and user communities. 
In this case, we had to collaborate together to make the final adjustments 
to the program so that the acquisition strategy, the budget, the 
requirements and technology were in alignment.  
So—and having the key leaders on both the requirements and the 
acquisition side and the resource side go down that path together and make 
those decisions understanding when a decision on the requirements side is 
going to have a direct impact—it is not even a second order effect, a direct 
impact on the acquisition strategy and path forward to actually produce 
that system. (personal communication, February 12, 2013) 
The ability to work together between the program office and the 
CBTDEV was essential in establishing the program’s acquisition baseline and 
maximizing efficiencies to continue to achieve the desired capabilities.  The collaboration 
between the communities led to the ability to remove capabilities that may generate 
higher risk and cause timelines to extend longer than desired.  Prevention of risk and 
reduction in time in capabilities trade-off afforded greater efficiency.  “I was able to work 
with the user community to pull out [requirements] in a way that was mutually 
supportive” (D. Bassett, personal communication, February 12, 2013).  A clear example 
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of the program officer for the JLTV working closely together with the requirements 
community is seen from the trade-off accepted for not being able to meet the weight 
requirement for the vehicle. 
The program’s involvement with the MCDs assisted in the ability 
to effectively complete the capabilities documents with the CBTDEV.  This had to be 
done in order to ensure all stakeholders concurred in the final MCDs and maximize 
effectiveness.     
I think that in the development of that draft CDD it can’t be TRADOC in 
isolation.  It has to be a collaborative process.  However, in that draft CDD 
and in any technology development phase, there may be some 
requirements that you deliberately stretch for.  So you know maybe you 
want to use your technology development phase to really understand the 
left and right limits and cost of power generation. So it was okay that the 
TD vehicles on JLTV pursued a substantially higher power generation 
requirement than we ended up [with] in our CDD. (D. Bassett, personal 
communication, February 12, 2013) 
This collaboration increased the efficiency of the workforce.  By 
doing so, the workforce increased their experience not only with the RGP but also with 
the CBTDEV.  While collaboration is essential in the development of MCDs, the 
CBTDEV must ensure they continue to develop those involved in RGP and not allow the 
acquisition workforce to surpass the CBTDEV’s experience. 
The JPO JLTV is able to progress towards the production and 
deployment phase of the acquisition life cycle from its MCDs.  Personnel in the program 
office are able to build the program’s RFP to clearly outline what is accepted of the 
potential contractors by building performance specifications from the requirements in the 
MCDs.  An excerpt from the draft executive summary of the request for proposal shows 
the program’s insight to prevent untested technologies and unproven designs.   
The JLTV acquisition strategy pre-supposes successful achievement of 
EMD testing and appropriate risk mitigation to achieve a Milestone C 
decision. Therefore, the Production Phase test profile is expected to be 
scaled to mitigate the remaining post Milestone C risks and complete 
mandated testing, and will not duplicate the extensive EMD testing. 
Accordingly, during the competition for the single award of the 
Production and Deployment Phase Contract, any offeror proposing JLTV 
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vehicle solutions reflecting untested and/or un-validated designs, or 
only partially tested designs, will be evaluated with higher risk. (Hepner, 
2011, p. 2) 
The JPO JLTV’s RFP for a production and deployment phase 
contract provides instructions to potential competitors that that a higher risk is 
automatically going to be assumed for untested and un-validated vehicle designs.  This 
creates a measurement within the contract to provide higher scores to companies with a 
validated design.  Movement in this direction creates greater efficiencies towards the 
materiel solution by reducing contractors that are not fully capable of delivering the 
desired system.  Additionally, this serves as the program’s means to keep the program 
and contractors on track for capabilities that have already been agreed upon with the user 
community and that are capable of being met with mature technologies.   
  The JLTV’s MCDs has been able to clearly define the 
requirements for the defense industry to better understand what is needed for prototyping.  
The JPO JLTV continues to keep the defense industry abreast of the current status of the 
program.  The program has conducted meetings and industry days to answer all questions 
that may not be fully understood in the MCDs and has created a website for industry 
exchange (Petermann & Garza, 2010).  The JPO JLTV has embraced industry as a 
stakeholder and network partner in its endeavor to produce a materiel solution.  The JPO 
JLTV understands the importance of the requirements provided by the CBTDEV and 
recognizes that the survivability of its program does not stop in the program office.  The 
JPO JLTV brings industry into the loop in order to maximize the efficiency of the 
requirements. 
(2) Reduce Cycle Times While Ensuring Sound Investment 
Decisions. 
Rating: Average 
The JLTV’s MCDs attempt to efficiently reduce cycle times.  
These documents are one of many factors that drive the program’s acquisition strategy.  
Industry has to consider not only what the materiel solution needs to be but also how to 
employ its best practices in production and sustainment to drive down costs.  The JPO 
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JLTV has placed a great deal of reliance on the defense industry to meet the needs of 
many capability gaps.  By doing so, the program attempted to minimize the technology 
development phase but went back to the TD phase upon receiving guidance for 
competitive prototyping. 
The CDD was approved and facilitated an avenue for efficient 
competitive prototyping.  Competitive prototyping is the ability to carry multiple vendors 
into the EMD phase for the purpose of having prototypes that have capabilities that may 
be compared against each other.  This would reduce the costs associated with developing 
new or untested technology in the TD and EMD phases of the program.  Going through 
this effort creates competition within the industries and potentially leads to a product that 
has greater capabilities and a lower price to the government.   
Additionally, the focus has shifted towards utilizing mature 
technology and vehicle designs.   
In February 2011, the JLTV Program Office announced the award of the 
EMD contract would be delayed until January or February 2012 because 
the Army changed requirements for the JLTV to have the same level of 
under body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV).  DOD had planned to award two contracts for 
the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months, but instead opted 
for a 48-month-long EMD phase before awarding Production and 
Deployment contracts in the second quarter of FY2016. In addition, the 
Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too heavy to 
meet the required weight of approximately 15,639 pounds to make it 
transportable by Army CH-47F and Marine Corps CH-53K helicopters. 
Now there will be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV), which 
can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds, and a Combat 
Support Vehicle (CSV), which can transport two passengers and carry 
5,100 pounds. (Feickert, 2013, p. 3) 
Although the program had to restart the second phase of the DAS, 
the JPO JLTV recognized that they must maximize efficiency in their timeline in order to 
complete the EMD phase.  Some unrealistic requirements that the CBTDEV and the JPO 
JLTV concurred that some requirements were unrealistic and removed them from the 
CDD..  Removal of these requirements and expanding the EMD phase can produce cost 
savings.  Cost savings would occur up front with removing requirements and later on in 
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the program by ensuring that a mature and validated design is ready before entering into 
production and deployment.  However, the extended EMD phase creates a delay within 
the program and displays signs of inefficiency by requiring more time within the specific 
phase.  Vehicle programs constantly struggle with trying to reach threshold values for 
weight.  The removal of that requirement creates greater efficiency, saves the program 
money, and prevents delays that could be created when trying to reach weight thresholds 
established within the requirement. 
The JLTV program also analyzed the designs of similar programs.  
Observations of these other programs provided the necessary insight to manage 
expectations in regards to timelines and respect to the development and production of a 
vehicle.  In addition, risks that occurred within the other programs could be anticipated 
and mitigated on the JLTV.  “We had seen those designs evolve over time largely 
because of the Army’s investment in [MRAPs]” (D. Bassett, personal communication, 
February 12, 2013).   
The JLTV program is able to take lessons learned from similar 
vehicle programs and apply the corrective actions before risks or issues arise.  These 
identified preemptive actions could possibly save money and time because deficiencies 
would not have to be corrected.  Moreover, new processes would not have to be 
developed because best practices have already been established and proven to work in 
other programs.  The JPO JLTV’s attempt to not repeat the mistakes of the past has 
allowed for greater efficiency in the program to meet the requirements and provide a 
materiel solution.   
The JPO JLTV went a step further with multiple contractors and prototypes. 
“We have all the data we need to make the right decision,” he [Kevin 
Fahey, PEO for CS & CSS Vehicles] said. “Based on that data we came 
up with a wonderful acquisition strategy for [moving through] EMD and 
into production.” (Gourley, 2013, p. 40) 
Fahey reinforced the process that is being used in the JLTV program office to 
develop a product with minimal cost and reduced cycle time.  Yet, the opposite usually 
occurs when trying to reach capabilities in the MCDs that are unfeasible and unrealistic. 
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The JLTV program also has pursued mature designs and 
technology that would decrease production time and resources.  Working to meet mature 
designs and technology and reducing cycle time yields a program to make better sound 
investments.  The JLTV program learned from the shortfalls in their past.  The program 
worked with the CBTDEV to refine the requirements in the MCD.  The program 
implemented best practices like competitive prototyping to reduce cycle time and make 
sound investments.  The JPO JLTV increased their efficiency by adjusting the acquisition 
strategy to fill the capability gaps in accordance with the ICD by ensuring that all 
stakeholders agreed on realistic requirements. 
MCDs requirements must be managed to maximize efficiency.  
The JPO JLTV looked at the requirements management best practices from other 
programs. The program implements a Requirements Management and Analysis Plan 
(RMAP) for the technology development phase of the acquisition life cycle.  The RMAP 
addresses 
 The knowledge gaps, knowledge point timing, events, and 
execution; 
 Roles, responsibilities, and decision authority; 
 Change management of key documents, including 
classified annex; 
 How analyses were initiated, tracked, and burned down and 
how results were integrated into the CDD/Specification; 
and 
 Use of SE software. (Pflanz, Yunker, & Wehrli, 2012, p. 
11) 
Each of these topics, when addressed thoroughly, has provided a 
tool for better requirements management, as outlined in the JCIDS documents.  The JPO 
JLTV learned from their first experience moving into MS B and wanted to ensure that 
they did not repeat the same mistake again.  The JLTV program adopted the process of 
RMAP (Pflanz et al., 2012) to assist the program’s efforts in meeting the competitive 
prototyping policy established by the USD(AT&L) in 2007 to ensure they were meeting 
their requirements efficiently (USD[AT&L], 2007).  As stated in the USD(AT&L) 
memo:  
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All acquisition strategies requiring USD(AT&L) approval must be 
formulated to include competitive, technically mature prototyping through 
MS B.  The component Acquisition Executives will review all existing 
programs and all programs in the initial stages of development for the 
potential to adopt this acquisition strategy. (USD[AT&L], 2007, p. 2) 
The JLTV went through the technology development phase for 30 
months and is now in the EMD phase.  The program carried three different companies on 
separate contracts to make competitive prototype vehicles and eventually will select a 
single company in the production and deployment phase (Pflanz et al., 2012). 
f. JLTV Better Buying Power 2.0 Effectiveness Analysis 
Eliminate Redundancy Within Warfighter Portfolios   
Rating: Average 
JLTV’s MCDs outlined capabilities in areas within the Army’s portfolio 
that did not currently exist.    
The objective of the JLTV program is to address the HMMWV fleet’s 
protection, payload, and performance imbalance within a transportable 
vehicle. JLTV is expected to provide comparable protection to the MRAP 
vehicles in most cases—the major exception being underbody 
protection—but with better payload and performance. (GAO, 2010, p. 4) 
As the new platform intended to replace the HMMWV, the JPO JLTV had 
to understand both the requirements in the HMMWV’s portfolio but also the portfolios 
across the acquisition community.  To further expound on this, the following excerpt 
demonstrates the uniqueness of the JLTV and that it is not a redundant system and 
vehicle to the HMMWV. 
The HMMWV’s demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs and the difficulties 
and costs experienced in “up-armoring” HMMWVs already in the 
inventory have led to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. DOD 
officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace 
HMMWVs “one for one.” (Feickert, 2013, p. 1)  
The described fielding plan shows that redundancy is going to exist within 
the Army’s vehicle portfolio.  The potential is created for some Army units to have both 
 135 
HMMWVs and JLTVs.  Units possessing both vehicle platforms would increase 
associated time and costs for training personnel on vehicle operation and maintenance. 
There are capabilities that do cross over and match up with other existing 
vehicles.  One such capability is survivability by providing a high level of protection to 
the vehicle.  This is seen with the requirement for the “JLTV to have the same level of 
under body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-
ATV)” (Feickert, 2013, p. 3).  The M-ATV was created as a platform that provided 
integration for present technology.  The JLTV is focused more on the concepts of open-
architecture for future advancements in technology and engineering.  This requirement 
was outlined in the JLTV’s MCDs to ensure that the JLTV would continue to effectively 
meet its mission throughout its life cycle.      
Another similarity is found with the transportation of personnel.  
Currently, the HMMWV is capable of transporting two to five personnel, based on the 
variant.  The JLTV is required to maintain the same capability as the HMMWV.  
Additionally, the M-ATV’s capability is four personnel.  Each of these three vehicles 
contains the same capability with no enhancement to carry additional personnel.  This 
personnel requirement displays some redundancy within the Army’s vehicle portfolio.  
However, this redundancy is minimal as the M-ATV is a product of the GWOT and a 
short-term fill during development of the vehicle that will eventually replace the majority 
of HMMWV variants. 
The DoD has initiatives in place to prevent the duplication of acquisition 
efforts with programs that contain similar or almost exact capabilities that mirror each 
other.  Thus, MCDs must also adhere to this consideration.  One mechanism to control 
duplication is by phasing out older systems and slowly halting modernization and 
replacement programs.  The JLTV is achieving this by analyzing the evolutionary 
changes to the HMMWV.  “DoD intends to ‘protect’ the JLTV program and HMMWV 
modernization would be terminated so that resources could be focused on the JLTV” 
(Feickert, 2013, p. 7).  Cancellation of the HMMWV modernization program ensures that 
only one vehicle program is moving forward.  Efforts are not duplicated in creating and 
maintaining vehicles with similar capabilities, therefore reducing redundancy in the 
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Army’s portfolio and maximizing effectiveness.  Additionally, funds become available 
and may be reallocated from one program to another as efficient reduction in the portfolio 
occurs. 
Another means to prevent the duplication of efforts is through external 
auditors.  Consultants can analyze the new program’s MCDs against other programs that 
are currently in existence.  This is accomplished by not looking at just other platforms but 
all other capabilities that may be inserted on the JLTV.  Audit findings from external 
organizations, such as RAND, allow the JPO JLTV to clearly identify the capability gaps 
and requirements and ensure that they are not duplicating efforts of other programs.  
RAND’s analysis verified the accuracy of the identified capability gaps in the ICD and 
requirements in the CDD (Kelly et al., 2011). 
The JLTV’s MCDs create unique capabilities to meet the future force’s 
needs through an array of fronts worldwide.  Unlike PM M-ATV, the JPO JLTV also has 
the opportunity to ensure increased effectiveness in its MCDs, by developing the 
platform to project a future sustainment plan.  The MCDs have served to effectively 
provide a means to prevent redundancy by duplicating existing systems.  “A comparison 
of JLTV’s capabilities with those of the M-ATV and HMMWV indicates the JLTV is 
expected to offer protection levels comparable to the M-ATV at a weight nearer to the 
HMMWV” (GAO, 2010, p. 11).  This has allowed the program to not duplicate other 
capabilities across the portfolios and has potentially preserved present and future funds.  
(1) Improve Requirements Definition and Prevent 
Requirements Creep. 
Rating: Poor 
JPO JLTV has faced issues due to requirements creep. 
In February 2011, it was announced the award of the EMD contract would 
be delayed until January or February 2012 because the Army changed 
requirements for the JLTV.  DOD had planned to award two contracts for 
the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months, but instead 
proposed a 48-month-long EMD. (Feickert, 2013, p. 2) 
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Issues such as this decrease the effectiveness of a program.  Delays 
resulting from increased and changing requirements have forced modifications to the 
CDD.  The recently approved CDD contains changes to the design through the addition 
of new requirements.  In addition, untested technologies are prevented from being added 
to a system or require extra efforts for interoperability with existing systems not required 
in the previous CDD.  This decreases effectiveness in producing a system based on the 
original desired capabilities.   
Another issue that has emerged is the capability to match the same 
level of survivability as the M-ATV.  Requirements creep affected the initial MCDs.  
Repeating the technology development phase has increased the schedule and costs.  
However, the JPO JLTV has overcome this obstacle by tailoring their acquisition strategy 
to meet the needs of the new capabilities and the CBTDEV.  The program implemented 
the initiative for competitive prototyping to identify the best capabilities, not just the 
platform, from multiple contractors.  This creates the positive effect for ensuring that the 
prototype meets all the MCDs’ requirements and mitigates requirements creep.  
Mitigation occurs from a contractor’s having to demonstrate their design and by having 
all stakeholders agree on the preferred design.  However, there also is an ineffectiveness 
in the original CDD.  The program’s second time through the TD phase shows that the 
MCDs’ requirements were not effective in allowing the program to move into the next 
phase of the acquisition life cycle. 
The JLTV program selected three contractors to produce three 
prototypes for a total of nine vehicles to use during the EMD phase.  The positive effect 
from this course of action is the preservation of funds and reduction of schedule time 
(GAO, 2012).  This increases effectiveness by having contractors demonstrate their 
vehicle designs.  It also ensures that industry has mature technologies to bring to the table 
to meet the requirements.  However, the downside to competitive prototypes is that the 
program may forgo activities that occur early on in the EMD phase to ensure the 
product’s design is mature and meets the specified requirements (GAO, 2012).  Forgoing 
early activities can create potential areas of risk for requirements creep.  Potential risk 
emerges from vehicles that do not possess a mature design in the later phases of the 
program. 
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what I want to do is pay for it [JLTV] one time after WIN-T [Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical] has already demonstrated that integration 
on another platform.  So it is one of those things where if you just looked 
at it [additional capabilities insertion] on the surface, you would say you 
have added risk to your program because now you run the risk, you may 
not be able to host WINT in a fielded JLTV.  If you took no actions to 
prevent that, that would be the case but I don’t have to demonstrate in 
EMD, in test, to be able to reduce that risk to an acceptable level.  By not 
doing that, I was able to save enough money to add additional RAM 
[reliability, availability, maintainability] vehicles and to buy some 
additional assets that we needed to get our test plan approved.  So it was a 
very hard, pragmatic trade that was made at the very, very last juncture.  
So to be able to get that pulled out of a document and approved by the 
JROC with the full support and approval of the user community was I 
think a key achievement.  That required a lot of leaders all rolling in the 
same direction. (D. Bassett, personal communication, February 12, 2013) 
The JPO JLTV was able to benefit from the competitive 
prototyping to enhance the requirements within the MCDs.  Competitive prototyping 
provides the program office the ability to select the most effective design that adheres to 
the MCDs.    Additionally, the program office was able to enhance other requirements 
after seeing the demonstration of the prototypes.  By pursing these enhanced 
requirements, the program office is able to potentially decrease future requirements creep 
within the area of RAM and prevent modifications to the MCDs’ requirements.  
The JPO JLTV understood the importance of having full support 
and collaboration with the key stakeholders when going through the acquisition life cycle 
and having the revised CDD approved by the JROC.  Requirements were refined through 
effective communication and collaboration between all parties involved.  The 
requirements of the CDD had buy in from the CBTDEV and the program office to ensure 
that they were clearly defined.  This collaboration assisted the JROC in its final approval 
on March 15, 2012, as shown in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38.  JLTV CDD Approval (From JROC, 2012b, p.1) 
Additionally, the JPO JLTV outlined the CBTDEV’s requirements 
and desired capabilities to the defense industry.  This may prevent the government from 
incurring unnecessary costs for unneeded R&D initiatives.  The end state is that the 
government can pick the best and most mature technologies that minimize future 
requirements creep.      
g. JLTV Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
Figure 39 is the JLTV’s MCDs scorecard.   
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Figure 39.  JLTV Overall Rating Scorecard 
Overall Score   
Efficiency: 1 × Average, 1 × Excellent 
Effectiveness: 1 × Poor, 1 × Average 
 
Figure 40 depicts our overall rating of the JLTV’s MCDs.   
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Figure 40.  JLTV Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis (After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
Overall Rating   
Efficiency: Average–Excellent  
Effectiveness: Poor–Average  
The JLTV receives an efficiency rating of average–excellent.  Efficiency 
of the MCDs results in using the minimum resources to provide the right materiel 
solution.  Stakeholders must be synchronized with each other’s missions.  The JLTV 
MCDs were created through the efficiencies of two cultures and their ability to 
collaborate between multiple organizations to establish trade-offs.  This allowed the 
program to get back on track.  Collaboration and agreements improved the ability to 
conduct trade-offs on requirements.  However, the program was unable to preserve the 
cycle time when trying to adjust requirements. This in return would preserve funds but 
increase time needed for the program.  Policy changes, in conjunction with the MCDs, 
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yielded additional efficiencies.  The new competitive prototyping and use of the draft 
RFP assist the MCDs in producing efficiencies in the program by reducing costs by 
enforcing validated designs prior to entering into the production and deployment phases.  
The JLTV receives a rating of poor–average for effectiveness.  Effective 
MCDs allow a materiel solution to traverse through the acquisition process with the 
feasibility of developing, writing, and understanding everything that is composed within 
the documents.  The JLTV had clearly defined requirements outlined by the MCDs found 
in the second CDD.  Effectiveness has yet to be achieved by reducing redundancies in the 
portfolios.  Since JLTV has not entered production and deployment, a one for one swap 
for the HMMWV is currently not going to take place and M-ATV remains in the 
warfighting portfolio.  Additionally, an effective document comes from the ability to 
address capabilities and the clarity of the written requirements.  These attributes assist the 
program office in performing proper life-cycle management and managing cost, schedule, 
and performance.  The JLTV program demonstrates how effective collaboration among 
the different stakeholders increases the experience of the workforce directly involved in 
the writing and execution of MCDs for greater effectiveness.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Our research has revealed that through MRDs/MCDs, program offices are able to 
produce materiel solutions at an increased level of efficiency; however, the program may 
still experience a decreased level of effectiveness.  Furthermore, the MRDs were less 
efficient and effective than the MCDs.  Nonetheless, the MCDs so far have been equally 
effective, but there has been an increase in efficiency from M-ATV to JLTV.   
Our research is focused on the MRDs/MCDs that produced materiel solutions for 
three wheeled platforms, and not the platform’s efficiency and effectiveness on the 
battlefield.  We combined our analysis by integrating the concepts of efficiency and 
effectiveness, together with the proper type of change and change management that has 
occurred throughout the history of the RGP, and four initiatives of BBP 2.0.  We scored 
three program offices’ MRDs/MCDs against these concepts.  The overall scores for all 
three wheeled platforms are displayed in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41.  BBP 2.0 Initiative Scorecard Roll-Up 
We have assessed the MRDs/MCDs for these platforms and consolidated them 
onto one model to reveal our results.  This links our scoring of efficiency and 
effectiveness scores, the BBP 2.0 initiatives, and evolutionary and revolutionary change 
appear in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42.  Platforms Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
(After Grüter & Boerendans, 2013) 
“Efficiency” was measured on how well the MRDs/MCDs “Did Things Right” in 
regards to the BBP 2.0’s two initiatives, (1) Build Stronger Partnerships With The 
Requirements Community to Control Costs and (2) Reduce Cycle Times While Ensuring 
Sound Investment Decisions.  On the other hand, “Effectiveness” was measured on how 
well the MRDs/MCDs “Did the Right Things” in regards to BBP 2.0’s two initiatives, (1) 
Eliminate Redundancy within Warfighter Portfolios and (2) Improve Requirements 
Definition; Prevent Requirements Creep.   
Overall, the MRDs/MCDs should be “Doing the Right Things Right” if they are 
to maximize efficiency and maximize effectiveness.  We have assessed HMMWV, M-
ATV, and JLTV’s requirements and capability documents to compare their scores against 
each other.  Our comparative analysis is revealed in Figure 42.    
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First, the HMMWV MRDs efficiency and effectiveness overall rating is in the 
“Doing Things” quadrant.  For HMMWV documents to increase in efficiency or 
effectiveness, the documents demand the need for evolutionary changes or perhaps a 
revolutionary change in order to increase their scores in regards to the BBP 2.0 
initiatives.  Data gathered showed that HMMWV program did not go through a 
revolutionary change of RGS to JCIDS and continued to use MRDs instead of MCDs.   
Ultimately, the JCIDS was implemented and MRDs ceased to evolve and were 
revolutionized by the MCDs. 
Second, the M-ATV MCDs efficiency and effectiveness overall rating is on the 
cusp of “Doing Things” and “Doing Things Right.”  This reveals M-ATV MCDs have 
increased in efficiency and effectiveness.  Evolutionary and revolutionary changes to the 
documents are not greatly demanded; however, there are still areas for refinement.   
Finally, the JLTV MCDs’ efficiency and effectiveness overall rating has placed 
the icon in “Doing Things Right” quadrant.  The JLTV MCDs received the highest score 
on the efficiency axis and an equal rating with M-ATV on the effectiveness axes.  This 
reveals that the JCIDS MCDs have increased in efficiency.  Of note, JLTV has yet to 
enter the production and deployment phase of the life cycle.  However, based on our BBP 
2.0 measurements, the JLTV program’s MCDs have scored higher than the other two 
platforms of HMMWV MRDs and M-ATV MCDs.  Our qualitative information shows 
that increase in efficiency and effectiveness is strongly based on the key stakeholders’ 
recognition of the mistakes of the past and implementation of best practices.        
In closing, HMMWV’s MRDs have undergone a revolutionary change due to the 
lack of efficiency and effectiveness.  The JCIDS MCDs have made great strides in 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness (depicted by the M-ATV MCD icon) and are 
continually reaching greater effectiveness (depicted by the JLTV MCD icon).  Therefore, 
the JCIDS MCDs are evolving in the right direction to support the programs executing 
the DAS.         
Both efficiency and effectiveness begin with the manner in which requirements 
and capability gaps are created and defined.  However, to truly be efficient and effective, 
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these requirements must not simply meet a current capability gap but also anticipate 
future capability gaps.  There are many external factors outside the MRDs/MCDs that 
contribute to requirements creep, such as emerging threats and advancement in 
technology.  That does not mean that key stakeholders should not anticipate possible 
foreseeable factors that change the requirements.  All key stakeholders must have the 
ability to project uncertainty and the flexibility to quickly adapt.  If all stakeholders work 
collaboratively, the current MCDs will be able to continuously provide the best materiel 
solution for the warfighter. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY  
 At first, we believed that revolutionary change would be required in order 
for materiel MRDs/MCDs to be efficient and effective based on comparison of 
documents from two different RGPs (the RGS and JCIDS).  In the end, we came to a 
very different realization as we conducted our research and analysis.  The following 
summary recaps our previous chapters: 
 In Chapter I, we introduced our paper by outlining our research questions 
and scope.   
 In Chapter II, we provided the necessary background information upon 
which we based our research and analysis.   
 In Chapter III, we presented the methodology for our project.   
 In Chapter IV, we detailed our qualitative focus and presented our 
comparative analysis through the use of case studies.   
Now, at the final portion of our project (Chapter V), we deliver our conclusion, 
recommendations, and areas for further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Research Findings 
Our study examined the following questions: 
 What makes requirement documents efficient and effective, or inefficient 
and ineffective for the stakeholders who facilitate the RGP? 
 What key differences exist in the documents from the old RGS process 
compared to the new JCIDS process, and why were these changes made 
during this transition? 
 Does future change need to be evolutionary or revolutionary?  
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a. What makes requirement documents efficient and effective, or 
inefficient and ineffective for the stakeholders who facilitate the 
RGP? 
In our study, we concluded that efficiency for MRDs/MCDs is a laborious 
balancing act of many factors and considerations that involves the stakeholder and 
acquisition processes.  Too much or too little consideration will unbalance the scale and 
shift the focus to specific stakeholders.  This may cause a chain reaction that will 
ultimately hinder a materiel solution.  For instance, if the CBTDEV is solely concerned 
with writing requirements for the warfighter without consideration of critical acquisition 
processes, the result may be a solution that does not really meet the identified capability 
gap.  Remember, “if you want it bad, you’ll usually get it bad” (P. Mann, personal 
communication, November 19, 2012). 
An efficient materiel requirements document is one written to cater to the 
preponderance of stakeholders who must staff, approve, and execute the primary 
functions of that requirement document.  MRDs/MCDs are not egocentric.  The 
CBTDEV cannot write requirements without consideration of the acquisition process.  
The program offices should not demand requirements that identify an exact product but 
performance based.  However, they must place full consideration into the missions of the 
CBTDEV and other key stakeholders’ organizations.  The JROC should not ask for 
MRDs/MCDs to be written just to ease staffing and processing.  Requirements must 
promote efficiency for all stakeholders.  The authors of the MRDs/MCDs must 
understand the constraints and limitations of the format.  The CBTDEV, acquisition 
workforce, JROC, and other key stakeholders require alignment of tasks and processes to 
produce the right solution.  This alignment comes from understanding of the processes, 
capabilities and constraints, and environment internal and external to the stakeholders’ 
organizations.   
Efficiency is purely creating a proficient, capable network.  All 
stakeholders of the RGP achieve efficiency through alignment and understanding of their 
partners’ cultures.  This may occur through personnel exchange programs such as 
CBTDEV and program office personnel rotating through a Department of the Army 
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Systems Coordinator (DASC) developmental duty assignment.  Service in this position 
allows key people to understand the inner workings of the Pentagon and the acquisition 
process.  Furthermore, including the CBTDEV in the acquisition process, inviting them 
to program reviews, helps ensure a clear understanding of requirements by every 
stakeholder. 
The intent for MRDs’ format to transition into MCDs’ format were to 
better streamline the process.  However, while there is always room for improvement, if 
those who prescribe the format continually change the process, it forces all stakeholders 
to continually adapt.  This constant adaptation will limit learning and make it difficult for 
any stakeholder to be a subject-matter expert in writing MRDs/MCDs.  This detracts 
from efficiency. 
The stakeholders must recognize where in the life-cycle system 
management process the requirements (capability) document fits and the gates that the 
documents must pass through to be approved prior to the next phase and milestone.  
Efficient requirement documents must be written well enough to enable a materiel 
solution to move along through the phases of the acquisition life cycle.  Additionally, the 
documents must be effective in minimizing future changes to that materiel solution, 
which would require  ECPs.  This is how efficient MRDs/MCDs enable an effective 
materiel solution for the warfighters.       
b. What key differences exist in the documents from the old RGS 
process compared to the new JCIDS process, and why were these 
changes made during this transition? 
In response to Question 2, we identified key differences in the 
MRDs/MCDs that supported both the RGS and the JCIDS.  The detailed formats for each 
document can be revisited in Chapter II.   
Formats for the documents for the RGS and JCIDS were very different.  
The documents varied in required length and format.  The MNS had a limitation of just 
five pages, while the ICD limitation doubled to 10 pages.  The MNS contained six parts 
in its format, while the ICD contains three primary parts (Part 2 contained eight subparts 
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and Part 3 contained seven sections) and requires four appendices.   The change in format 
structure allows information to be captured with greater fidelity.  Beyond differences in 
the format structure, there are also differences concerning the purpose and intent of 
sections between the RGS and JCIDS documents.  A major change from the MNS to ICD 
was that the ICD identifies a capability gap while the MNS outlined a requirement need.  
Another difference comes from the MNS using DTLOMS for analysis, but the ICD used 
DOTMLPF and now uses DOTmLPF-P for analysis.  Changes in the analysis ideology 
provide a more expansive concept to a broader group of stakeholders.     
The ORDs formats for both the initial and revised versions are the same.  
The only difference came with the capacity for revision for production modification in 
the RGS, if change was necessary.  An ORD-Initial written to support production activity 
would remain the same, but could change as required after JROC approval.   
The JCIDS separated the ORD into two distinct documents, the CDD and 
CPD.  The main reason for the creation of two documents from one document came from 
the lack of restrictions for the ORD.  The ORD does not have a page restriction and can 
go through multiple paths for approval, as long as approval occurs at the appropriate 
level.  Additionally, the ORD’s format had eight parts with Part 4 containing four 
subparts and Part 5 containing nine subparts.  This structure caused the document to be 
very vague and allowed for a great deal of interpretation by the authors in identifying the 
requirements. This created discrepancies and ambiguities in the RGS’s requirements 
documents (MNS and the two ORDs), which ultimately created difficulty for the 
stakeholders to execute various acquisition processes.  
Unlike the RGS requirements documents, the JCIDS capabilities 
documents contained greater structure and restrictions to control the information that is 
placed in the document.  The CDD has five parts with Part 3 containing 16 subsections 
and is specifically constrained to not exceed 45 pages.  The body of a CPD consists of 
five primary parts, the 16 primary subsections, and Appendix A, all of which cannot 
exceed 40 pages.  Additionally, the ICD, CDD, and CPD formats have clearly defined 
instructions for their completion.  The majority of the parts and sections in the JCIDS 
documents clearly outline the expectations of how sentences begin and what is in every 
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part of the documents.  The JCIDS documents provide better standardization for all 
stakeholders.  If stakeholders need to reference only a part of the document, for example 
Spectrum Requirements, they know the exact section that is to contain all the details 
(Part.4.h).  While portions of the RGS documents could accomplish the same level of 
detail, the JCIDS documents have clearly anticipated more technology considerations for 
integration. 
Adjustment to the new way of thinking, in regards to a capability gap 
instead of a requirement need, has been beneficial to all stakeholders.  Requirements 
often employ very technical information.  An example of this is the following: the 
warfighter asks for an M4 rifle requirement, instead of asking for the capability of a 
weapon that does not weigh more than 12 lbs, has an effective range of 500 meters, and is 
integrated with optics.  Proceeding based on the direction of the capability versus the 
need allows the executors of the MRDs/MCDs to seek out and provide the most effective 
capability.   
Along with achieving a more effective solution, using capabilities 
provides horizontal networks to connect the different stakeholders’ communities.  
Actions involved with each of the different capability documents (ICD, CDD, CPD) 
occur sequentially and are more streamlined (efficient) as all stakeholders are constantly 
working in a synchronized method.  The CBTDEV can outline the capability, and the 
acquisition community is able to comment back to the CBTDEV on which capabilities 
are technically mature and cost effective.  
c. Does future change need to be evolutionary or revolutionary?   
Finally for Question 3, we have identified that evolutionary change may 
continue to develop the JCIDS capabilities documents to achieve higher levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Yet, a revolutionary change would be more detrimental 
than beneficial.  Additionally, to implement change in large organizations, such as the 
defense industry that supports Army acquisitions, is slow and arduous.  
History reveals that the DoD and the industrial base has been challenged 
to meet the requirements of the warfighter during the midst of the turmoil of war.  For 
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instance, during World War II the U.S. military had to adapt to counter the threat of the 
German U-boats by developing new capabilities such as the B-24 Liberator bomber to 
assist in defeating the threat.  Later during the Vietnam War the M-72, 66-mm Light 
Anti-Tank Weapons (LAWs) served as bunker busters to defeat the threat of hidden 
bunkers in the jungle.  The LAW was an existing system.  Finally, the MRAP FoV came 
about to counter IED threats during the GWOT.  Each materiel solution came by means 
of its own respective RGPs and associated documents.     
The JCIDS capabilities documents have undergone evolutionary changes 
during the last decade of war.  The current capabilities documents of the ICD, CDD, and 
CPD must have an opportunity to prove their relevancy during more stable times.  
Furthermore, few large acquisition programs have yet to proceed through the entire 
JCIDS process.  Revolutionary change would only create more havoc than order.  
Stakeholders are only now starting to understand the full JCIDS process and the 
associated documents.  Creating a new process and or documents would serve to 
eliminate all of the knowledge and experience that recent generations of the defense 
workforce and defense industry have developed over the last 10 years with the JCIDS 
process.     
2. Recommendations 
a. Continue to refine the capabilities documents in support of 
modifications to the JCIDS process, as needed 
Our first recommendation is to continue to refine the capabilities 
documents in support of modifications to the JCIDS process, as needed.  In 2003, a 
revolutionary change was necessary to cease the RGS and developed the JCIDS in order 
to refine the requirements generation process and its supporting documents.  The JCIDS 
and its supporting capabilities documents have served their purpose throughout the 
GWOT.  However, the JCIDS and its capabilities documents have not had the 
opportunity to fully prove their effectiveness in defense acquisition during peace time.  
The requirements, acquisition, and defense industry workforce are still implementing best 
practices and changing each of their cultures to align with the JCIDS process.  
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Furthermore, the acquisition and DoD workforce has implemented and learned to utilize 
the JCIDS’ capabilities documents for over a decade. 
There are many benefits that may be gained by continuing to utilize the 
current JCIDS’ capabilities documents.  Revolutionary change tends to result in great 
disruptions in established cultures.  The JCIDS and its supporting capabilities documents 
are still in their early stages of maturity.  Continually evolving the JCIDS capabilities 
documents will minimize the learning curve for its SMEs.    
b. Improve the quality of requirements writing 
A second recommendation is to improve the quality of requirements 
writing.  It is critical to continually improve the efficiency of JCIDS capabilities 
documents in order to better guide the process of creating a materiel solution.  BBP 2.0 
outlines the importance of clearly defined requirements for all stakeholders.  The DoD 
must continue to impress the importance of requirements writing as a primary profession 
and not just simply an additional duty.  Additionally, Congress has recognized the 
importance of writing quality requirements.  Poorly written capabilities documents often 
lead to requirements creep.  Better quality and more understandable capabilities 
documents can anticipate and prevent requirements creep.  Anticipation may prevent 
future ECPs.  This could result in cost avoidance.  Also, no ECP means there is no need 
to change the system design or conduct re-engineering to achieve an added 
performance/capability.  This helps preserve the acquisition schedule.    
Employing best practices will shape better definition of requirements that 
are capability based and will meet the initiatives of BBP 2.0.  The defense industry will 
continue to challenge itself with new and future technologies.  The DoD can leverage this 
effort in cost savings in R&D while still obtaining the most cutting-edge technologies.  
However, the DoD must be at the forefront of requirements definition.  Capability gaps 
drive the requirements that drive a materiel solution.  That being said, using our previous 
example of efficiency and effectiveness with the mortar team, the DoD must seek out the 
capability to effectively destroy a bunker versus demanding a requirement of a 120-mm 
mortar shot from a tube that meets the expectations.  If a bunker can be taken out with 
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another materiel solution that possesses greater effectiveness than a 120-mm mortar, and 
is more efficient and effective within the parameters of the acquisition process, then this 
is the right solution to fill the capability gap.  The defense industry’s capabilities and its 
technological advancements can meet capability gaps.  However, the DoD cannot be 
overly confident in these technologies, which may result in a “conspiracy of hope.”  This 
conspiracy of hope leads to failed programs like the Army’s Future Combat Systems 
(FCS) that was neither efficient nor effective.    
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, Section 801 (109 U.S.C., 2007, § 801[a-c]), introduced the initiative for a 
Requirements Management Certification Training (RMCT) Program.  This policy 
mandates that those with authority within the DoD who generate requirements cannot 
participate in authoring requirements without receiving certification.  The DAU has 
created courses and has outlined the curriculum for the certification.  Currently, there are 
five required courses, based on duty position and grade.  These courses are CLR 101: 
Introduction to JCIDS, RQM 110: Core Concepts for Requirements Management, RQM 
310: Advanced Concepts and Skills for Requirements Managers, RQM 403: 
Requirements Executive Overview Workshop, and RQM 413: Senior Leader 
Requirements Course.  The effectiveness of these prescribed courses has yet to be 
proven, but requiring them is a move in the right direction.  These requirements courses 
and certification are not limited to individuals responsible for writing requirements.  
Anyone in the DoD workforce may attend the courses.  Members of the DoD workforce 
that are stakeholders dealing with capabilities documents would benefit from taking these 
courses as well.  Leadership must also reinforce this training in order to create an 
efficient requirements workforce within their organizations.  The DoD community can 
only benefit by ascribing to better requirements definition through training and better 
understanding of the JCIDS process. 
c. Requirements focus on a perceived capability and not the 
identification of a specific materiel solution 
The third recommendation is to ensure requirements focus on a perceived 
capability and not the identification of a specific materiel solution.  This may be more 
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challenging than it sounds.  The defense industry continues to be at the forefront of 
technology and the DoD continues to stress the importance of purchasing commercial-
off-the-shelf items.  Furthermore, the defense budget continues to become more 
constrained.  The defense industry struggles to survive during periods of constrained 
DoD budgets.  In their struggle to survive, the defense industry attempts to showcase its 
new technologies to those stakeholders who develop requirements. Warfighter 
requirements may not identify a direct materiel solution, but the capability documents 
have the potential to be written in such a way that there is only one materiel solution.  
The DoD workforce must be vigilant in its efforts to ensure that this does not occur or 
become common practice.  Capability gaps must be identified in a way that allows the 
acquisition workforce to work within identified constraints to fill these gaps.  Capability-
based principles can only benefit the DoD.         
Embrace the best practice of “trade-offs” as a tool when refining the 
requirements of a material solution 
Our fourth recommendation is to fully embrace the best practice of “trade-
offs” as a tool when refining the requirements of a material solution.  The capability gaps 
are identified in the ICD by the CBTDEV.  After the MDA has identified that the 
materiel solution is needed, stakeholders must cooperatively work together to produce the 
best product for the warfighter.  The CBTDEV’s intent is to be a steward of the 
warfighters and provide them with everything that they require, but often providing 
everything is not realistic due to the many constraints in the defense acquisition process.  
There are many trade-offs that may be made in order to come to a desired end result.  
Trade-offs exist in multiple capabilities, between the adjustment of threshold and 
objective goals, the reclassification of a KPP to a regular requirement, and even within 
DOTmLPF-P analysis, to name a few.   
The balance between survivability and maneuverability is an example of a 
requirements trade-off.  Survivability usually requires additional weight and takes away 
from maneuverability.  Thus neither threshold nor objective values would be met for 
either requirement.  The CBTDEV’s willingness to make trade-offs is the solution.  The 
priority that identifies survivability over maneuverability is half the solution.  The other 
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half comes into play with a trade-off between objective and threshold values.  A trade-off 
can be established to decrease the expected threshold value of maneuverability in order to 
reach the threshold value of survivability for the solution.  This collaboration on trade-
offs between stakeholders is essential in defining requirements.  Stakeholders must 
always remember that every organization has the best interests of the warfighter in mind.  
Working on realistic and reasonable trade-offs allows everyone to build stronger 
relationships and enhance the government requirement network. 
d. RGP community does not repeat the mistakes of the past 
Our fifth and final recommendation is that the RGP community does not 
repeat the mistakes of the past.  We are at a volatile time in the DoD since we have been 
a nation at war for over a decade.  The RGP community has done great things to support 
the warfighter.  However, this same community must have the humility to identify the 
critical shortfalls and mistakes that have also been made.  Many of these shortfall and 
mistakes have already been recognized in numerous reports and studies by organizations 
like the GAO, CRS, and Defense Business Board.  Nevertheless, it is important that 
requirements stakeholders not stand by for these external think-tanks to identify 
solutions.  Requirements stakeholders must develop and integrate their own after actions 
review and lessons learned to develop and implement best practices for the requirements 
generation workforce. 
Furthermore, the solutions that come from self-analysis cannot fall on deaf 
ears or become a document that no one ever reads.  The requirements community must 
take time as the wars wind down to pause and scrutinize how the capabilities documents 
have evolved during the JCIDS process.  Then they must implement the best practices 
until they become standard practice, and create additional standards to ensure that the 
failures of the past are never repeated in their organizations.  This will result in positive 
evolutionary change within the requirements generation workforce.  AARs are only good 
if they are used.     
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section contains two subsections.  The first subsection identifies ways to 
expand our study.  The second subsection outlines four related projects that may be 
conducted as future research to further advance knowledge beyond the point of this 
project.   
1. Expanded Study to Other Program Offices 
We used a qualitative methodology when conducting our research.  We conducted 
due diligence to eliminate personal bias when doing the study and ensured that we 
remained objective in our analysis.  However, removing biases proved difficult since one 
of the researchers was formerly the assistant product manager of the M-ATV.  
Additionally, the platforms in the comparative analysis solely came from a single PEO of 
CS&CSS, which limited our sample size of acquisition programs that occurred in both 
the RGPs.  Capabilities documents are used in every program of the DoD as outlined in 
the JCIDS.  The data used for our research required personal interpretation and analysis 
as Army acquisition officers with limited experience and knowledge based on our current 
curriculums.  Our interviews were structured to allow the SMEs to provide input based 
on the programs they had experience in and were subjective, which may have led to some 
biases in the results. 
Similar research could be conducted by modifying our research methodology.  
Additional research could analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of other programs, 
whether they are across the Army’s Acquisition Program Offices or across the programs 
of other Services in the DoD.  Additionally, the inclusion of TRADOC would also 
expand the scope of a new project.  This would provide a larger sample size that is more 
expansive and compares a multitude of varying programs from different perspectives.  
Additionally, a comparative analysis could also be done with non-like items or materiel 
solutions within different acquisition categories.   
A second change to our research could be done by collecting more quantifiable 
data such as cost and timelines within the life cycle.  The sample could be with similar 
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materiel solutions that have life cycles within the same calendar/fiscal years to reduce the 
variance of the cost analysis.  This would provide another means for analyzing efficiency 
and effectiveness and for observing whether the results are similar or different.  
2. Other Related Proposed Research Topics 
We have conducted a great deal of research and analysis to come to our 
conclusions and recommendations.  It has been truly a learning and professional 
development experience.  It was often difficult to remain on one path since a great deal of 
the information provided us with more questions in regard to our subject.  Consequently, 
here are some areas of interest for future research based on our study. 
The first area for additional research is to look into other effects that occurred 
within the HMMWV program.  There are two areas to look at within the HMMWV 
program as possible expanses that may or may not impact the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the program’s requirements documents.  The first area is the program’s 
continued use of RGS requirements documents instead of transferring to JCIDS 
capabilities documents.  Our research showed the program continued to follow RGS 
instead of changing to JCIDS.  The question then becomes, why did the program not 
change to MCDs once JCIDS became enacted?  The second area deals with the 
recapitalization program that occurred for HMMWVS.  This provides the opportunity to 
look into the effects that any documents associated with the recapitalization program may 
or may not have had on the efficiency and effectiveness of the requirements documents. 
A BBP 2.0 initiative that could be examined on the impact it places on the 
efficiency or effectiveness of the MRDs/MCDs is   establish stronger professional 
qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties (Kendall, 2012).  We originally 
planned on examined this initiative for effectiveness of MRDs/MCDs.  However, after 
data collection and analysis we determined that the data we had collected to support this 
initiative was better suited towards the other BBP 2.0 initiatives.  We recommend 
conducting an analysis of the level of certifications with CBTDEVs and PMs to examine 
the effects that may impact the MRDs/MCDs. 
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Analyze the average time it takes for each of the capabilities documents to go 
from initial draft to JROC approval in the JCIDS.  As we learned from our research, there 
has been a great deal of variation in these times from the initial implementation of the 
JCIDS in 2003 to the present date.  We questioned, What were the driving elements that 
affected the documents enroute to JROC approval?  Was it urgency, priority, or staffing? 
Was it internal or external to individual stakeholders? Or was it the result it the result of 
streamlining changes as the JCIDS was more accepted and understood within the DoD 
community?  We propose research to further investigate the processes of requirements 
document approval within the RGP. 
Another research project we identified while examining our methodology was 
effective change management.  In regards to evolutionary and revolutionary changes, we 
questioned if the change from the RGS to JCIDS was effectively implemented.  What 
resistance was encountered when implementing the JCIDS and what were the effects of 
that resistance?  Why were there so many versions of CJCSI 3170.01, and what were the 
factors that created a demand for so many evolutionary changes in the instruction?  This 
research may potentially provide better methods to streamline change within the RGP and 
the DoD.   
A fourth topic for consideration is how to better network our government and 
defense industry within the sphere of the RGP and how to manage this network.  There 
are many constraints occurring, such as budget confidentiality, downsizing of our 
military, and our past reliance on contractor support.  Many studies, reports, and 
investigations have been published in regards to realigning this network and managing 
the network to better meet the public interest.  However, the question arises, How does 
the DoD and the acquisition community assist in this initiative without surrendering its 
sovereignty?   
A final topic we recognize as an issue was the impact of the future state of the 
nation and the rapid growth of technology.  The current National Security and Defense 
Strategy has identified that the great magnitude of involvement in the Central Command 
AOR is slowly decreasing and the priority shift is moving towards the Pacific Command 
AOR (Obama, 2012).  A new capability document has been created known as a Joint 
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Emerging Operational Needs Statement (JEON) and is now in CJCSI 3170.01H (CJCS, 
2012).  What are the concerns and considerations that the RGP may face in this future 
challenge?  How will technology be implemented as the nation and DoD shift their focus 
to a new threat?  What can the DoD do to be at the forefront of this evolving NSS?  This 
is an evolving issue for which the DoD must prepare.  Answering these questions is one 
genuine way to truly serve our warfighters.  
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A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PERSONNEL AT THE PENTAGON 
Date:    Interviewee:    
Interviewer: Anh H. Ha & Nathaniel P. Costa 
In your experience, what was right about the pre 2003 (pre JCIDS) “legacy” 
requirements systems process. 
In your experience, what was wrong about the pre 2003 (pre JCIDS) “legacy” 
requirements systems process. 
In your experience, why was the Joint Capabilities Integration Development 
System (JCIDS) Process created?\ 
In your experience, were their certain trends within the DOD / Army that drove 
the need for Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) Process?   
In your experience, what is right with the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) Process? 
In your experience, what is wrong with the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (JCIDS) Process? 
In your experience, why was the Joint Urgent Operational Needs System 
(JUONS) /  Urgent Operational Needs System (UONS) Process created? 
In your experience, what is right with the Joint Urgent Operational Needs System 
(JUONS) /  Urgent Operational Needs System (UONS) Process? 
In your experience, what is wrong with the Joint Urgent Operational Needs 
System (JUONS) /  Urgent Operational Needs System (UONS) Process? 
In your experience, what do you feel are the bottlenecks in the Army Materiel 
Requirements Process?  Of these bottlenecks, what are the steps that should be eliminated 
or what actions should be taken to begin correcting the issues to streamline the process? 
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What present actions are being identified to change / enhance the Army materiel 
requirements process? 
How do you feel the Agile Process influence / effects / contributes to the current 
Army materiel requirements process? 
How do you feel the Network Integration Evaluation influence / effects / 
contributes to the current Army materiel requirements process? 
How do you feel the System of Systems Integration (SOSI) Directorate influence / 
effects / contributes to the current Army materiel requirements process? 
How do you feel TRADOC influences / effects / contributes to the current Army 
materiel requirements process? 
How do you feel TRADOC should influence / effect / contribute to the future 
Army materiel requirements process? 
How do you feel your organization should influence / effect / contribute to the 
current Army materiel requirements process? 
How has the current Army materiel requirements program influenced / effected / 
contributed to your program / initiative / mission? 
How do you feel the current Army materiel requirements program has influenced 
/ effected / contributed to your program / initiative / mission? 
In your experience, do you feel the Army Materiel Requirements Process should 
undergo an evolutionary or revolutionary change?  Why? 
In your experience, what are the essential elements that need to be considered in 




B. U.S. ARMY TANK AND AUTOMATIVE COMMAND INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONS 
Rank:    Name:     Title / Position:    
In your ___________________ (duty position), what is the MOST important 
thing that must come from a MNS /  ICD?  Why? 
In your ___________________ (duty position), what is the LEAST important 
thing that comes from a MNS /  ICD?  Why? 
In your ___________________ (duty position), what is the MOST important 
thing that must come from a CDD /  ORD – Initial?  Why? 
In your ___________________ (duty position), what is the LEAST important 
thing that comes from a CDD /  ORD – Initial?  Why? 
In your ___________________ (duty position), what is the MOST important 
thing that must come from a CPD /  ORD – Revised?  Why? 
In your ___________________ (duty position), what is the LEAST important 
thing that comes from a CPD /  ORD – Revised?  Why? 
Requirements writers lack (Rank Order) 
__  Acquisition Knowledge 
__  Training 
__  Experience 
__  Other; Comment: 
Do you feel that requirements should be defined by (Rank Order):  
__  Capability 
__  Threat 
__  Identified system 
__  Other; Comment: 
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How beneficial do you feel each document is for providing requirements? (0, 
being worst – 10, being best)  __  MNS  __  ORD  __  ICD  __  CDD  __  CPD 
 What causes the “worst” document to be the worst? 
 What causes the “best” document to be the best? 
How beneficial do you feel each document is for clarity (easily read and 
understood)? (0, being worst – 10, being best)  __  MNS  __  ORD  __  ICD  __  CDD  
__  CPD 
 What causes the “worst” document to be the worst? 
 What causes the “best” document to be the best? 
How useful do you feel each document is within the RGP? (0, being worst – 10, 
being best)  __  MNS  __  ORD  __  ICD  __  CDD  __  CPD 
 What causes the “worst” document to be the worst? 
 What causes the “best” document to be the best? 
How beneficial do you feel each document is for providing needed information to 
execute the document for the appropriate phase of the acquisition lifecycle? (0, being 
worst – 10, being best)  __  MNS  __  ORD  __  ICD  __  CDD  __  CPD 
 What causes the “worst” document to be the worst? 
 What causes the “best” document to be the best? 
Rank order the documents from most useful to least useful? (1, being worst – 5, 
being best)  __  MNS  __  ORD  __  ICD  __  CDD  __  CPD 
 What causes the “worst” document to be the worst? 
 What causes the “best” document to be the best? 
How well do requirement documents allow the ability for you to perform your 
duties based on the four key functions outlined by the Army Acquisition Review Board in 
2011: 
 Realign, resource and focus its requirements and acquisition professionals 
on their raison d’être and associated core competencies, i.e., Training and 
Doctrine Command’s timely delivery of requirements; PEO and Program 
Manager delivery of products meeting the requirement on cost and on 
schedule; and Army staffs that are accountable for enabling the 
requirement to be met 
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 Involve all stakeholders collaboratively in requirements development, 
development planning and acquisition solicitation, rather than just 
critiquing others  
 Realistically assess and manage risk, and follow more tailored 
evolutionary acquisition strategies with associated reductions in steps, 
time and documentation to provide new systems  
 Improve the number, quality and accountability of the people essential to 
the acquisition of equipment and systems needed for our servicemen and 
women to be equipped, trained and ready (Army Acquisition Review 
Board, 2011, p. iv).   
 What could be changed to help meet these requirements? 
What key differences exist in the documents from the old RGS process compared 
to the new JCIDS process, and what is your understanding for why these changes 
occurred during this transition? 
 What requirement document(s) do you feel is most valuable? And why? 
 When comparing RGS documents (MNS and ORD) to JCIDS documents 
(ICD, CDD, CPD), which documents do you prefer or mixture of 
documents do you prefer? 
 What are your reasons for picking those particular documents? 
Which document(s) are the most difficult to execute for JCIDS and RGS? 
 What causes the difficulty? Organizations? Missing components within 
the documents? Unnecessary data? 
What makes requirement documents efficient and effective for the stakeholders 
who facilitate the RGP? In regards to the program office, CMBTDEV and MATDEV. 
Are CMBTDEV providing requirement documents with adequate detail and 
requirements that are clear, concise and easily understood? 
 What is good? 
 What is bad? 
 Does TRADOC provide enough oversight to CMBTDEV? 
 How effective and efficient is communication between program offices 
and CMBTDEV when working with ICDs, CDDs, and CPDs? 
Is there adequate involvement and integration between CMBTDEV and 
MATDEV when requirements are cross-walked from the CPD to the RFP? 
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 Any thoughts on how the documents could be influenced to allow for a 
smoother process 
 How effective is the process? 
What makes requirement documents inefficient and ineffective for the 
stakeholders who facilitate the RGP? 
 Do you feel any information to help the program perform its function is 
missing in the requirement documents?  If so, what is missing? 
 How difficult or easy is it to transpose the requirement documents to 
information used by industry? 
 How much interaction and follow up do CMBTDEVs provide program 
offices once writing and submitting a requirement document? 
Does future change need to be evolutionary or revolutionary change? 
 How has the continued modification and incremental changes of the RGP 
(CJCSI3170.01A thru H) affected you or your program? 
 What observations do you have of the continually changing document on 
the acquisition process? 
 Do the continual changes impact the programs in a positive or negative 
way and what impacts have you seen or experienced? 
Do you feel that JCIDS needs to undergo an evolutionary change or revolutionary 
change to support the Requirements Generation Process post GWOT? 
 Evolutionary: Maintain JCIDS, but continue refinement. 
 Revolutionary: Replace JCIDS with another Requirements Generation 
Process. 
How may future change be successfully implemented into the U.S. Army? 
 What changes would you recommend for requirement documents in 
general and or for a specific document? 
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